Tax Oversight, Security Forces, and the Relationship Between State and People
Taxation serves as the primary source of state revenue used to fund various public needs, ranging from government administration to infrastructure development. However, a significant question arises: what happens when tax compliance monitoring is no longer solely the authority of tax authorities, but involves military personnel down to the village level? This question has become increasingly relevant following the Directorate General of Taxes (DJP) issuance of Circular Letter Number SE-8/PJ/2026 regarding Guidelines for Taxpayer Compliance Monitoring.
Through this regulation, the DJP has altered its monitoring pattern by combining the use of information technology with field data collection at the village level. Shortly thereafter, it became public knowledge that the implementation involves Babinsa (village supervisory officers) and Bhabinkamtibmas (community policing officers) within the tax information network. This move has triggered opposition from the Civil Society Coalition for Security Sector Reform, which argues that involving military personnel in tax matters is inconsistent with the principles of civilian supremacy and the TNI’s mandate, and potentially threatens the confidentiality of taxpayer data.
Regardless of the government’s justification that the involvement of Babinsa and Bhabinkamtibmas is limited to building information networks, this policy raises questions regarding the direction of the relationship between the state and its people. Normatively, the TNI and Polri are not tax collectors or enforcers. However, the involvement of security forces in tax administration indicates a tendency towards an increasingly repressive approach. Compliance, which should be built through trust, education, and good public service, potentially shifts towards an approach rooted in fear. Such a phenomenon is difficult to separate from the practice of militarism, which expands the role of security forces into the civilian sphere.
This condition does not exist in a vacuum. Under a capitalist system, taxes are a primary source of state revenue to fund various budgetary needs. As revenue targets continue to rise, the state is driven to find various ways to expand the tax base and increase public compliance. Consequently, the people are positioned as objects of state revenue whose contributions must be continuously optimised through various monitoring instruments.
On the other hand, the government also provides various fiscal incentives and investment ease for certain business actors to encourage economic growth. Meanwhile, the optimisation of tax revenue from the public continues to be strengthened through various monitoring instruments. This contrast has drawn criticism that the fiscal burden is primarily directed at the people, while the business world receives various tax facilities.
This discrepancy is rooted in the paradigm of the relationship between the state and the people. In a capitalist democratic system, the relationship resembles a social contract that places the state as the administrator of government based on the agreement of its citizens. Consequently, taxes are viewed as a primary obligation of citizens to fund the state’s operations. The greater the budgetary needs, the greater the state’s drive to optimise tax revenue through various monitoring instruments.
In contrast, Islam views the relationship between the ruler and the people as a leadership contract (bai’at) based on Sharia. Bai’at is not merely the handover of power, but a contract to implement Allah’s law and manage all the people’s affairs. The Prophet ﷺ said, “The Imam (caliph) is a shepherd (raa’in) and he is responsible for the people under his care.” (HR. al-Bukhari and Muslim). Therefore, the orientation of the state is not to maximise revenue from the people, but to fulfil the mandate of management by ensuring the people’s needs are met according to Sharia provisions.
This paradigm is closely related to the concept of ownership in Islam. Sharia divides ownership into individual ownership, public ownership, and state ownership. Natural resources that are essential to the lives of many, such as mines with large reserves, oil, gas, forests, seas, and water resources, are part of public ownership and must not be handed over to individuals or corporations for private control. The state is tasked with managing them on behalf of the Ummah, while the proceeds are returned for the public good through the Baitulmal. The Prophet ﷺ said, “Muslims are partners in three things: water, pasture, and fire.” (HR. Abu Dawud and Ibnu Majah).
Through the management of these public resources, state revenue relies on sources established by Sharia, ensuring that taxation does not become the backbone of state financing. In addition to the management of public ownership, the Baitulmal also receives revenue from kharaj, fai, ganimah, jizyah, usyur, and various other Sharia-compliant sources. As for dharibah (tax), it is only collected temporarily when the Baitulmal treasury is empty while there are urgent mandatory needs and no other available funding sources, as explained by Sheikh Abdul Qadim Zallum in Al-Amwal fi Daulah al-Khilafah.
Thus, Islam offers a solution that does not stop at changing the mechanism of tax collection, but changes the paradigm of state management entirely. The state does not depend on the optimisation of levies from the people, but rather on the optimisation of the management of natural resources as public property for the greatest benefit of society. In such a system, the state truly exists as a raa’in (shepherd) managing the people’s affairs, rather than merely being a collector of state revenue.