Tapping the Tappers: Regulating and Overseeing Surveillance Technology in Indonesia
Brigadier General Suhermanto, director of cybercrime at the National Police’s Criminal Investigation Department (Bareskrim), announced that Inspector General Slamet Uliandi had been named the fourth suspect in an alleged illegal wiretapping case. The other three suspects — former National Police chief Listyo Sigit Prabowo, Ahrie Sonta Nasution and Eko Hadi Santoso — have been detained at the Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob) headquarters.
According to investigators’ statements reported by several national media outlets, the alleged targets of the wiretapping, which was carried out without following procedures, included the telephone numbers of President Prabowo Subianto, state officials, political figures, media outlets, civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations and businesspeople in 2025–26. In October 2026, investigators also disclosed the alleged deletion of intercepted files from the Lawful Interception Management System (LIMS). The reported charges include Articles 258 and 332 of the Criminal Code and Article 32(1) of the Electronic Information and Transactions Law.
It should be emphasised that these remain allegations that have not been tested in court. Nevertheless, the case has raised a question that cannot be overlooked: how can the state control a tool that inherently gives its operator the power to see almost everything without being seen?
The answer, unfortunately, remains scattered across the law. Antara has noted that wiretapping rules are spread across 16 laws. In Constitutional Court Decision No. 5/PUU-VIII/2010, the court affirmed that restrictions on privacy rights through wiretapping must be stipulated by law, not by government regulation. Yet a dedicated law governing wiretapping has still not been enacted.
As a result, the rules governing wiretapping vary. The National Police refer to Police Regulation No. 5 of 2010, under which authorisation is granted by the head of a district court through the chief of Bareskrim. The Narcotics Law limits wiretapping to a maximum of three months, with one possible extension, while the law on terrorism permits it for up to a year. Law No. 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence gives the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) authority to conduct wiretapping for six months; court approval is required only once there is sufficient preliminary evidence against the target.
Meanwhile, on 18 November 2025, Habiburokhman, head of the House of Representatives’ Commission III, said the new Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) did not regulate wiretapping and described Article 136(2) as the basis for drafting a separate law. This legal vacuum is a double-edged sword: law enforcement agencies operate in a grey area, while citizens have no clear standard for judging when their privacy has been violated.
Another aspect of oversight can be seen at the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Following the Constitutional Court’s decision on a judicial review of the KPK Law in May 2021, the KPK no longer needs permission from its Supervisory Board, but must instead notify it. Supervisory Board member Benny Mamoto reported that the KPK carried out 762 wiretaps in the first half of 2026. All of them — 100 per cent — were reported on time, no later than 14 working days after the action. This figure is worth noting, but so too is what it does not measure.
Timely reporting measures administrative compliance, not substantive justification. Oversight after a wiretap has taken place does not establish whether the action was necessary and proportionate. The Supervisory Board also recorded delays in reporting other actions: only 152 of 232 searches and 893 of 1,093 seizures were reported on time. If reporting remains imperfect even at the institution subject to the closest scrutiny, what of agencies with looser oversight?
The technological dimension makes the issue more complex. An Amnesty International report published on 1 May 2024 traced the flow of spyware and surveillance products from Israel, Greece, Singapore and Malaysia to Indonesia between 2017 and 2023. The report recorded shipments of equipment to the National Police through intermediary companies worth about US$5.59 million on 9 September 2019 and US$11.06 million on 15 July 2021.
The National Police declined to comment, while the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN) did not respond before the report was published. Amnesty found no evidence that specific individuals from civil society had been targeted. The issue, therefore, is not proven abuse but the near absence of transparency in procurement. The alleged deletion of files from LIMS points to a similar operational risk: even a lawful interception system can be abused if the people operating it can erase the record of its use.
At this point, safeguards need to be designed in layers. The ISW Strategic Report 2.4.2 (2026), an open-source study that explicitly describes its findings as recommendations rather than the results of an operational audit, proposes a five-layer model: a legal framework and democratic accountability; independent authorisation for each case; technical limits through separation of duties; data protection with tamper-resistant logs; and independent audits accompanied by mechanisms to remedy rights violations.
The key is to prohibit the concentration of authority. The party proposing a target must not also be the sole party authorising and carrying out the wiretap, auditing it and having the power to erase the operational record.
For systems such as LIMS, the study proposes cross-checking legal authorisations against the target database and active configurations. Any deletion of intercepted material should also require authorisation and leave an audit trail. Procurement governance — from identifying suppliers’ beneficial owners to including audit rights in contracts — is equally important. This should be accompanied by consideration of a moratorium on the use of invasive spyware until legal assessments and independent oversight are in place.
The study also states that it has not concluded that any particular vendor was involved in this case. It should therefore be read as a preventive framework, not a verdict. Aribowo’s 2025 study of the relationship between intelligence agencies and political parties is a useful starting point because it treats control of information as a factor inseparable from political competition. Without these layers of safeguards, a new law would merely become a more orderly instrument for granting permission.
The legislative opportunity is now open. The House of Representatives’ Legislation Body (Baleg) added the Wiretapping Bill to the 2026 Priority National Legislation Programme on 27 November 2025. Meanwhile, on 5 November 2026, Habiburokhman said discussions would begin around December, after the Asset Confiscation Bill was completed. He described the case as Indonesia’s Watergate and stressed that protection must apply to all citizens, not only the president.
That statement deserves serious attention. The real test is not how quickly the bill is debated, but whether its final wording can constrain everyone, including the law enforcement officials now advocating for it. A law born of momentary anger risks repeating old flaws. By contrast, legislation shaped with public participation could close the gaps that have left wiretapping caught between the needs of law enforcement and a threat to democracy.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/tapping-the-tappers-regulating-and-overseeing-surveillance-technology-in-indonesia-1794282737)
Originally published by detikcom (https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-8746088/menyadap-penyadap-pengendalian-pengawasan-teknologi-penyadapan-di-ri), translated from Indonesian