TaniHub Case a Wake-Up Call: Time to Audit All SOE and Danantara Startup Investments
Over the past decade, startups have become a symbol of optimism for Indonesia’s digital economy. Unicorns emerged, investment flowed abundantly, and the term digital transformation became a mantra seemingly promising a bright future. Not only private investors and foreign capital flocked in; state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also established various venture capital firms to invest in startups. The noble aim was to support national innovation and ensure Indonesia did not merely become a market for foreign technology. However, the case of BRI Ventures’ investment in TaniHub, which has now led to legal proceedings, serves as a reminder that startup investments do not always end sweetly. This case should not be viewed in isolation. It is precisely the momentum to conduct a thorough audit and evaluation of all startup investments ever made by SOEs, as well as those to be undertaken by Danantara in the future. Ultimately, the funds managed by SOEs and Danantara are tied to the public interest.
The spotlight is currently on TaniHub, but the larger question is: what about the other investments? Over the years, various SOEs, through subsidiaries and venture capital firms, have injected funds into numerous startups, from early-stage companies to those that have achieved unicorn status. Some investments have succeeded, while others have suffered valuation declines. Therefore, the evaluation must not stop at TaniHub. All investment portfolios need to be opened and examined. How much has been invested? What was the basis for the investment decisions? What is the current condition of these investments? Are they generating profits, breaking even, or incurring losses? The public has a right to know. An audit does not mean fault-finding; it is necessary to ensure that investment governance has been carried out professionally and accountably.
The evaluation must also not only target failed startups. Large startups that have received investment from SOEs, including companies that have become unicorns or publicly listed entities like Gojek and GoTo, also need to be evaluated openly. Not because of any assumption of wrongdoing, but because transparency is part of good governance. If these investments yielded profits, the public needs to know. Conversely, if there has been a decline in investment value, this must also be disclosed openly. Good investment is not measured by the popularity of a company’s name, but by the value generated.
It is crucial to distinguish between business failure and criminal acts. Startup investment inherently carries high risk; even in Silicon Valley, not all investments succeed. Therefore, losses resulting from market shifts or business model failures cannot automatically be categorised as criminal offences. However, if manipulation, conflicts of interest, abuse of authority, or legal violations are found, the legal process must proceed without compromise. The principle is simple: wrongdoing must be prosecuted, but pure business risk must not be criminalised.
This case also recalls the Merah Putih Fund, which was initiated several years ago as an investment vehicle to support national startups. At the time, expectations were high. Indonesia wanted to possess domestic capital strength capable of supporting the birth of national technology companies without excessive reliance on foreign capital. Yet, to this day, the Merah Putih Fund’s resonance is barely heard. Few success stories have emerged from the initiative. No major new startups have appeared that are identifiably linked to its support. For some industry players, the Merah Putih Fund’s existence has been more of a concept than a real force on the ground. This is a lesson that merely forming an investment fund is insufficient. What matters more is how the fund is managed, who makes the decisions, and how robust the applied governance is.
Indonesia now has Danantara, which manages very large assets and is projected to become a national strategic investment vehicle. In the future, it is highly likely that Danantara will also enter the technology, AI, data centre, semiconductor, and startup sectors. Therefore, lessons from the past must be taken seriously. Danantara must not fall into the trap of valuation euphoria or fleeting trends. Investments must be made based on strong business fundamentals, in-depth analysis, and strict oversight. The spirit of supporting the digital economy must not lead to investment decisions that fail to deliver added value.
Indonesia still needs startups. The TaniHub case must not make Indonesia afraid to invest in startups. On the contrary, Indonesia needs more new technology companies, especially in AI, cybersecurity, healthtech, agritech, deep tech, and other strategic industries. But the era of burning cash is over. Now is the time to enter an era of more rational, disciplined, and responsible investment. Because ultimately, the goal of state investment is not merely to chase unicorn status, but to create healthy, sustainable companies that provide tangible benefits to the national economy. That is why the TaniHub case should not remain just a legal matter. It must become a momentum for reforming national startup investment governance. Amidst the global AI and digital economy race, Indonesia needs more than just capital; it needs smart investment.