Systemic Absolutism: A Juridical Examination of Gig Work Relations

The development of the gig economy in Indonesia has given rise to a concerning deviation, particularly in the online transport (ojek online or ojol) sector. While in the early phase of digital transformation, platform operators held full control in setting standard tariffs based on distance and time, recent innovations have introduced a direct price-bidding system. In this system, the platform operator delegates authority to consumers to determine the payment for the transport services they require. This phenomenon represents a business model engineering that radically reduces the value of human labour into a commodity subject to the laws of market supply and demand. This bidding-based business model systematically releases the platform company from its normative responsibilities, while simultaneously shifting all operational risks and price burdens onto the shoulders of the drivers. When price control is handed over to consumers, who naturally act rationally to seek the cheapest price, a race to the bottom phenomenon occurs. Drivers, the majority of whom rely on this work as their primary source of income, are forced to compete with fellow drivers. They are compelled to accept highly irrational payments, which often do not even cover the operational costs of fuel and vehicle depreciation, just to maintain their order completion rate within the application system. This practice creates an illusion of economic freedom, where drivers seemingly have the right to refuse orders, but in reality, they are held hostage by an algorithm that will punish them with order restrictions if they too often ignore offers from consumers. The complexity of this problem demands a comprehensive discussion, not just from a single legal perspective, but through a multidisciplinary legal approach. Labour law, civil law, constitutional law, administrative law, competition law, and the sociology of law must be integrated to uncover the exploitation behind the guise of partnership. The absence of state intervention to curb the rampant contractual freedom between consumers and drivers has resulted in a regulatory vacuum. The root of the platform operator’s abdication of responsibility in the bidding system rests on the unilateral claim that drivers are partners (independent contractors) and not employees. However, under Indonesian labour law, this claim constitutes a massive form of legal circumvention. Article 1 point 15 of Law Number 13 of 2003 concerning Manpower, as amended in the Job Creation Law, defines a work relationship as one possessing four elements: a subject, work, command, and wages. Although in the bidding system the consumer nominally determines the payment amount, the platform operator remains the party that extracts economic value through a mandatory commission deduction from each transaction. This proves that the platform operator continues to act like an employer profiting from the surplus value of its drivers’ labour. The element of command in the context of a conventional work relationship has now transformed into algorithmic subordination. Bidding-based ojol drivers do not have the freedom of independent entrepreneurs; they are bound by the application’s code of conduct, cannot negotiate the platform operator’s commission deduction, are prohibited from transacting outside the system, and are constantly under the threat of unilateral termination sanctions (suspension or partner termination) executed by a machine. When a consumer enters a very low price, the algorithm distributes the offer within a very short duration, forcing drivers to make reflexive decisions under pressure. This system control negates the argument that drivers have autonomy. The partnership status is merely a legal fiction designed by technology corporations solely to evade obligations regarding sectoral minimum wage payments, working hour limits, severance pay, and employment social security, which are the fundamental rights of every worker. This condition is exacerbated by the absence of regulations defining protections for platform workers in Indonesia. National labour law remains trapped in a rigid polarity between formal workers subject to labour law and independent partners subject to civil law. This rigidity causes the state to fail in responding to the vulnerability of ojol drivers. Considering that drivers de facto lack the bargaining power to refuse the bidding system unilaterally imposed by the platform operator, the doctrine of progressive labour law demands an expansion of the interpretation of the work relationship itself. Courts and lawmakers must respond.