Supersemar was meant to lead the country to democracy

Supersemar was meant to lead the country to democracy

By Benget Simbolon

JAKARTA (JP): "It's amazing to see that within three years we
managed to stabilize our economy. Look at Russia, which is still
in a mess after the 1989 revolution," said Frans Seda, who held
several ministerial positions both in Old and New Order
governments in an interview with The Jakarta Post.

This success, he said, was due to the then government's
practice of transparency and meaningful communication with the
various groups, even with students.

Supersemar was a way to secure the basic idea of New Order:
Back to democracy. People were interested in the New Order
because of its commitment to restoring democracy by opposing
President Sukarno with his guided democracy, which was actually
not democracy in the real sense.

The process of creating the New Order was started in 1960,
when the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) was trying to establish a
political infrastructure.

But according to Seda, the reality is that the New Order
succeeded in exterminating the Communist Party (PKI), but thirty
years on has yet to develop democracy.

The following are excerpts from the interview with Frans Seda
on the occasion of the commemoration of the March 11, 1966,
Executive Order which was given by President Sukarno to General
Soeharto to restore order in the aftermath of the attempted
communist coup of Sept. 30, 1965.

On the background of the New Order: Actually, the basic idea
behind the New Order was democracy. We were interested in and
supported the New Order because of its strong commitment to
restoring democracy by opposing the leadership of President
Sukarno.

The September 1965 coup by the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI) was only the momentum used by the pro-democracy exponents.

Foreign countries were surprised to see how the charismatic
and very influential Sukarno could have been overthrown by the
Indonesian people. Even President Sukarno himself was surprised
by his fall.

There was not only the matter of fighting the communists. No.
It was also the reflection of the people's wish to rid itself of
Sukarno's system of guided democracy.

At that time, with the support of the Indonesian Armed Forces
(ABRI), the people established the Democracy League. But then
President Sukarno asked its founder to disband the organization.
As ABRI did not want to get involved in an open conflict with
Sukarno, it just allowed the organization to be dissolved.

On the preparation of New Order supporters: The process of
creating a New Order was actually started in 1960 by ABRI. At
that time, ABRI established a political infrastructure. To deal
with political matters, it set up what was then called Koti
(highest operation command) whose members included all ministers.
To deal with economic matters it set up what was called Kotoe
(highest economy command). To drum up support from the general
public, it set up what was called BKS (cooperation board).

The three organizations managed to keep PKI's movements in
check. Within the government, it was controlled by Koti and Kotoe
and within the general public it was controlled by BKS.

Helped by the political infrastructure, ABRI was ready to face
the PKI when the latter tried to gain control of Indonesian
politics.

To consolidate its position, ABRI organized a meeting in East
Java, where the late General Achmad Yani told officers that ABRI
was anti-communist.

On PKI's counter movement: The ABRI's movement prompted the
PKI to propose to President Sukarno that Indonesia, which had
already four branches of the Armed Forces--Army, Navy, Air Force
and Police--form a fifth force (peasants and workers). But
President Sukarno refused to countenance such a notion.

On why ABRI had support: We supported ABRI because we saw that
ABRI has always been independent in terms of politics. There are
two sides to ABRI. One ABRI that is independent in politics and
another that is a tool of the state.

Now, as ABRI serves as the state tool and is independent
politically, we do see a double function of the Indonesian Armed
Forces. It leaves political matters to the Functional Group
(Golkar) and it is no longer independent in politics. It has
became a government tool rather than a state tool. It is no
longer able to distance itself from the government the way it did
in Sukarno's day.

On the main actors creating the New Order: The political
actors who came forward after the September 1965 coup seemed to
be the heroes. But actually they were nothing of the sort. They
only followed a political design that had been stenciled out
earlier, as I have mentioned before. The New Order was based on
an existing political blueprint and the bravery of the Indonesian
Armed Forces.

But to mention one man. I think Ali Moertopo was one of the
most outstanding figures in the birth of the New Order. He
effectively used Koti, Kotoe and BKS to counter every move of the
PKI.

When ABRI got involved in the conflict with Sukarno, Ali
Moertopo came up with an idea to launch Opsus (special
operation). As he needed financial back-up for such an operation,
I installed him as a plantation representative in Bangkok,
Thailand.

On the September attempted coup: In 1964, PKI was known to
make a five year plan to fight against the government. It was
reportedly Adam Malik who first got hold of this information.
This led to his move from being minister of trade to being
minister of economic democracy.

In 1965, the signs pointing toward the imminent coup were
beginning to be detected, among other things in Soebandrio's
speech: "Our motherland is already in an advanced stage of
pregnancy. This year is a decisive year. Friends could become
enemies and enemies could become friends."

On Sept. 27, 1965, Soebandrio as the then prime minister made
a visit to Sumatra. He brought with him 15 ministers, including
me (as minister for plantations).

First we visited Lampung, then Bengkulu and Padang, West
Sumatra. In every province, he made a speech in front of mass
gatherings arranged by the Communist Party and then held a
meeting with regional government officials.

On Sept. 30, we were in Medan. He canceled a general public
meeting. We were scheduled to proceed to Aceh on Oct. 1 but a
news story from Jakarta abruptly changed our itinerary. The news
story told of an attempt to kill General A.H. Nasution in Jakarta
on Sept. 30 but failed.

At that time, Soebandrio came to tell us: "ABRI and PKI have
long been quarreling. Before we left, I had already told
President Sukarno about this. So let's just wait and see who
comes up as the winner."

So Soebandrio's journey to Medan was actually set to
anticipate the success of the coup in Jakarta. If the Jakarta
coup had been successful, the second coup would have been in
Medan, which was at that time economically a very important city
outside Java.

On the birth of Supersemar: After the Communist coup, we were
trying to separate the issue of Bung Karno from the issue of PKI.
Many people still supported President Sukarno.

On Nov. 9, political parties held a general meeting and
invited Bung Karno to make his first speech after the coup. But
the president refused to attend. We reckoned that Sukarno was
still needed by the people. General Soeharto himself once
recounted one of his conversations with Sukarno to me in which he
says he said: "I'll return this baton to you if you condemn the
Communist Party." But he reportedly refused.

The political parties' meeting came up with 22 resolutions,
including a demand for the dissolution of the incumbent cabinet.

The New Order at that time was on the rise. But things turned
out differently in December 1966. Our economy saw the worst
condition. The government had to make a drastic currency reform,
slashing the currency's nominal value by a thousand, from Rp
1,000 to Rp 1.

Sukarno's supporters set up Barisan Sukarno (Sukarno's Guard)
which was immediately countered by an anti-Sukarno movement. The
two opposing groups were often engaged in conflict. Many
political demonstrations turned into riots. These developments
obviously threatened the idea of New Order. We thought if we did
not take immediate steps to secure the New Order process, the
idea might die away.

I suspected that those conflicts were engineered by Sukarno's
opponents to create a situation that would play into their hands.

On March 10, a group of anti-Sukarnoites that was supported by
ABRI intimidated a cabinet meeting. President Sukarno left the
meeting and fled Jakarta aboard a helicopter to his palace in
Bogor.

General Soeharto and me were absent from the meeting as we had
previously been phoned by Ali Moertopo and told not to attend.

Acknowledging the worsening situation, Sukarno then acceded to
Soeharto's demand that Sukarno give him the authority to restore
order and stability and to maintain security. The authority was
stipulated in a letter, which is known as Supersemar or the
Letter of March 11.

Vested with this authority, General Soeharto acted immediately
to dissolve the Indonesian Communist Party.

But for me, Supersemar was not only aimed at overthrowing the
Communist Party. It was also aimed at establishing a new
structure -- the New Order -- which I thought was against
Sukarno's will.

Here I saw the role of ABRI. General Soeharto just followed
the tradition of ABRI: politically self reliant.

On who drafted the Supersemar: There were many individuals
involved in the political process that led to the creation of
Supersemar. That was a historical process. Before the signing of
Supersemar by Sukarno, tough negotiations were proceeding between
Leimena, Soebandrio and Chaerul Saleh. I noticed that Leimena
helped a lot in formulating the Supersemar.

But I thought there would have been a written concept prepared
before the negotiations and I suspect that Ali Moertopo was the
person who made the concept. He was one of the most outstanding
figures in designing the Supersemar. If there were any people who
said that the credit should go to General M. Jusuf and the other
two generals because it was them who came to Bogor to negotiate
directly with Sukarno, I would say that they were only used in a
scenario set by others.

Ali Moertopo should be credited for the Supersemar. For me he
was an outstanding person. That's why I once protested to
President Soeharto who belittled Ali's role in one of his books.
I said: "Look, this man is the architect of the New Order. He did
many good things to help the creation of the New Order long
before the signing of the Supersemar. This man helped you in your
efforts to gain the trust of the people."

On the aftermath of Supersemar: The first program of New Order
was economy as the New Order could gain a political legitimacy
only if it came up with economic policies. It was General
Soeharto who made a decision on this. He employed two personal
assistants (Aspri): Ali Moertopo who dealt with political matters
and Widjojo Nitisastro who dealt with economic matters.

Widjojo later expanded his influence in economy. Economic
programs during the first decade of New Order were strongly
marked by his views and those of other economists closest to him.
Later their views were crystallized in a group called Berkeley
Group as its members were mostly graduates from Berkeley
University. Among the members were Prof. Mohammad Sadli, Ali
Wardhana, Subroto who all later became ministers dealing with
economic matters.

Soeharto himself gained an increasingly stronger position on
the political stage. After Supersemar he changed the cabinet. And
Sukarno's political influence soon faded away.

There were no government regulations which were not subject to
the approval of the House of Representatives.

So the Supersemar actually was a way to secure the basic idea
of the New Order: back to democracy. But the reality is that the
New Order had succeeded in exterminating the Communist Party but
has yet to develop democracy.