Strengthening ASEAN as a security community

Strengthening ASEAN as a security community

Amitav Acharya, Deputy Director, Institute of Defense
and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore

Unlike Europe, Southeast Asia does not aspire to be what
Robert Kagan in his best-selling book Of Paradise and Power,
would call a "Kantian paradise". Southeast Asians have not
forsaken military power in dealing with domestic and external
threats, although they have avoided resort to force to settle
intra-ASEAN conflicts. Strategic competition on matters of
national interest has not been abandoned. Yet, Southeast Asia is
also a far cry from a Hobbesian world of anarchy ruled by fear
and power.

The main reason why Southeast Asia is not a Hobbesian world or
a "Balkans of the Orient" it could have easily become is the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). To be sure, other
factors have helped. Some would say the benign hegemony of the
United States is the key factor. But hegemony can be divisive as
well as stabilizing. Southeast Asia would have been worse off for
its security without two major contributions by ASEAN since its
establishment in 1967.

ASEAN's first contribution is moderating inter-state tensions
in Southeast Asia, especially between Indonesia and its
neighbors, Singapore and Malaysia. Indonesia's role was vital in
this process. As the region's largest nation, its decision to
accept restraint in dealing with its neighbors for the sake of
their common security and development is a remarkable achievement
not found in other parts of the world with a comparable disparity
in size and relative power. The stability in inter-state
relations offered by ASEAN helped its members to overcome
internal challenges such as the communist insurgency and focus on
economic development through foreign investment.

ASEAN's second contribution has been to provide a political
and psychological cushion to shield the non-communist Southeast
Asian countries in the wake of the British withdrawal from East
of Suez and American withdrawal from Indochina. This
contribution, not so easily remembered today, but becomes
apparent if we take a look back at the late 1960s and the 1970s.

Instead of weathering under pressure, ASEAN became the
developing world's closest approximation to a security community.
A security community is defined as a group of states which have
developed a long-term habit of managing their disputes without
resort to violence.

Three main forces contribute to a security community:

First, common threats and common vulnerabilities can be an
initial trigger, although these are not sufficient conditions.

Second, economic and functional interdependence produce a
spill-over effect in creating peaceful relationships.

Third, states can create and consolidate security communities
through deliberate effort at building multilateral institutions.
Multilateral institutions spread common values and contribute to
a common sense of identity, help to develop habits of cooperation
and provide mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes.

In the 1970s, these three factors combined to help ASEAN make
its journey towards a security community. This quest was helped
by the threat of communist insurgency, by emphasizing economic
and cultural cooperation, and by developing a habit of conflict
avoidance through socialization and identity-building.

For a long time, this effort turned out to be quite
successful. But the political climate for regional cooperation in
Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific has changed considerably even
since the late 1990s.

Three main problems combined to undermine ASEAN's stock in
world affairs:

First, membership expansion increased ASEAN's complexity and
diversity, underscoring intar-regional economic disparities,
created expectations among new members which could not be filled,
and strained ASEAN's relations with the West over Myanmar's
membership despite its lack of political reform and
liberalization.

Second, ASEAN was confronted with a regional currency crisis.
The problem was not whether ASEAN could have prevented the
crisis. It was that ASEAN seemed to be a house divided in
fighting a common danger which undermined ASEAN's credibility.

Third, ASEAN saw a debate over non-interference. While
consensus was preserved in the end, it created the perception of
an organization unwilling to change. Hence, doubts about its
capacity to deal with non-traditional threats: Environment,
terrorism and now disease.

Today, ASEAN is confronted with new challenges. In the past
two years, first terrorism and then the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) have emerged as the new transnational security
threats which have undermined confidence in the stability of
Southeast Asia. A terrorist attack like Bali in October 2002 or
the outbreak of SARS are in some ways more devastating than a
conventional military attack on ASEAN members.

Second, the relative power of the U.S. has never been more
pronounced. American hegemony today is a double-edged sword for
ASEAN. Balance of power thinking sees it as a stabilizing force,
offering reassurance against a rising China and keeping peace in
the Korean Peninsula. But dependence on American power also
raises questions about ASEAN's own autonomy and relevance.

ASEAN's intra-mural quarrels are a huge distraction. A
stricter definition of a security community would preclude
mutually threatening arms races, moving to a stage when fortified
borders are no longer necessary.

ASEAN is in some danger of being divided by the divergent
responses of its members to American ascendancy. America's
resources and leadership are vital for ASEAN if it is to succeed
in its war on terror.

In dealing with the U.S., China, India, and other major
powers, it is important to bear in mind that ASEAN's assets are
not just or even mainly physical, such as its markets and
resources, but also ideational. Its unity and credibility is its
most vital asset, which is not to be squandered for selfish
national considerations.

ASEAN does not need to abandon all its principles and
practices to stay relevant. But it must adapt its non-
interference doctrine to the changing realities. ASEAN should not
shy away from engaging Myanmar in ways that results in an
improved political climate, which in turn will enhance ASEAN's
international credibility and reputation.

First, an ASEAN security community should not be inward-
looking. It should seek the constructive involvement of outside
actors and channels their resources for the benefit of the
region. ASEAN works best by pooling sovereignty, rather than
diluting it.

Second, urgent measures are needed to promote the
institutional development of ASEAN. ASEAN has created a Troika,
but it remains unused.

Third, ASEAN needs to take firm charge of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) process. The ARF needs new institutional mechanisms
as well, including a secretariat. The ARF's approach has been
method-driven, emphasizing process over the product. It needs to
become more problem-driven approach, addressing concrete common
challenges such as terrorism and proliferation.

Fourth, ASEAN needs to develop new responses to terrorism and
disease. Combating terrorism could be helped by creating a
regional conduct on terrorism.

While its remarkable openness to outside ideas and influences
is remarkable, ASEAN is a project conceived for Southeast Asians
by Southeast Asians themselves.

If this identity is allowed to wither away through neglect or
lack of political will, ASEAN's states and societies will be
confronted with the Hobbesian nightmare where the strong get what
they want and the weak suffer what they must.