Strengthening ASEAN as a security community

Strengthening ASEAN as a security community

Amitav Acharya, Deputy Director, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Unlike Europe, Southeast Asia does not aspire to be what Robert Kagan in his best-selling book Of Paradise and Power, would call a "Kantian paradise". Southeast Asians have not forsaken military power in dealing with domestic and external threats, although they have avoided resort to force to settle intra-ASEAN conflicts. Strategic competition on matters of national interest has not been abandoned. Yet, Southeast Asia is also a far cry from a Hobbesian world of anarchy ruled by fear and power.

The main reason why Southeast Asia is not a Hobbesian world or a "Balkans of the Orient" it could have easily become is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). To be sure, other factors have helped. Some would say the benign hegemony of the United States is the key factor. But hegemony can be divisive as well as stabilizing. Southeast Asia would have been worse off for its security without two major contributions by ASEAN since its establishment in 1967.

ASEAN's first contribution is moderating inter-state tensions in Southeast Asia, especially between Indonesia and its neighbors, Singapore and Malaysia. Indonesia's role was vital in this process. As the region's largest nation, its decision to accept restraint in dealing with its neighbors for the sake of their common security and development is a remarkable achievement not found in other parts of the world with a comparable disparity in size and relative power. The stability in inter-state relations offered by ASEAN helped its members to overcome internal challenges such as the communist insurgency and focus on economic development through foreign investment.

ASEAN's second contribution has been to provide a political and psychological cushion to shield the non-communist Southeast Asian countries in the wake of the British withdrawal from East of Suez and American withdrawal from Indochina. This contribution, not so easily remembered today, but becomes apparent if we take a look back at the late 1960s and the 1970s.

Instead of weathering under pressure, ASEAN became the developing world's closest approximation to a security community. A security community is defined as a group of states which have developed a long-term habit of managing their disputes without resort to violence.

Three main forces contribute to a security community:

First, common threats and common vulnerabilities can be an initial trigger, although these are not sufficient conditions.

Second, economic and functional interdependence produce a spill-over effect in creating peaceful relationships.

Third, states can create and consolidate security communities through deliberate effort at building multilateral institutions. Multilateral institutions spread common values and contribute to a common sense of identity, help to develop habits of cooperation and provide mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes.

In the 1970s, these three factors combined to help ASEAN make its journey towards a security community. This quest was helped by the threat of communist insurgency, by emphasizing economic and cultural cooperation, and by developing a habit of conflict avoidance through socialization and identity-building.

For a long time, this effort turned out to be quite successful. But the political climate for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific has changed considerably even since the late 1990s.

Three main problems combined to undermine ASEAN's stock in world affairs:

First, membership expansion increased ASEAN's complexity and diversity, underscoring intar-regional economic disparities, created expectations among new members which could not be filled, and strained ASEAN's relations with the West over Myanmar's membership despite its lack of political reform and liberalization.

Second, ASEAN was confronted with a regional currency crisis. The problem was not whether ASEAN could have prevented the crisis. It was that ASEAN seemed to be a house divided in fighting a common danger which undermined ASEAN's credibility.

Third, ASEAN saw a debate over non-interference. While consensus was preserved in the end, it created the perception of an organization unwilling to change. Hence, doubts about its capacity to deal with non-traditional threats: Environment, terrorism and now disease.

Today, ASEAN is confronted with new challenges. In the past two years, first terrorism and then the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) have emerged as the new transnational security threats which have undermined confidence in the stability of Southeast Asia. A terrorist attack like Bali in October 2002 or the outbreak of SARS are in some ways more devastating than a conventional military attack on ASEAN members.

Second, the relative power of the U.S. has never been more pronounced. American hegemony today is a double-edged sword for ASEAN. Balance of power thinking sees it as a stabilizing force, offering reassurance against a rising China and keeping peace in the Korean Peninsula. But dependence on American power also raises questions about ASEAN's own autonomy and relevance.

ASEAN's intra-mural quarrels are a huge distraction. A stricter definition of a security community would preclude mutually threatening arms races, moving to a stage when fortified borders are no longer necessary.

ASEAN is in some danger of being divided by the divergent responses of its members to American ascendancy. America's resources and leadership are vital for ASEAN if it is to succeed in its war on terror.

In dealing with the U.S., China, India, and other major powers, it is important to bear in mind that ASEAN's assets are not just or even mainly physical, such as its markets and resources, but also ideational. Its unity and credibility is its most vital asset, which is not to be squandered for selfish national considerations.

ASEAN does not need to abandon all its principles and practices to stay relevant. But it must adapt its non- interference doctrine to the changing realities. ASEAN should not shy away from engaging Myanmar in ways that results in an improved political climate, which in turn will enhance ASEAN's international credibility and reputation.

First, an ASEAN security community should not be inward- looking. It should seek the constructive involvement of outside actors and channels their resources for the benefit of the region. ASEAN works best by pooling sovereignty, rather than diluting it.

Second, urgent measures are needed to promote the institutional development of ASEAN. ASEAN has created a Troika, but it remains unused.

Third, ASEAN needs to take firm charge of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) process. The ARF needs new institutional mechanisms as well, including a secretariat. The ARF's approach has been method-driven, emphasizing process over the product. It needs to become more problem-driven approach, addressing concrete common challenges such as terrorism and proliferation.

Fourth, ASEAN needs to develop new responses to terrorism and disease. Combating terrorism could be helped by creating a regional conduct on terrorism.

While its remarkable openness to outside ideas and influences is remarkable, ASEAN is a project conceived for Southeast Asians by Southeast Asians themselves.

If this identity is allowed to wither away through neglect or lack of political will, ASEAN's states and societies will be confronted with the Hobbesian nightmare where the strong get what they want and the weak suffer what they must.