Indonesian Political, Business & Finance News

State Capture and the Future of Economic Sovereignty

| Source: CNBC Indonesia Translated from Indonesian | Economy
State Capture and the Future of Economic Sovereignty
Image: CNBC Indonesia

Indonesia is not currently trapped in state capture. This statement is not an apologetic stance, but rather an analytical position that must continue to be empirically tested moving forward and is not a conclusion that can be considered definitively proven.

Referring to the study by Joel Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann (2000) on 22 post-communist transition countries, state capture is defined as a systematic effort by business actors to influence the formation of legal products and regulations through ‘dark transactions’ with public officials.

This phenomenon is fundamentally different from conventional administrative corruption, which is limited to manipulating the implementation or enforcement of existing rules. In several former Soviet Union countries, this transactional law-making practice gave rise to a ‘capture economy’. In such an order, the rules of the game are traded, causing economic rents to concentrate within a small group of oligarchs, while the social costs are borne by the entire economy.

Indonesia’s current position provides a proper foundation to strengthen institutions so as not to slide into state capture. Therefore, reform should be understood not as a linear agenda that reaches a stopping point, but as an adaptive process that is ongoing and requires refinement. In this context, complexity economics offers an adaptive framework to monitor the nation’s political economy journey in a measurable manner.

Orthodox political economy often imagines reform as a linear process: starting with liberalisation, privatisation, and leading to law enforcement, which is assumed to automatically generate growth. Conversely, complexity economics teaches that the economy is a complex adaptive system inhabited by heterogeneous agents who constantly interact, adapt, and learn.

Institutions are not static, ‘plug-and-play’ variables, but rather the result of repeated historical interactions (path dependence) that tend to lock the order into certain developmental trajectories.

Indonesia’s reform trajectory post-1998 has never been a straight line. For instance, decentralisation and regional autonomy policies have distributed the arena of political competition down to the local level. Although some observers fear the risk of fragmented corruption, the lens of complexity suggests that this distributed division of power can function as a bulwark against large-scale national state capture.

This is because, in a decentralised system, there is no single decision-making point that, if bought, could simultaneously control the entire rules of the economic game. However, it must be emphasised that decentralisation, if not accompanied by adequate local supervisory capacity, can transform into the decentralisation of rent-seeking.

International experience reinforces the importance of institutional consistency. Estonia and Lithuania successfully locked in reform commitments since the early 1990s with the support of the European Union integration anchor. As a result, state capture found it difficult to take root in both countries. In contrast, Russia became trapped in a cycle of oligarchs that continues to strengthen itself to this day.

Anatomy of State Capture and the Line of Defence for Competition Authorities

Theoretically, George Stigler (1971) and Sam Peltzman (1976) state that public regulation is often captured to serve the interests of producer groups rather than protecting consumers. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (19im91) formalised this mechanism as a hierarchical agency problem: the people act as the primary principal, politicians and regulators as agents, while business actors attempt to bribe agents for economic gain.

State capture occurs when corporations succeed in displacing the people and positioning themselves as the de facto principal, buying the right to design and formulate rules, rather than merely paying to break them. It is at this point that competition authorities, such as the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU), hold a crucial role.

When a handful of business actors dominate market structures, their financial capacity to influence political policy increases exponentially. Competition policy, therefore, functions as the first line of defence, working to restrain the accumulation of economic power before it transforms into hegemonic political power.

In many developed nations, competition authorities are treated as core anti-capture instruments. The United States employs a dual enforcement model through the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, which possesses the authority to annul mergers that potentially concentrate the market. The European Union, through the European Commission, can impose fines of up to ten per cent of a company’s annual global turnover.

Meanwhile, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) and the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) are designed to perform semi-judicial functions that are relatively free from short-term political interest pressures, although the level of independence for both in practice remains a subject of ongoing evaluation by competition policy observers in the East Asian region.

Designing an Anti-fragile System Architecture

How can we ensure that Indonesia does not slide into the abyss of state capture? An anti-fragile system resilience approach offers four concrete, mutually supporting pillars.

First, strengthening the public voice. Referring to Albert Hirschman’s (1970) framework of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, the ability of citizens to express dissatisfaction (voice) without having to leave the system (exit) is the primary deterrent to state capture. This voice must be strengthened through budget transparency and access to information…

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Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/state-capture-and-the-future-of-economic-sovereignty-1790506345)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20260927165736-14-771252/state-capture-dan-masa-depan-kedaulatan-ekonomi), translated from Indonesian
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