State Budget Qurbani: Between Public Benefit and Ethical Scrutiny

The controversy over President Prabowo Subianto’s state budget-funded sacrificial cattle must be approached with a cool head. The government, through the State Secretariat Ministry, stated that for Eid al-Adha 1447 H/2026, the President will distribute 1,098 cattle under the Presidential Social Assistance programme. This includes 598 cattle for 552 provinces, regencies, and cities, and 500 for Islamic organisations, Islamic boarding schools, and religious figures across regions. The State Secretariat noted that the procurement involved 525 local farmers, with cattle meeting veterinary health certificates and sacrificial requirements. Public debate has centred on whether using state budget funds for Qurbani is permissible. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) stated that, under Islamic law, the President’s purchase of sacrificial cattle via the Presidential Assistance scheme is acceptable if viewed as state aid for public welfare, not the President’s personal sacrifice. MUI also linked this to the Baitul Mal tradition—a public fund that leaders can use for the community’s benefit. However, the ‘sharia-compliant’ label does not absolve the need to assess the policy on public ethics, budget priorities, transparency, and socio-economic benefits. This is the fundamental distinction. Personal Qurbani is an individual act involving personal ownership, intention, and responsibility. Thus, state budget funds should not be claimed as the official’s personal sacrifice; it is better framed as state social-religious assistance during Eid al-Adha. Some scholars cited by Republika emphasise that public funds for sacrificial animals should be considered public charity or gifts, not personal Qurbani that fulfils an individual’s obligation. Thus, the debate should not halt at a ‘halal’ or ‘haram’ dichotomy. In Islamic social and economic jurisprudence, public policy is measured by public benefit. If the programme genuinely expands poor communities’ access to meat, assists Islamic boarding schools and vulnerable groups, supports local farmers, and strengthens social solidarity, its benefits are tangible. Conversely, if it becomes mere ceremony, image-building, or unmeasured symbolic distribution, public criticism is valid and must be heeded. Sociologically, Qurbani is more than animal slaughter; it is a social solidarity mechanism. In villages, mosques, boarding schools, and urban areas, Eid al-Adha brings together citizens across classes—the able to share, the less fortunate to partake. State presence in this space can strengthen social cohesion. Yet, the government must ensure it does not displace community mutual aid, create symbolic dependency, or centre the meaning of Qurbani around power figures. Anthropologically, Qurbani in Indonesia is part of collective culture, embodying religious values, gratitude, respect for neighbours, and social honour distribution. State-provided cattle are readily accepted as a gesture of care. However, culture also recognises the danger of ‘charity politics’—where public funds are perceived as the ruler’s personal generosity. The state budget is not the official’s personal money; it is a public trust. Therefore, government communication must be precise: this is state assistance, not a personal gift. From a state finance law perspective, the budget must be managed orderly, compliant, efficient, economical, effective, transparent, and accountable with fairness and propriety. This principle is outlined in Article 3(1) of Law No. 17 of 2003 on State Finance. Thus, the programme’s viability isn’t merely about having a budget. Further questions: is procurement efficient, pricing reasonable, recipients appropriate, benefits measurable, and reports publicly accessible? As an economist, I view this through the lens of opportunity cost. Some reports suggest the cattle procurement costs around Rp10 billion. Since this figure isn’t in the State Secretariat’s primary release, it should be treated as media-reported data requiring official confirmation. If accurate, the public has a right to details: average prices, cattle weights, logistics costs, purchase regions, procurement methods, and involved farmers. Transparency isn’t about suspicion but maintaining trust. Arguments that such funds would be better spent elsewhere shouldn’t be deemed anti-religious. In Islamic legal objectives (maqashid syariah), prioritisation is part of benefit ethics. Indonesia still faces poverty, food insecurity, and purchasing power pressures. BPS data shows 23.36 million poor people in September 2025, a poverty rate of 8.25 per cent. In this context, every state budget rupiah must be tested for immediate or structural benefits—or both. However, outright rejection is also unfair. If cattle are sourced from local farmers, significant economic ripple effects occur—funds circulate to breeders, feed suppliers, transport services, animal health workers, distribution committees, and recipient communities. From an Islamic social finance perspective, this could link public spending, halal economy, livestock strengthening, and food distribution. But conditions apply: avoid elite supplier concentration, prevent rent-seeking, and prioritise small-to-medium farmers. Thus, the most constructive middle ground is accepting its sharia compliance while tightening public accountability. The government must clarify this programme’s