Soft Authoritarianism and the Disappearance of Our Opposition
I think we need to begin with what Daniel Dhakidae explored in depth in his original book Intellectuals and New Order Indonesia (1985), which spans more than 700 pages and contains two practices of political life in Indonesia. There is a positive correlation between repressive power in Indonesia and (1) the decline of national and state life and (2) the decline of knowledge, particularly social sciences, as a negative impact of that oppressive power. Many scholars chose to be ‘safe’ by not carrying out their intellectual duties. Studies of the reform era may record various advances in political liberalisation and democratic dynamics (Syamsuddin Haris & Firdaus Syam 2010). However, the results of the 2024 presidential election two years ago reaffirmed the ‘bad practice’ of power without opposition, indicated by a bloated cabinet (everyone piling into the cabinet). This symptom resembles the era of Pak Harto, where there was no meaningful opposition power, not because of fear of repression but fear that economic leverage in politics would not reach these figures.
I would like to explain further that several scholars have criticised the direction of democracy in the Prabowo era. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a research professor at BRIN and a political scientist, has been quite firm in criticising the direction of democracy under Prabowo. In an interview with the Financial Times, she said that Reformasi has ‘died’ since Prabowo was elected and predicted that Prabowo might lead Indonesia towards ‘soft authoritarianism’. Her criticism mainly concerns democracy, the centralisation of power, and civil-military relations.
A critical view was also expressed by Vedi R. Hadiz, a professor and political scientist who has extensively researched Indonesian politics, oligarchy, political Islam, and democracy. He criticised the Prabowo government’s tendencies regarding technocracy, populism, and the concentration of power. In his 2025 writings, he discussed how technocrats are increasingly losing influence in the Prabowo government and linked this to right-wing populist tendencies.
The same stance was also outlined by Made Supriatma, an Indonesian politics and military researcher at the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. He sees Prabowo as having a tendency to achieve development through a centralised and command-oriented government. Another critical contribution comes from Arya Fernandes, a political researcher and Head of the Department of Politics and Social Change at CSIS Indonesia. His criticism focuses on the weakening of checks and balances, executive dominance, and the reduced voice of opposition groups. He said parliament increasingly resembles a rubber stamp due to strong executive dominance.
From here, we are reminded of the dark days of Guided Democracy (1959-1965), which is understood as a phase of decline during the Bung Karno era, namely (a) the period of authoritarian politics at that time and (b) the consequence after guided democracy, which continued into the Pak Harto era. It is interesting to note that the centralisation of the Prabowo era is in line with the fading function of the opposition.
Since the beginning of the Prabowo government, almost all major parties have had relationships with the government. Max Lane from ISEAS called this configuration ‘Prabowo’s political cartel’ and placed the problem of opposition as the main issue in this new political structure. PDIP is the major party not in government, but even PDIP has not clearly defined itself as the opposition.
In political science, a rubber stamp legislature can describe a situation where a legislative institution formally still has the authority to make laws and oversee the government, but in practice rarely uses that authority to correct, limit, or reject the executive agenda.
A journal article titled ‘Protecting Two Presidents: Legislative Decline in Indonesia’s Post-2024 Election Transition’ (2026) by Rendy Pahrun sees parliament as an actor that strategically facilitated the transition of power to the Prabowo government while maintaining Jokowi’s central position during the transition period.
Academic Masdar Hilmi explicitly discussed Prabowo’s ideas about a distinctive Indonesian democracy. In his writing in Kompas, he noted that Prabowo views Indonesian democracy as needing to be rooted in harmony, togetherness, and gotong royong, and does not have to follow the oppositional political practices of Western liberal democracy. This is where a fairly fundamental conceptual shift occurs.
Liberal democracy places political competition, opposition, and checks and balances mechanisms as important elements for controlling power. Conversely, the idea of harmonious democracy places more emphasis on unity, consensus, and minimal conflict. Discussing differences of interest and political conflict should not be something that must be eliminated. On the contrary, conflict is seen as a normal part of democratic life.