Soerjadi vs political scientists

By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti

JAKARTA (JP): When Megawati Soekarnoputri was elected as leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) at the Extraordinary Congress in Surabaya in December 1993, and her election was recognized by the government in January 1994, many Indonesian political scientists expected the party to provide stiff opposition for Golkar. In early 1996, optimistic analysts even predicted that PDI and Golkar would receive the same number of votes in the recently held election.

If political analysts had been right, it would have meant the reduction of Golkar's presence in the House of Representatives and the People's Consultative Assembly. It would have put the government in an awkward position with the Moslem community since the Moslem-based PPP would be relegated to third place even though 90 percent of the population are Moslem.

The expectations of political experts was based on several factors. First, Megawati is the eldest daughter of first president Sukarno. Bung Karno's name holds a special place in the hearts of many PDI members, particularly with supporters of the former Indonesian National Party (PNI), who joined PDI in 1973.

Bung Karno's reputation was used brilliantly by Soerjadi to boost the number of PDI voters in the 1987 and 1992 elections. One of his ploys was to show Bung Karno's picture at PDI campaigns and to urge the late president's family to become legislative counselors for the 1992 elections.

In the 1982 election, the PDI secured 24 seats in the House. By 1987 this figure had jumped to 40 seats and in 1992 it increased further to 56 seats. In this context, if Soerjadi could have increased the number of PDI voters on the Bung Karno ticket, PDI would be faring even better had it been led by Megawati.

Second, under Megawati, PDI would grow more strongly than under Soerjadi's leadership particularly with the slogan "I Unfurled The Flag, Stop Crying". Megawati's slogan was like a drop of cold, fresh water to PNI nationalist oldtimers, who still dreamed of the return of Marhaenism (public nationalism). Young voters saw the PDI as the party of the future and expected the party to defend the fate of the poor who are the majority of the nation.

Third, even if Megawati could not be called a national authority and is still considered wet behind the ears where national politics is concerned, she has the support of politicians and economists. People like Sabam Sirait, Kwik Kian Gie, Marcel Beding and Admiral Sukardi have greatly contributed to PDI's development.

The PDI party structure, which was established by Soerjadi and strengthened with a research and development body, had formed an important base for the PDI under Megawati's leadership.

PDI supporters' hopes to revive the Banteng (bull) party were dashed when Fatimah Ahmad, Soerjadi, Buttu Hutapea and others supported by the government and the Armed Forces held a PDI congress in Medan in June 1996. This was followed by the takeover on July 27, 1996 of the party's head office on Jl. Diponegoro, Jakarta.

Soerjadi denied allegations that he would topple Megawati. At the time, Megawati considered Soerjadi a loyal cadre of the PDI whose contributions had benefited the party from 1986 to 1993. But Soerjadi's position teetered in 1988 and before the 1992 election.

It appears Soerjadi did not learn from his 1973 experience when he resurrected the PDI from destruction as a result of party fusions. He also forgot that major external interests were working for the demise of the PDI which was reeling under internal squabbles and bickerings.

His takeover of the party's leadership from Megawati gravely disappointed PDI members and supporters. It seemed, to them, an act of treason. It was like the political suicide of the PDI, a calamity for Bung Karno whose name Soerjadi had traded for the sake of the party's growth in the 1987 and 1992 elections.

It was not surprising when strong-minded Megawati supporters stood behind her and wanted to oust Soerjadi.

In the conflict that plagued the PDI, Soerjadi believed that as a government-backed leader and experienced politician, he would be able to settle internal matters within the party and consolidate before the 1997 election.

He had various assumptions.

First, that he was the rightful leader of the party. Second, that the PDI's internal experiences before the 1977, 1987 and 1992 elections would stand him in good stead. Third, that the difficulties he met as a young PDI authority who parried senior politicians in 1986-1988 were far worse than his problems in 1997.

But few politicians agreed with Soerjadi's theories. One said that PDI hard-liners would never withdraw because they resemble a wild herd returning to their pen and would vote for the PDI. This analysis was supported by Soerjadi and Buttu Hutapea, the PDI secretary general during campaigning. Genuine PDI supporters would not draw a line between Soerjadi and Megawati.

But the majority of political scientists had a different opinion. Their analysis, hinging on the sober side, suggested that the PDI's problems at the time were far more difficult than other obstacles. Soerjadi, Fatimah Ahmad and friends may be blamed for abandoning old policies and the adulation of a much respected figure. It was apparent in the way they toppled Megawati, an offspring of Bung Karno, the much admired founding father of the nation.

Soerjadi and friends regarded Megawati as an inexperienced newcomer to politics who could not possibly gird support to oppose the PDI. They also forgot that the Soerjadi-led PDI party was supported by the government, while the PDI under Megawati belonged to the people. Some Megawati supporters thought they might as well give their support to the dominant Golkar, instead of backing the Soerjadi-led PDI. A large number of Megawati supporters swung to Golput, while the others opted for the PPP.

When the election campaigns were in full swing, Soerjadi criticized political analysts who forecasted a drastic slump in PDI ballots at the 1997 poll. He blamed these experts for taking their facts from the media, saying they were fake experts and ignorant of the real situation.

Few experts were of the opinion that PDI votes would not decrease because the party enjoyed government support.

A political scientist with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), J. Kristiadi, predicted a 9 percent loss of votes for the PDI. An ISP-Trend researcher and lecturer at the Institute of Social and Political Sciences (IISIP), Mansyur Al Farisyi, estimated a loss of 50 percent for the party. The Center for Political and Regional Studies, National Institute of Sciences (PPW-LIPI) even suggested the PDI could lose between one third and half of its voters. It did not rule out the possibility the number of PDI voters could dwindle to a third its former size in 1992.

They also predicted Golkar votes would increase marginally, while PPP numbers would increase because of the "Mega-Bintang" phenomena, suggesting a joining of PPP and PDI-Mega supporters.

An analysis made by LIPI researchers, coordinated by Sjamsuddin Haris, came close to the reality. It predicted that "PPP voters would experience a small increase, Golkar would nosedive and PDI would be deluged with voters". They proved to be right. The PPP increased 1 seat (62), Golkar dropped 17 seats (from 299 down to 282),and the PDI gained 16 seats (56). With both forecasts (1992 and 1997), LIPI estimated an increase in Golput voters. As it was, the number of non-voters increased dramatically in the 1997 election. More so, since Megawati said that she would abstain from voting.

One day after the May 29 election Soerjadi admitted that his party had lost votes due to internal problems. It seems certain that the PDI has not gained one seat in Jakarta. It was an indirect admission that the political observers he had snubbed before were right. It further implied that Soerjadi had not only betrayed Bung Karno, he also betrayed political scientists.

The PDI vote, estimated at 3 percent, is small when compared with the number of non-voters (Golput). It is regrettable voters in this group were not represented in the polling results of 1997.

It bore all the signs of political engineering in a bid to erase the suspicion hovering over the recent election which prompted questions among Megawati supporters and other Indonesians about the way the poll was handled.

Soerjadi's fate after the 1997 polls resembles that of an exhausted bull, stabbed by matadors, or, trampled on by Megawati's "young bulls".

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Political and Regional Studies -- Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PPW-LIPI), Jakarta. This writing does not reflect the views of LIPI, it is the writer's personal view.

Window A: When the election campaigns were in full swing, Soerjadi criticized political analysts who forecasted a drastic slump in PDI ballots at the 1997 poll.

Window B: The PDI vote, estimated at 3 percent, is small when compared with the number of non-voters (Golput). It is regrettable voters in this group were not represented in the polling results of 1997.