Soerjadi vs political scientists

Soerjadi vs political scientists

By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti

JAKARTA (JP): When Megawati Soekarnoputri was elected as
leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) at the
Extraordinary Congress in Surabaya in December 1993, and her
election was recognized by the government in January 1994, many
Indonesian political scientists expected the party to provide
stiff opposition for Golkar. In early 1996, optimistic analysts
even predicted that PDI and Golkar would receive the same number
of votes in the recently held election.

If political analysts had been right, it would have meant the
reduction of Golkar's presence in the House of Representatives
and the People's Consultative Assembly. It would have put the
government in an awkward position with the Moslem community since
the Moslem-based PPP would be relegated to third place even
though 90 percent of the population are Moslem.

The expectations of political experts was based on several
factors. First, Megawati is the eldest daughter of first
president Sukarno. Bung Karno's name holds a special place in the
hearts of many PDI members, particularly with supporters of the
former Indonesian National Party (PNI), who joined PDI in 1973.

Bung Karno's reputation was used brilliantly by Soerjadi to
boost the number of PDI voters in the 1987 and 1992 elections.
One of his ploys was to show Bung Karno's picture at PDI
campaigns and to urge the late president's family to become
legislative counselors for the 1992 elections.

In the 1982 election, the PDI secured 24 seats in the House.
By 1987 this figure had jumped to 40 seats and in 1992 it
increased further to 56 seats. In this context, if Soerjadi could
have increased the number of PDI voters on the Bung Karno ticket,
PDI would be faring even better had it been led by Megawati.

Second, under Megawati, PDI would grow more strongly than
under Soerjadi's leadership particularly with the slogan "I
Unfurled The Flag, Stop Crying". Megawati's slogan was like a
drop of cold, fresh water to PNI nationalist oldtimers, who still
dreamed of the return of Marhaenism (public nationalism). Young
voters saw the PDI as the party of the future and expected the
party to defend the fate of the poor who are the majority of the
nation.

Third, even if Megawati could not be called a national
authority and is still considered wet behind the ears where
national politics is concerned, she has the support of
politicians and economists. People like Sabam Sirait, Kwik Kian
Gie, Marcel Beding and Admiral Sukardi have greatly contributed
to PDI's development.

The PDI party structure, which was established by Soerjadi and
strengthened with a research and development body, had formed an
important base for the PDI under Megawati's leadership.

PDI supporters' hopes to revive the Banteng (bull) party were
dashed when Fatimah Ahmad, Soerjadi, Buttu Hutapea and others
supported by the government and the Armed Forces held a PDI
congress in Medan in June 1996. This was followed by the takeover
on July 27, 1996 of the party's head office on Jl. Diponegoro,
Jakarta.

Soerjadi denied allegations that he would topple Megawati. At
the time, Megawati considered Soerjadi a loyal cadre of the PDI
whose contributions had benefited the party from 1986 to 1993.
But Soerjadi's position teetered in 1988 and before the 1992
election.

It appears Soerjadi did not learn from his 1973 experience
when he resurrected the PDI from destruction as a result of
party fusions. He also forgot that major external interests were
working for the demise of the PDI which was reeling under
internal squabbles and bickerings.

His takeover of the party's leadership from Megawati gravely
disappointed PDI members and supporters. It seemed, to them, an
act of treason. It was like the political suicide of the PDI, a
calamity for Bung Karno whose name Soerjadi had traded for the
sake of the party's growth in the 1987 and 1992 elections.

It was not surprising when strong-minded Megawati supporters
stood behind her and wanted to oust Soerjadi.

In the conflict that plagued the PDI, Soerjadi believed that
as a government-backed leader and experienced politician, he
would be able to settle internal matters within the party and
consolidate before the 1997 election.

He had various assumptions.

First, that he was the rightful leader of the party. Second,
that the PDI's internal experiences before the 1977, 1987 and
1992 elections would stand him in good stead. Third, that the
difficulties he met as a young PDI authority who parried senior
politicians in 1986-1988 were far worse than his problems in
1997.

But few politicians agreed with Soerjadi's theories. One said
that PDI hard-liners would never withdraw because they resemble a
wild herd returning to their pen and would vote for the PDI. This
analysis was supported by Soerjadi and Buttu Hutapea, the PDI
secretary general during campaigning. Genuine PDI supporters
would not draw a line between Soerjadi and Megawati.

But the majority of political scientists had a different
opinion. Their analysis, hinging on the sober side, suggested
that the PDI's problems at the time were far more difficult than
other obstacles. Soerjadi, Fatimah Ahmad and friends may be
blamed for abandoning old policies and the adulation of a much
respected figure. It was apparent in the way they toppled
Megawati, an offspring of Bung Karno, the much admired founding
father of the nation.

Soerjadi and friends regarded Megawati as an inexperienced
newcomer to politics who could not possibly gird support to
oppose the PDI. They also forgot that the Soerjadi-led PDI party
was supported by the government, while the PDI under Megawati
belonged to the people. Some Megawati supporters thought they
might as well give their support to the dominant Golkar, instead
of backing the Soerjadi-led PDI. A large number of Megawati
supporters swung to Golput, while the others opted for the PPP.

When the election campaigns were in full swing, Soerjadi
criticized political analysts who forecasted a drastic slump in
PDI ballots at the 1997 poll. He blamed these experts for taking
their facts from the media, saying they were fake experts and
ignorant of the real situation.

Few experts were of the opinion that PDI votes would not
decrease because the party enjoyed government support.

A political scientist with the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), J. Kristiadi, predicted a 9 percent
loss of votes for the PDI. An ISP-Trend researcher and lecturer
at the Institute of Social and Political Sciences (IISIP),
Mansyur Al Farisyi, estimated a loss of 50 percent for the party.
The Center for Political and Regional Studies, National Institute
of Sciences (PPW-LIPI) even suggested the PDI could lose between
one third and half of its voters. It did not rule out the
possibility the number of PDI voters could dwindle to a third its
former size in 1992.

They also predicted Golkar votes would increase marginally,
while PPP numbers would increase because of the "Mega-Bintang"
phenomena, suggesting a joining of PPP and PDI-Mega supporters.

An analysis made by LIPI researchers, coordinated by
Sjamsuddin Haris, came close to the reality. It predicted that
"PPP voters would experience a small increase, Golkar would
nosedive and PDI would be deluged with voters". They proved to be
right. The PPP increased 1 seat (62), Golkar dropped 17 seats
(from 299 down to 282),and the PDI gained 16 seats (56). With
both forecasts (1992 and 1997), LIPI estimated an increase in
Golput voters. As it was, the number of non-voters increased
dramatically in the 1997 election. More so, since Megawati said
that she would abstain from voting.

One day after the May 29 election Soerjadi admitted that his
party had lost votes due to internal problems. It seems certain
that the PDI has not gained one seat in Jakarta. It was an
indirect admission that the political observers he had snubbed
before were right. It further implied that Soerjadi had not only
betrayed Bung Karno, he also betrayed political scientists.

The PDI vote, estimated at 3 percent, is small when compared
with the number of non-voters (Golput). It is regrettable voters
in this group were not represented in the polling results of
1997.

It bore all the signs of political engineering in a bid to
erase the suspicion hovering over the recent election which
prompted questions among Megawati supporters and other
Indonesians about the way the poll was handled.

Soerjadi's fate after the 1997 polls resembles that of an
exhausted bull, stabbed by matadors, or, trampled on by
Megawati's "young bulls".

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Political and
Regional Studies -- Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PPW-LIPI),
Jakarta. This writing does not reflect the views of LIPI, it is
the writer's personal view.

Window A: When the election campaigns were in full swing,
Soerjadi criticized political analysts who forecasted a drastic
slump in PDI ballots at the 1997 poll.

Window B: The PDI vote, estimated at 3 percent, is small when
compared with the number of non-voters (Golput). It is
regrettable voters in this group were not represented in the
polling results of 1997.