Sipadan/Ligitan Row: A matter of national pride
Sipadan/Ligitan Row: A matter of national pride
Endy M. Bayuni, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
What is the worth of two small islands to Indonesia, when it
already has more than 17,000 of them? A lot, apparently.
Indonesia has gone to great lengths -- bar waging war -- in
its battle with Malaysia to settle a row over the ownership of
Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan, two small islands off the
northern coast of East Kalimantan.
The International Court of Justice in The Hague is due to
announce its ruling on the dispute on Tuesday. But with no clear
picture about the winner even at this very late stage, officials
believe that the decision could go either way.
This means that Indonesia must face bitter reality if it loses
the case. The government must be ready for the fallout.
The dispute, going back 33 years, may be about two islands,
but deep down, it is really about sovereignty, and if you stretch
the argument a little further, it boils down to national pride.
And, pride is something that you cannot put a price tag on.
Never mind the fact that both countries almost forgot about
the existence of the islands in the early years of their
independence. It was not until 1969 that both simultaneously laid
their claims.
The two islands are so small they did not even appear on
earlier national maps of Indonesia and Malaysia. Neither Malaysia
nor Indonesia included the two islands in the concessions they
gave out to foreign oil companies operating in the area.
In Indonesia, most people, including government officials,
cannot even give the exact number of islands that are supposed to
come under the nation's sovereignty.
Given that they do not seem concerned about the real number of
islands (they simply state "more than 17,000 islands"), why
should losing two small ones hurt so much (the Naval Hydro-
Oceanographic Office puts the number of islands in the Indonesian
archipelago at 17,508, so should Jakarta lose the court battle,
Indonesia's island possessions will officially be reduced to
17,506 as of Tuesday).
Pulau Sipadan has high economic value. It is listed as one of
the world's top five spots for diving. Malaysia, which de facto
is occupying the island, has turned it into a tourism resort, and
has been touting it to the world as a diving paradise since the
1990s.
Sipadan's fame has become such that it has not only attracted
tourists, but also terrorists. A group of Abu Sayyaf rebels from
the Philippines kidnapped foreign tourists from the island in
2000. That put Sipadan, which had previously been known only to
diving enthusiasts, on the world map.
Sipadan, with an area of 10.4 hectare, is rich in vegetation
and the water around it is home to a rare giant turtle species,
and other animals.
The economic value of Ligitan, a coral island of 7.9 hectares,
is less established.
But the row between Indonesia and Malaysia is not about the
economic value nor about the strategic value, if any, of the
islands.
Rather it is about national sovereignty and national pride.
No country can tolerate the loss of even an inch of territory,
let alone entire islands. It would simply hurt its pride too
much.
Which takes us to the question that has been in the mind of
many people here these last few weeks as the court ruling becomes
imminent: What if Indonesia loses?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has led the Indonesian
campaign in the courtroom battle in The Hague, has been going
around the nation telling the public, and politicians in
particular, to prepare for the worst possible outcome.
Not that they are pessimistic.
As late as last week, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan
Wirajuda stated that he still believed there was a fifty-fifty
chance. But the nation must be prepared nevertheless to swallow
bitter reality if the ruling goes wholly against Indonesia.
Hassan has repeatedly stressed that the decision to go to The
Hague was taken by the administration of President Soeharto. It
would be wrong, and unfair, to lay the blame on President
Megawati Soekarnoputri if Indonesia loses the islands.
He pointed out that Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, in turning to
international arbitration in 1996, pledged to accept the court's
ruling. So, there is no going back after Tuesday.
To the credit of both governments, they have shown a spirit of
cooperation and neighborliness in trying to resolve the row since
it began in 1969. They have shown consistency in genuinely trying
to settle the conflict in a peaceful manner.
Three years earlier, Indonesia and Malaysia had just ended
their military confrontation. Two years earlier, they had joined
hands in establishing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), along with the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
The spirit within ASEAN has been one of cooperation, even if
all the members had outstanding disputes among themselves. The
consensus in the early years of ASEAN was to defer any
territorial rows, and to tend to other, less potentially
explosive matters. In the late 1960s, and through most of the
1970s, their chief business was to counter the threat of
communism from the Indochinese states.
Malaysia also had overlapping territorial claims with
Singapore and the Philippines. The decision to defer discussion
on the Sipadan and Ligitan row was not unique in ASEAN.
The territorial dispute over the two islands emerged when
Indonesia and Malaysia opened their first negotiations to
delineate their common borders in 1969. They quickly came to a
stumbling block in demarcating the maritime boundaries along the
Sulawesi Sea when they realized that both were claiming
sovereignty over the two uninhabited islands.
It was not until 1989 that the island row was brought up again
for serious discussion. Then, both countries agreed to negotiate
a peaceful settlement.
Their leaders then, President Soeharto and Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad, were resolved to settle this issue once and for
all. So when diplomacy failed, the two countries decided in 1996
to turn to international arbitration: The International Court of
Justice. The proceedings in the court did not start until 1998.
To their credit, the spirit of cooperation and neighborliness
were maintained throughout all this time, first during the
diplomatic negotiations, and later during the legal battle.
Given that the two countries have put so much into their
campaigns, there is bound to be ill-feeling on the part of the
loser when the court in the Dutch capital announces its ruling.
But with the two countries already pledging to abide by the
court's decision, there is no reason for their bilateral
relations to deteriorate.
The losing party must get over it and nurse its wounded pride.
Should Indonesia lose the case, however, the greater challenge
will come from within.
With President Megawati's political position already
precarious as it is, and given the never-ending political and
economic crises at home, there are bound to be politicians
seeking to capitalize from this unfortunate situation at her
expense.
Nationalism and national pride will then come to the fore once
again. That is the political reality of Indonesia today.
Some might even link it with Indonesia's loss of sovereignty
over East Timor in 1999, prompting the question, where next?
Assuming the worst-case scenario, losing the row over Pulau
Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan will not necessarily be such a
disaster. At the end of the day, they are just two of the 17,000-
something islands that Indonesia possesses or claims to possess.
And they are so small.
Win or lose, Indonesia and Malaysia can look back on this
episode with pride. They have given their best shots in defending
their sovereignty and national pride without resorting to the use
of force, without firing a single shot in anger.
Indonesia can claim it has done all it can to maintain its
territorial integrity without breaking international law or the
codes governing the conduct of nations. The two small islands are
worth fighting for, but not to the point of declaring war, or
sacrificing lives, whether ours or Malaysian.
The court ruling will remove one more pebble in the existing
relations between the two countries. This can only be good for
the entire Southeast Asian region.
Once the losing party has properly nursed its wounded pride,
we need to put this behind us and get on with other, more
important business.