Sipadan/Ligitan Row: A matter of national pride

Endy M. Bayuni, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

What is the worth of two small islands to Indonesia, when it already has more than 17,000 of them? A lot, apparently.

Indonesia has gone to great lengths -- bar waging war -- in its battle with Malaysia to settle a row over the ownership of Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan, two small islands off the northern coast of East Kalimantan.

The International Court of Justice in The Hague is due to announce its ruling on the dispute on Tuesday. But with no clear picture about the winner even at this very late stage, officials believe that the decision could go either way.

This means that Indonesia must face bitter reality if it loses the case. The government must be ready for the fallout.

The dispute, going back 33 years, may be about two islands, but deep down, it is really about sovereignty, and if you stretch the argument a little further, it boils down to national pride.

And, pride is something that you cannot put a price tag on.

Never mind the fact that both countries almost forgot about the existence of the islands in the early years of their independence. It was not until 1969 that both simultaneously laid their claims.

The two islands are so small they did not even appear on earlier national maps of Indonesia and Malaysia. Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia included the two islands in the concessions they gave out to foreign oil companies operating in the area.

In Indonesia, most people, including government officials, cannot even give the exact number of islands that are supposed to come under the nation's sovereignty.

Given that they do not seem concerned about the real number of islands (they simply state "more than 17,000 islands"), why should losing two small ones hurt so much (the Naval Hydro- Oceanographic Office puts the number of islands in the Indonesian archipelago at 17,508, so should Jakarta lose the court battle, Indonesia's island possessions will officially be reduced to 17,506 as of Tuesday).

Pulau Sipadan has high economic value. It is listed as one of the world's top five spots for diving. Malaysia, which de facto is occupying the island, has turned it into a tourism resort, and has been touting it to the world as a diving paradise since the 1990s.

Sipadan's fame has become such that it has not only attracted tourists, but also terrorists. A group of Abu Sayyaf rebels from the Philippines kidnapped foreign tourists from the island in 2000. That put Sipadan, which had previously been known only to diving enthusiasts, on the world map.

Sipadan, with an area of 10.4 hectare, is rich in vegetation and the water around it is home to a rare giant turtle species, and other animals.

The economic value of Ligitan, a coral island of 7.9 hectares, is less established.

But the row between Indonesia and Malaysia is not about the economic value nor about the strategic value, if any, of the islands.

Rather it is about national sovereignty and national pride.

No country can tolerate the loss of even an inch of territory, let alone entire islands. It would simply hurt its pride too much.

Which takes us to the question that has been in the mind of many people here these last few weeks as the court ruling becomes imminent: What if Indonesia loses?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has led the Indonesian campaign in the courtroom battle in The Hague, has been going around the nation telling the public, and politicians in particular, to prepare for the worst possible outcome.

Not that they are pessimistic.

As late as last week, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Wirajuda stated that he still believed there was a fifty-fifty chance. But the nation must be prepared nevertheless to swallow bitter reality if the ruling goes wholly against Indonesia.

Hassan has repeatedly stressed that the decision to go to The Hague was taken by the administration of President Soeharto. It would be wrong, and unfair, to lay the blame on President Megawati Soekarnoputri if Indonesia loses the islands.

He pointed out that Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, in turning to international arbitration in 1996, pledged to accept the court's ruling. So, there is no going back after Tuesday.

To the credit of both governments, they have shown a spirit of cooperation and neighborliness in trying to resolve the row since it began in 1969. They have shown consistency in genuinely trying to settle the conflict in a peaceful manner.

Three years earlier, Indonesia and Malaysia had just ended their military confrontation. Two years earlier, they had joined hands in establishing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), along with the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

The spirit within ASEAN has been one of cooperation, even if all the members had outstanding disputes among themselves. The consensus in the early years of ASEAN was to defer any territorial rows, and to tend to other, less potentially explosive matters. In the late 1960s, and through most of the 1970s, their chief business was to counter the threat of communism from the Indochinese states.

Malaysia also had overlapping territorial claims with Singapore and the Philippines. The decision to defer discussion on the Sipadan and Ligitan row was not unique in ASEAN.

The territorial dispute over the two islands emerged when Indonesia and Malaysia opened their first negotiations to delineate their common borders in 1969. They quickly came to a stumbling block in demarcating the maritime boundaries along the Sulawesi Sea when they realized that both were claiming sovereignty over the two uninhabited islands.

It was not until 1989 that the island row was brought up again for serious discussion. Then, both countries agreed to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

Their leaders then, President Soeharto and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, were resolved to settle this issue once and for all. So when diplomacy failed, the two countries decided in 1996 to turn to international arbitration: The International Court of Justice. The proceedings in the court did not start until 1998.

To their credit, the spirit of cooperation and neighborliness were maintained throughout all this time, first during the diplomatic negotiations, and later during the legal battle.

Given that the two countries have put so much into their campaigns, there is bound to be ill-feeling on the part of the loser when the court in the Dutch capital announces its ruling.

But with the two countries already pledging to abide by the court's decision, there is no reason for their bilateral relations to deteriorate.

The losing party must get over it and nurse its wounded pride.

Should Indonesia lose the case, however, the greater challenge will come from within.

With President Megawati's political position already precarious as it is, and given the never-ending political and economic crises at home, there are bound to be politicians seeking to capitalize from this unfortunate situation at her expense.

Nationalism and national pride will then come to the fore once again. That is the political reality of Indonesia today.

Some might even link it with Indonesia's loss of sovereignty over East Timor in 1999, prompting the question, where next?

Assuming the worst-case scenario, losing the row over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan will not necessarily be such a disaster. At the end of the day, they are just two of the 17,000- something islands that Indonesia possesses or claims to possess. And they are so small.

Win or lose, Indonesia and Malaysia can look back on this episode with pride. They have given their best shots in defending their sovereignty and national pride without resorting to the use of force, without firing a single shot in anger.

Indonesia can claim it has done all it can to maintain its territorial integrity without breaking international law or the codes governing the conduct of nations. The two small islands are worth fighting for, but not to the point of declaring war, or sacrificing lives, whether ours or Malaysian.

The court ruling will remove one more pebble in the existing relations between the two countries. This can only be good for the entire Southeast Asian region.

Once the losing party has properly nursed its wounded pride, we need to put this behind us and get on with other, more important business.