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Signatories ignoring spirit of Aceh peace agreement

| Source: JP

Signatories ignoring spirit of Aceh peace agreement

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Civil Society Alliance for Democracy
(Yappika), Jakarta

Many observers of the Aceh conflict have said that the political
status of the peace pact between the Republic of Indonesia and
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is so vulnerable that peace will
soon be consigned to the dustbin again.

Some suggest the pact is prone to collapse because it was
facilitated by an international non-governmental organization and
also because it was a mistake to place the Republic on the same
level as GAM.

But why should Indonesia reject outside mediation in respect
of a vertical conflict that has been going on for many years, a
conflict that has led to growing Acehnese ethno-nationalism,
particularly among those whose parents have fallen victim to this
conflict? Aren't the Republic and the mediating foreign entity
mere political entities created by humans?

The status of the mediating body, the Geneva-based Henry
Dunant Center, has been strengthened since its first involvement
in attempting to resolve the conflict in 2000. The participation
of the "four wise men" reflects the informal political
involvement of four countries. The presence of foreign military
officers on the Joint Security Commission (JSC) emphasizes the
political empathy that foreign countries have for the Aceh issue.

The international community has also provided loans and
financial aid for humanitarian purposes in Aceh.

There has been progress in the cessation of hostilities as
reflected by several indicators. First, the JSC, made up of 50
foreign military officers, 50 military officers of the Republic
and 50 GAM officers, is now up and running.

Second, armed contacts have fallen sharply following a decline
in combat operations, hence the number of Acehnese victims has
also declined. There are surely still victims as a result of
intensive intelligence-gathering and military operations.
However, even these operations have begun to be somewhat better
controlled.

Third, crimes against humanity have also decreased. However,
ordinary crimes have risen considerably due to the presence of
some 50,000 Indonesian soldiers and thousands of GAM guerrillas.

Fourth, zones of peace have been established.

Fifth, a decision has been reached about who will be
considered as violating the pact and how such violations are to
be gauged.

But it becomes a problem when the parties concerned forget the
spirit of the pact that they themselves signed. It was agreed
that the pact was intended "to fulfill the aspirations of the
Acehnese to live in peace and security, and with dignity and just
prosperity." This ambition can be realized only if the parties
concerned stop their hostilities.

However, the Indonesian government has interpreted the
hostility cessation period as the beginning of Aceh's renewed
integration into the Unitary Republic, while GAM has taken it to
mean a prelude to Aceh's independence. Meanwhile, Acehnese
civilians want to see a referendum on self-determination.

Indeed, the pact says nothing about a ban on campaigning for
special autonomy or for independence. The parties, however,
should assume a mature political attitude in considering which
steps will support the transformation of the conflict from its
current violent nature, and which steps would cause the conflict
to reignite.

Ignoring or forgetting the spirit of the pact will surely only
lead to interpretations based on the two sides respective
political orientations as to the future. Important matters will
be unilaterally defined as these relate to the other side. One
party will campaign for the other party to lay down its arms and
surrender its weapons. Instead of observing the spirit of the
pact and their obligations, the parties are instead redefining
their opponent's obligations.

The parties also try to justify their violations of the pact
including those perpetrated by their own soldiers. The Indonesian
Military commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto and National Police
chief Gen. Da'i Bachtiar bristled in reaction to the recent
announcement by the JSC regarding five cases of violation.

First, they said that the JSC had to be professional, yet 50
Indonesian military officers are members of this commission.
People might then believe that the JSC decision was made without
their participation. Any party unsatisfied with the JSC decision
should consult their own representatives on the JSC. They must
not complain to the JSC, nor even to the Henry Dunant Center.

Second, the JSC is said to be incapable of differentiating a
breach of the pact and the role of police as law enforcers. Gen.
Endriartono refered to one of the violations of the peace pact
according to the JSC, the shooting of one person in East Aceh. He
questioned whether the shooting of this person on the grounds
that he resisted could be categorized as a breach of the pact,
while the victim was on the list of wanted people.

If the police have not made such a list public, how would
anyone know he was wanted?

Third, the government wants the HDC to find out how many
weapons GAM possesses, while actually the weapons stores have two
keys, accessible only to GAM and the HDC.

Fourth, the widening of hostilities is condoned despite
efforts to build up mutual confidence. The latest examples
involve acts of blockade, terror, shooting and the arrest of
civilians. Yet, the mobilizing of mobs in the interests of each
side's propaganda effort is allowed to go on.

Such attitudes have not only affected civilians. The parties
have violated one of the pact's key points, namely that "The two
parties will allow civilians to express themselves without
hampering their democratic rights."

An attitude expressing hostility to civilians violates the
spirit of the pact. The parties should take into account the
strength of Acehnese civilians, who in the past have been very
successful in mobilizing themselves for mass strikes, a boycott
of the 1999 election, and support for a referendum.

In line with the future phase of all-inclusive dialogs -- and
also the next 2004 elections -- the parties concerned should now
vie with each other to steer developments in Aceh towards lasting
peace.

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