Should we go to war with Malaysia?

Rizal Sukma Jakarta

The territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia on the ownership of the Ambalat oil and gas block has taken an increasingly ugly turn. Several Indonesian politicians and legislators have repeatedly called for the government to declare war against Malaysia. Demonstration after demonstration is being staged across Indonesia. The old slogan Ganyang Malaysia (Crush Malaysia) -- is being voiced again. Some organizations have even begun to register volunteers to support a war with Malaysia.

Of course, there is nothing wrong with the determination and spirit showed by elements of the society to protect Indonesia's sovereignty over Ambalat. Indeed, it is the obligation of every citizen to defend his/her country from foreign encroachment. Seen from Indonesia's point of view, Malaysia's claim over Ambalat clearly presents such a case. What becomes a problem, however, is how quickly some of us resort to the call for war as a means to resolve conflict.

Is Indonesia really prepared to go to war with Malaysia? Fortunately, those in the executive branch of the government still think rationally. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono clearly stated that the conflict should be resolved through diplomatic means. Indonesian Military (TNI) chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto has also maintained that the TNI prefers diplomatic means over the use of force. Until today, very few -- if any -- within the government think that Indonesia should really go to war with Malaysia.

As a civilized nation who always takes pride in our culture, history, and national morality, we should understand that war should be the last option in resolving a dispute. Indeed, as a nation, we strongly believe that war will never solve any problem. That is the main reason why Indonesia has opposed the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Indonesia has also opposed the use of force against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

We should remember that Indonesia played an instrumental role in bringing stability to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), after the dust of konfrontasi with Malaysia settled. It was also Indonesia that promoted ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which denounces the use of force as a means of resolving bilateral conflicts. More recently, it is Indonesia that pushed for the establishment of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC).

As for Malaysia, many Indonesians feel that there has been a growing tendency in that country to look down on Indonesia. For example, Malaysian leaders have never concealed their feelings about reformasi. They are displeased by political changes and the emergence of democracy in Indonesia and view it as a source of trouble for the region. While Indonesia is largely responsible for the failure to provide jobs for its citizens, the treatment of Indonesia's illegal workers in Malaysia has really hurt Indonesia's dignity. Some nationalists in Indonesia remain dissatisfied with the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan Islands. The claim by Malaysia over Ambalat has only added fuel to the fire.

Our pride and dignity as a nation has been hurt by the arrogant attitude showed by the Malaysian authorities. The latest problem over Ambalat is only the tip of the iceberg. But again, are there enough reasons to declare war on our closest neighbor?

Whatever problems we are having with Malaysia, unless we are invaded by that country, we should not contemplate war as a solution. we should be able to demonstrate that we prefer to resolve conflict through diplomatic and legal means. Until all diplomatic measures have been exhausted, war should never be considered as a solution.

This position, however, should not be taken as a sign of weakness. In fact, it serves as a reminder of Indonesia's strength in its belief in peaceful conflict-resolution.

However, it should also be stressed that Malaysia should not try to take advantage of this position. Leaders of both countries should restrain themselves, and their respective domestic constituencies, to prevent the situation turning from bad to worse. This can only be achieved if Malaysia's government begins to show some respect for Indonesia, and engage in open dialog with Jakarta to find a face-saving formula for Kuala Lumpur to renounce its claim over Ambalat.

What is more curious in the current Jakarta-Kuala Lumpur conflict is the fact that ASEAN is no where to be seen. There have not been any significant efforts from ASEAN to help diffuse the tension. In fact, there is no institutionalized mechanism within ASEAN to respond to such a problem among member states. As an institution for regional cooperation, ASEAN has always been reticent when it comes to political and security issues. Indeed, the tension between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the silence of ASEAN, has once again demonstrated the growing irrelevance of the association.

For Indonesia, there is indeed an important lesson that we should learn, not only from the dispute over Ambalat but also from the entire story of our relationship with Malaysia. We are reminded that our dignity as a nation is at the lowest ebb, not because we are poor, but because we have never seriously tried to match words with deeds.

We always said that a weak nation -- both in economic and military terms -- is never respected by others, but we never try hard to make ourselves strong. We have said in the Defense White Paper 2004, that threats to our national security have always been maritime-based, but we continue to insist on a concept of defense that obliges all citizens to be ready to defend the country (hankamrata). We claim to be an archipelagic state, but our naval capability has been in a dire state for decades.

So, what should be done? We should make the current crisis over Ambalat a turning point for matching words with deeds. We should immediately begin to undertake a major review of our defense policy, strategy, and posture. The Ambalat case clearly shows us that we have no credible deterrent capability. It also shows us that we will have difficulty in matching the naval capability of Malaysia.

Therefore, it is time for Indonesia to pay more serious attention to building the Navy and the Air Force. Indonesia's defense force structure should give equal treatment to the three services. That will require a fundamental restructuring of the existing territorial command structure (Komando Teritorial) as mandated by Law No. 34/2004 on Indonesia's defense force, a force modernization plan, organizational changes and revision of doctrines.

At a national level, Indonesia's government can no longer ignore the need to formulate a comprehensive national security strategy. The importance of military modernization as suggested above cannot be separated from other elements of the national strategy. Here, our national security strategy should be based on four pillars: Diplomacy, democracy, development and defense.

These four elements should be designed as an integrated framework that guides us to ensure our national survival, defend our core interests, protect the security of both the state and the citizens, and contribute to the stability of the region and beyond.

Dr. Rizal Sukma is the Director of Studies at CSIS, Jakarta. He can be reached at rsukma@csis.or.id.