Should we go to war with Malaysia?

Should we go to war with Malaysia?

Rizal Sukma
Jakarta

The territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia on the
ownership of the Ambalat oil and gas block has taken an
increasingly ugly turn. Several Indonesian politicians and
legislators have repeatedly called for the government to declare
war against Malaysia. Demonstration after demonstration is being
staged across Indonesia. The old slogan Ganyang Malaysia (Crush
Malaysia) -- is being voiced again. Some organizations have even
begun to register volunteers to support a war with Malaysia.

Of course, there is nothing wrong with the determination and
spirit showed by elements of the society to protect Indonesia's
sovereignty over Ambalat. Indeed, it is the obligation of every
citizen to defend his/her country from foreign encroachment. Seen
from Indonesia's point of view, Malaysia's claim over Ambalat
clearly presents such a case. What becomes a problem, however, is
how quickly some of us resort to the call for war as a means to
resolve conflict.

Is Indonesia really prepared to go to war with Malaysia?
Fortunately, those in the executive branch of the government
still think rationally. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
clearly stated that the conflict should be resolved through
diplomatic means. Indonesian Military (TNI) chief Gen.
Endriartono Sutarto has also maintained that the TNI prefers
diplomatic means over the use of force. Until today, very few --
if any -- within the government think that Indonesia should
really go to war with Malaysia.

As a civilized nation who always takes pride in our culture,
history, and national morality, we should understand that war
should be the last option in resolving a dispute. Indeed, as a
nation, we strongly believe that war will never solve any
problem. That is the main reason why Indonesia has opposed the
U.S. occupation of Iraq. Indonesia has also opposed the use of
force against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

We should remember that Indonesia played an instrumental role
in bringing stability to the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), after the dust of konfrontasi with Malaysia
settled. It was also Indonesia that promoted ASEAN's Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which denounces the use of force as a
means of resolving bilateral conflicts. More recently, it is
Indonesia that pushed for the establishment of the ASEAN Security
Community (ASC).

As for Malaysia, many Indonesians feel that there has been a
growing tendency in that country to look down on Indonesia. For
example, Malaysian leaders have never concealed their feelings
about reformasi. They are displeased by political changes and the
emergence of democracy in Indonesia and view it as a source of
trouble for the region. While Indonesia is largely responsible
for the failure to provide jobs for its citizens, the treatment
of Indonesia's illegal workers in Malaysia has really hurt
Indonesia's dignity. Some nationalists in Indonesia remain
dissatisfied with the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan Islands. The
claim by Malaysia over Ambalat has only added fuel to the fire.

Our pride and dignity as a nation has been hurt by the
arrogant attitude showed by the Malaysian authorities. The latest
problem over Ambalat is only the tip of the iceberg. But again,
are there enough reasons to declare war on our closest neighbor?

Whatever problems we are having with Malaysia, unless we are
invaded by that country, we should not contemplate war as a
solution. we should be able to demonstrate that we prefer to
resolve conflict through diplomatic and legal means. Until all
diplomatic measures have been exhausted, war should never be
considered as a solution.

This position, however, should not be taken as a sign of
weakness. In fact, it serves as a reminder of Indonesia's
strength in its belief in peaceful conflict-resolution.

However, it should also be stressed that Malaysia should not
try to take advantage of this position. Leaders of both countries
should restrain themselves, and their respective domestic
constituencies, to prevent the situation turning from bad to
worse. This can only be achieved if Malaysia's government begins
to show some respect for Indonesia, and engage in open dialog
with Jakarta to find a face-saving formula for Kuala Lumpur to
renounce its claim over Ambalat.

What is more curious in the current Jakarta-Kuala Lumpur
conflict is the fact that ASEAN is no where to be seen. There
have not been any significant efforts from ASEAN to help diffuse
the tension. In fact, there is no institutionalized mechanism
within ASEAN to respond to such a problem among member states. As
an institution for regional cooperation, ASEAN has always been
reticent when it comes to political and security issues. Indeed,
the tension between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the silence of
ASEAN, has once again demonstrated the growing irrelevance of the
association.

For Indonesia, there is indeed an important lesson that we
should learn, not only from the dispute over Ambalat but also
from the entire story of our relationship with Malaysia. We are
reminded that our dignity as a nation is at the lowest ebb, not
because we are poor, but because we have never seriously tried to
match words with deeds.

We always said that a weak nation -- both in economic and
military terms -- is never respected by others, but we never try
hard to make ourselves strong. We have said in the Defense White
Paper 2004, that threats to our national security have always
been maritime-based, but we continue to insist on a concept of
defense that obliges all citizens to be ready to defend the
country (hankamrata). We claim to be an archipelagic state, but
our naval capability has been in a dire state for decades.

So, what should be done? We should make the current crisis
over Ambalat a turning point for matching words with deeds. We
should immediately begin to undertake a major review of our
defense policy, strategy, and posture. The Ambalat case clearly
shows us that we have no credible deterrent capability. It also
shows us that we will have difficulty in matching the naval
capability of Malaysia.

Therefore, it is time for Indonesia to pay more serious
attention to building the Navy and the Air Force. Indonesia's
defense force structure should give equal treatment to the three
services. That will require a fundamental restructuring of the
existing territorial command structure (Komando Teritorial) as
mandated by Law No. 34/2004 on Indonesia's defense force, a force
modernization plan, organizational changes and revision of
doctrines.

At a national level, Indonesia's government can no longer
ignore the need to formulate a comprehensive national security
strategy. The importance of military modernization as suggested
above cannot be separated from other elements of the national
strategy. Here, our national security strategy should be based on
four pillars: Diplomacy, democracy, development and defense.

These four elements should be designed as an integrated
framework that guides us to ensure our national survival, defend
our core interests, protect the security of both the state and
the citizens, and contribute to the stability of the region and
beyond.

Dr. Rizal Sukma is the Director of Studies at CSIS, Jakarta.
He can be reached at rsukma@csis.or.id.