Short-sighted policy motivates missile firings
Short-sighted policy motivates missile firings
HONG KONG (JP): High above Indonesia as you read this,
somewhere in the stratosphere above the Northern Hemisphere, a
large Chinese spy satellite is now entering its death throes.
This Tuesday it will probably fall into either the Atlantic or
Pacific Ocean. The precise spot cannot yet be calculated. The
satellite was meant to be recovered by its spymasters, so it will
not burn up on re-entry into the atmosphere. But because its
technology has failed, the satellite's parachute will not open
and bring it down to a soft landing in China.
Instead the satellite, should it come down over land, will
crash into the earth at a speed of around 400 m.p.h. and make a
sizable crater.
Chinese leaders should be praying that the errant satellite
does not come down on the heavily populated areas of Hong Kong or
Taiwan, where it could easily cause heavy casualties.
Were it to do so, it would be a further nail in the coffin of
China's reunification -- at a time when the Chinese are already
hammering in such nails as a result of their obviously counter-
productive policy choices.
First, they are making their policy towards Taiwan, and indeed
towards Southeast Asia, hostage to the uncertain qualities of
their missile technology. The missiles fired early last Friday at
target areas close to the two main Taiwanese ports of Kaohsiung
and Keelung landed safely.
But more such missile tests are due and there can be no
guarantee they will all land in the right place. The Chinese
should quit while they are ahead, but they will not do so.
Instead, China risks losing out whatever happens. If China
continues the missile tests, it will only embolden those in
Taiwan who argue that separation from the One China dream is the
best option for the island. If one missile actually lands
accidentally on Taiwan that too plays into the hands of those
advocating Taiwan independence. It would give the demand even
more emotional thrust, when it has plenty of that already.
Second, the very resort to missile tests advertises China's
weakness rather than its strength. The hard truth is that, with
around 54 amphibious ships in the Chinese Navy, there is no
question whatsoever of China being able to actually invade Taiwan
across the 100 miles or so of the Taiwan Strait.
Some experts calculate that China, with its present amphibious
capability, could only land 5,000 troops on Taiwan's beaches, a
totally insufficient force when faced with a hostile country of
21 million people.
Even if China had the amphibious capability to land one or two
divisions, say 20,000 troops, it would still be wholly inadequate
army to pit against the large and well-armed Taiwan military
forces.
Thirdly, what the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could
possibly do is to capture one of the smaller offshore islands
from among the dozen or so still held by Taiwan on the Chinese
side of the Taiwan Straits. They may try to do this at some point
in the next few weeks if China sticks with its policy of
intimidation.
Even so, the two larger islands of Quemoy and Matsu, the focal
points of the two earlier Taiwan Straits crises in 1954-55 and
1958, are probably still too heavily defended to be easily taken.
But even if the PLA captures an island or two, it still plays
into the hands of the Democratic Progressive Party on Taiwan,
advocating independence. The DPP has long sought the abandonment,
by Taiwan, of its offshore island connection with Chinese
territory.
Fourth, whichever way China pursues the policy of military
intimidation, it will end up being counter-productive.
Reunification can only mean something, can only be implemented,
if China abandons its old image as a harsh and brutal
totalitarian regime. By firing missiles close to Taiwan it only
sustains that image. Beijing has to win hearts and minds on
Taiwan, if reunification is to mean anything, but is instead
alienating them.
Fifth, lobbing missiles in the general direction of your
leading foreign investor is not usually considered a good way of
attracting its investment. But that is what China has been doing
for quite a while. Taiwan is the leading "foreign" investor in
China with investments variously estimated at between US$18
billion and $25 billion.
Already Taiwanese investors are scaling back both the number
and the extent of their investments on the mainland. The wonder
is that the total value of Taiwan's financial commitments to
China has, until now, continued to increase. Actual
disinvestment has not yet set in. It may well do so if the policy
of intimidation accidentally backfires or even if it just
continues.
Taiwanese businesses invest in China because they are free to
do so. Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui could end that freedom if
China continues to pursue reunification through the threat of
force. With foreign exchange reserves still hovering around $100
billion Taiwan could easily afford to fully compensate all those
who suffered losses as a result.
China, by contrast, would find that all other foreign
investors were having second thoughts, too. China's bubble-like
economy would be in greater danger of bursting.
But, sixth, China is not only in danger of losing the
confidence of foreign businesses. Much more important, it could
lose much hard-won credibility with foreign countries, too.
China attacks those nations whom it alleges are pursuing a policy
of containment towards it. No nation is pursuing such a policy
right now. But if China continues to behave like a regional
bully, it will willy-nilly force other nations to the conclusion
that China needs to be contained.
For, seventh, by pursuing reunification in its present
counter-productive way, China forces foreigners to wonder if, in
the erratic world of Chinese factionalism, mindless politics is
once more in command. That excessive factionalism, which gave
China the famine that accompanied the Great Leap Forward, and the
civil war horrors that attended the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution, could be staging a comeback.
Window: For now, the greatest danger posed by the missile tests is
that they could easily go wrong, thereby making further
escalation inevitable.