Searching for the ideal design for eradicating corruption
The case that has implicated the Junior Attorney General for Special Crimes, Febrie Adriansyah, should not be understood merely as a matter of an individual’s guilt or innocence. It is too early to conclude any criminal wrongdoing before the legal process has run its course and a final, binding decision has been reached.
Beyond the polemic lies a far more fundamental issue: the institutional design of corruption eradication in Indonesia. The real question is not ‘who is guilty’, but rather ‘who is the most appropriate to handle a case when law enforcement officials themselves are suspected of corruption?’
Hikmahanto Juwana, writing in 2012, warned that the crisis in Indonesia’s law enforcement is marked by five key problems: law enforcement officials implicated in corruption, the growth of judicial mafias, laws easily manipulated by power, weak law enforcement, and declining public trust in legal institutions.
This issue reopens a long-standing debate about the relationship between the authority of the Police, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). For more than two decades of reform, Indonesia has built a corruption eradication system by granting authority to three institutions simultaneously. The reformist ideal was that more institutions with authority would lead to more effective corruption eradication. In practice, the opposite has occurred. Overlapping authority, conflicts of interest, sectoral egos, and competition among law enforcers have become increasingly apparent.
This polemic clearly demonstrates that Indonesia needs a fundamental evaluation of its criminal justice system design, particularly in handling corruption cases.
Muladi explained that the criminal justice system is a network consisting of subsystems—the police, prosecutors, courts, and correctional institutions—that must work in an integrated manner. This integration is not only structural but also includes the synchronization of legal substance and institutional culture. Therefore, the system’s success is not determined by the dominance of one institution, but by the harmonization of functions among law enforcers.
Mardjono Reksodiputro reinforced this concept, stating that if the components of the criminal justice system do not work cohesively, at least three consequences will follow. First, it becomes difficult to assess the performance of each institution. Second, each institution tends to solve its own problems without coordination. Third, overall responsibility becomes blurred, reducing the system’s overall effectiveness. This condition is precisely what is visible in the current polemic over handling corruption cases involving law enforcement officials.
Normatively, the Police, under Article 14, paragraph (1), letter g of Law Number 2 of 2002, have the authority to conduct investigations and inquiries into all criminal acts. On the other hand, Article 30, paragraph (1), letter d of Law Number 11 of 2021 grants the Attorney General’s Office the authority to investigate, prosecute, and execute court decisions on corruption cases. Furthermore, the KPK, under Article 6 of Law Number 19 of 2019, is also authorized to conduct investigations, prosecutions, coordination, supervision, and execution of corruption cases. Consequently, three institutions simultaneously possess authority at almost the same stages of the process.
This overlapping authority not only creates juridical problems but also institutional ones. The more institutions are given the same function without clear boundaries, the greater the potential for conflicts of authority. Francis Fukuyama’s theory of state capacity asserts that a state’s effectiveness is determined not only by the extent of its authority but also by the clarity of function distribution among state organs. A state that assigns similar functions to many institutions is at risk of inefficiency and authority conflicts.
The case involving a law enforcement official is the clearest example. When a prosecutor is suspected of corruption, the question arises: is the Attorney General’s Office fit to investigate a member of its own institution? Does this not constitute a conflict of interest?
Corruption has long been categorized as an extraordinary crime. Its characteristics not only harm state finances but also undermine democracy, hinder development, weaken public services, and violate the constitutional rights of citizens. This is why the international community, through the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003, places the independence of anti-corruption bodies as a key prerequisite for eradicating corruption.
Indonesia responded to this need by establishing the KPK in 2002. The KPK’s presence was not merely the addition of a new institution, but a state acknowledgment that conventional mechanisms through the Police and the Attorney General’s Office had not been optimally capable of eradicating corruption, especially cases involving state officials. The anti-corruption body was formed as an oversight mechanism for institutions with potential conflicts of interest. Therefore, independence should be the core spirit of the KPK.
Unfortunately, the revision of the KPK Law through Law Number 19 of 2019 altered this configuration. Article 3 places the KPK as part of the executive branch, while its employees’ status was changed to that of civil servants (ASN). Although the Constitutional Court, through Decision Number 70/PUU-XVII/2019, provided a correction regarding wiretapping mechanisms so as not to hinder law enforcement effectiveness, the debate over the KPK’s independence has never truly been resolved.
This precedent is an irony for Indonesia’s fight against corruption. As corruption becomes increasingly complex, the institutional design of its eradication is being weakened.