SE Asia still suspicious of Japan (1)
SE Asia still suspicious of Japan (1)
This is the first of a two-part article examining Japan's relations with Southeast Asia.
By Lam Peng Er
SINGAPORE: The post-Cold War era presents Japan with both opportunities and dilemmas in redefining its relations with Southeast Asia, a region that is becoming increasingly important to Tokyo's economic, strategic and diplomatic interests. Southeast Asia, as a subregion of the dynamic Asia-Pacific basin, is expected to continue to enjoy some of the strongest global economic growth in the first quarter of the 21st century.
The sharp appreciation of the yen makes Southeast Asia more attractive for Japanese investment; to take advantage of the region's cheaper cost of production. Rapid economic growth and greater consumer power in the region will make it a more important market for Japanese goods and services, especially given protectionist sentiments in Western Europe and the United States. The end of the Cold War also permits Tokyo to forge better political and economic ties with the Indochina states that are no longer aligned with the former Soviet Union, the adversary of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Despite optimism that the 21st century will be the Pacific century, there are a few hot spots in Southeast Asia, especially the dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The squabbles over the islands involve the intractable questions of sovereignty, potential mineral resources, especially oil, and fishing grounds. Any armed conflict among claimant states over the islands has the potential to disrupt the shipping lifeline of Japan, which straddles the disputed seas. Even though Japan is characteristically quiet about the issue, to avoid antagonizing any of the claimants (China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei), it cannot but be concerned about a potential tinderbox that may affect its vital interests.
Thus far, Tokyo is merely an interested bystander of the dispute with no discernible means of influencing the behavior of the claimants.
The region is also important to Japan's quest to play an international role that is commensurate with its economic superpower status. Official Development Assistance is an approach the country adopts as its contribution to the international community without resorting to a controversial military role.
Some of the Southeast Asian countries are the largest beneficiaries of Tokyo's foreign aid program. The end of the Cold War also saw Japan taking tentative steps to participate in the UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. Obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council is Tokyo's ambition for status and also to have an influence on security matters that affect global and regional stability. By the early 21st century it is likely that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will become a group of 10 that includes new members Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. It will be difficult for Japan to obtain its coveted seat if it does not obtain the diplomatic support of the ASEAN states, which may form a voting bloc of 10 in the United Nations.
If Japan cannot even win the support of its neighbors, it will not necessarily be easier to gain diplomatic support for a permanent seat in the Security Council from other regions. The formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also provides Japan with an important forum to discuss security issues pertaining to the Asia-Pacific region.
Unlike Northeast Asia, comprising China, Taiwan, the two Koreas and Japan, Southeast Asia has been able to institutionalize security dialogs to enhance confidence-building measures in the region.
Notwithstanding Japan's extensive economic, political and foreign aid involvement in the region, it is not easy for the country to play a larger leadership role in the region toward the 21st century. There are considerable international and domestic constraints to any Japanese attempts to play such a role.
Southeast Asia prefers Japan to be its partner rather than a political leader. This is in part a legacy of World War II when Japan invaded the region and sought to lead the so-called Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. To many Southeast Asians, the war is more accurately remembered as the Greater East Asia Co-Misery Sphere. Residual suspicions about Japan's lack of sincerity and contrition over wartime atrocities remain strong, especially in the wake of Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's inability to persuade his Liberal Democratic Party coalition partners to endorse a resolution that renounces militarism. The failure to offer a symbolic gesture to mark the 50th anniversary of the war reinforces the perception that Japan as a nation has not truly undergone a national catharsis to regard the war as an act of self-serving aggression against its neighbors.
The primacy of the U.S.-Japan alliance in Tokyo's international relations also constrains its approach to the region. Take for example the Malaysian proposal for an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). The scheme would include Japan but exclude the United States form an Asian regional grouping that could ostensibly counteract protectionist tendencies in other regions. Not surprisingly the United States rejects the idea of the EAEC, even though the North American Free Trade Area includes the United States, Canada and Mexico but excludes Asian countries from the trading bloc. Japan is sandwiched by the diametrically opposite positions of Washington and Kuala Lumpur towards the EAEC. Unwilling to jeopardize its relations with Washington, Tokyo is lukewarm to the Malaysian proposal.
Exasperated by Tokyo's reluctance to take an explicit stand over the EAEC, Malaysia has commented that Japanese commitment to the EAEC would be better appreciated than formal apologies over its wartime atrocities.
In the short run, it is difficult for Japan to play a more active role in Southeast Asia. The collapse of the LDP one-party dominance, and the making and unmaking of unstable coalition governments mean that the country is likely to be too preoccupied with domestic issues and lacks strong leadership to embark on bold foreign policy initiatives.
Until a more stable party system evolves, Japan remains a country adrift.
-- The Daily Yomiuri
Window: Southeast Asia prefers Japan to be its partner rather than a political leader. This is in part a legacy of World War II...