SE Asia still suspicious of Japan (1)

SE Asia still suspicious of Japan (1)

This is the first of a two-part article examining Japan's
relations with Southeast Asia.

By Lam Peng Er

SINGAPORE: The post-Cold War era presents Japan with both
opportunities and dilemmas in redefining its relations with
Southeast Asia, a region that is becoming increasingly important
to Tokyo's economic, strategic and diplomatic interests.
Southeast Asia, as a subregion of the dynamic Asia-Pacific basin,
is expected to continue to enjoy some of the strongest global
economic growth in the first quarter of the 21st century.

The sharp appreciation of the yen makes Southeast Asia more
attractive for Japanese investment; to take advantage of the
region's cheaper cost of production. Rapid economic growth and
greater consumer power in the region will make it a more
important market for Japanese goods and services, especially
given protectionist sentiments in Western Europe and the United
States. The end of the Cold War also permits Tokyo to forge
better political and economic ties with the Indochina states that
are no longer aligned with the former Soviet Union, the adversary
of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Despite optimism that the 21st century will be the Pacific
century, there are a few hot spots in Southeast Asia, especially
the dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The
squabbles over the islands involve the intractable questions of
sovereignty, potential mineral resources, especially oil, and
fishing grounds. Any armed conflict among claimant states over
the islands has the potential to disrupt the shipping lifeline of
Japan, which straddles the disputed seas. Even though Japan is
characteristically quiet about the issue, to avoid antagonizing
any of the claimants (China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Malaysia and Brunei), it cannot but be concerned about a
potential tinderbox that may affect its vital interests.

Thus far, Tokyo is merely an interested bystander of the
dispute with no discernible means of influencing the behavior of
the claimants.

The region is also important to Japan's quest to play an
international role that is commensurate with its economic
superpower status. Official Development Assistance is an approach
the country adopts as its contribution to the international
community without resorting to a controversial military role.

Some of the Southeast Asian countries are the largest
beneficiaries of Tokyo's foreign aid program. The end of the Cold
War also saw Japan taking tentative steps to participate in the
UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. Obtaining a permanent
seat on the UN Security Council is Tokyo's ambition for status
and also to have an influence on security matters that affect
global and regional stability. By the early 21st century it is
likely that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will
become a group of 10 that includes new members Cambodia, Laos and
Myanmar. It will be difficult for Japan to obtain its coveted
seat if it does not obtain the diplomatic support of the ASEAN
states, which may form a voting bloc of 10 in the United Nations.

If Japan cannot even win the support of its neighbors, it will
not necessarily be easier to gain diplomatic support for a
permanent seat in the Security Council from other regions. The
formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also provides Japan
with an important forum to discuss security issues pertaining to
the Asia-Pacific region.

Unlike Northeast Asia, comprising China, Taiwan, the two
Koreas and Japan, Southeast Asia has been able to
institutionalize security dialogs to enhance confidence-building
measures in the region.

Notwithstanding Japan's extensive economic, political and
foreign aid involvement in the region, it is not easy for the
country to play a larger leadership role in the region toward the
21st century. There are considerable international and domestic
constraints to any Japanese attempts to play such a role.

Southeast Asia prefers Japan to be its partner rather than a
political leader. This is in part a legacy of World War II when
Japan invaded the region and sought to lead the so-called Greater
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. To many Southeast Asians, the war
is more accurately remembered as the Greater East Asia Co-Misery
Sphere. Residual suspicions about Japan's lack of sincerity and
contrition over wartime atrocities remain strong, especially in
the wake of Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's
inability to persuade his Liberal Democratic Party coalition
partners to endorse a resolution that renounces militarism. The
failure to offer a symbolic gesture to mark the 50th anniversary
of the war reinforces the perception that Japan as a nation has
not truly undergone a national catharsis to regard the war as an
act of self-serving aggression against its neighbors.

The primacy of the U.S.-Japan alliance in Tokyo's
international relations also constrains its approach to the
region. Take for example the Malaysian proposal for an East Asian
Economic Caucus (EAEC). The scheme would include Japan but
exclude the United States form an Asian regional grouping that
could ostensibly counteract protectionist tendencies in other
regions. Not surprisingly the United States rejects the idea of
the EAEC, even though the North American Free Trade Area includes
the United States, Canada and Mexico but excludes Asian countries
from the trading bloc. Japan is sandwiched by the diametrically
opposite positions of Washington and Kuala Lumpur towards the
EAEC. Unwilling to jeopardize its relations with Washington,
Tokyo is lukewarm to the Malaysian proposal.

Exasperated by Tokyo's reluctance to take an explicit stand
over the EAEC, Malaysia has commented that Japanese commitment to
the EAEC would be better appreciated than formal apologies over
its wartime atrocities.

In the short run, it is difficult for Japan to play a more
active role in Southeast Asia. The collapse of the LDP one-party
dominance, and the making and unmaking of unstable coalition
governments mean that the country is likely to be too preoccupied
with domestic issues and lacks strong leadership to embark on
bold foreign policy initiatives.

Until a more stable party system evolves, Japan remains a
country adrift.

-- The Daily Yomiuri

Window: Southeast Asia prefers Japan to be its partner rather than
a political leader. This is in part a legacy of World War II...