Scurrying for a face-saving measure

Scurrying for a face-saving measure

Can supporters of President Abdurrahman Wahid save him now?
Political analyst Mochtar Mas'oed of Gadjah Mada University in
Yogyakarta shares his views in these excerpts from an interview:

Question: The House of Representatives has finally censured
President Abdurrahman Wahid, with 363 members voting for the
censure, 52 rejecting it, and 42 abstaining. What would be the
likely aftermath of this measure?

Answer: Well, 363 votes are too many compared with those who
voted to reject ... A special session of the People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) will be inevitable. There could be a
compromise this month (before the President's time is up to give
his response at the end of May) -- but without a special session
the 363 House members will not be satisfied.

This is the time for the President's supporters, particularly
the National Awakening Party (PKB), to go all out for a political
compromise, for a face-saving measure in the interests of the
President.

And PKB must realize that they are now dealing with a damage
control situation with limited options ... The President has
clearly suffered a severe political injury: the only choice left
is how to stop the attack against him which could knock him out.
So what's most likely to happen -- not that I'm recommending this
-- is the MPR special session, but impeachment may be dropped,
with a compromise.

What compromise?

That Abdurrahman remains as President, but he must abandon
most of his authority and let Vice President Megawati
Soekarnoputri do the day-to-day policy making, particularly
regarding two urgent problems: the threat of disintegration and
the economic crisis. At the same time, the President and his men
should find a few portfolios to be retained (for their camp) for
the President's survival.

We must realize that President Abdurrahman is not a good
administrator, despite his brilliance and conceptualization of
the country's move towards democracy.

Would Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI
Perjuangan) accept such an arrangement, since its members have
said the President has already violated his own decree on power
sharing between himself and Megawati?

The effectiveness of power sharing would be much stronger if
authorized through an MPR forum. The arrangement should also be
spelt out in detail to ensure Gus Dur (Abdurrahman) does not
violate it again.

PDI Perjuangan should also realize that it is impossible for
Gus Dur to hand 100 percent of his authority to Megawati. That's
why it is called "power sharing". Furthermore, PDI Perjuangan won
only around 30 percent of the total votes in the 1999 general
election.

How do you interpret the preparations currently being
undertaken by the largest factions, PDI Perjuangan and the Golkar
Party?

They are of course deliberating the possibility of an
impeachment against Abdurrahman in the MPR special session. PDI
Perjuangan and Golkar might also consider a coalition between
them, which would be firm enough as the political basis of a
strong government. But the problem is the likely unacceptability
of such a coalition among PDI Perjuangan grassroots supporters.

Therefore, PDI Perjuangan should reconsider giving PKB another
opportunity to implement (the above mentioned) face-saving
measure for the President.

Face saving is very important for PKB as most of Gus Dur's
supporters are Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) followers (claimed to total
30 million) who consider him more their spiritual leader than
their President.

What about the military and police faction?

I don't think it will remain silent as it does not want to be
left behind in politics ... the faction may eventually take the
initiative and might appear as the hero in a political stalemate.
Its abstention on the issuance of the second memorandum of
censure did not represent its real stance.

The faction, especially the military, has as its interest the
establishment of a good image for its political position within
the country.

Back to power sharing. Do you think Megawati would have a
stronger leaning toward military solutions to overcome unrest in
the regions, given her reported closeness to some TNI hard-
liners?

This is what I want to convey to her advisers. That they
should be more proactive in offering solutions to overcome
problems such as in Aceh and Irian Jaya -- to avoid Megawati
having to choose a military solution, as preferred by TNI.

How can Gus Dur be expected to change his leadership style?

That's his style, moreover he was raised as a son of a kyai, a
religious leader, with the title of "Gus" which is highly
respected by NU. And anyway, how can you tell a leopard to change
its spots? He can't be expected to stop issuing controversial
statements. What can be done is to reduce the opportunities where
he is able to make such statements.

I urge an end to the dialogs after Friday prayers, where he
answers any question in his own inimitable style, without the
replies being screened beforehand by a presidential spokesman.
(Asip A. Hasani)