Scurrying for a face-saving measure

Scurrying for a face-saving measure

Can supporters of President Abdurrahman Wahid save him now? Political analyst Mochtar Mas'oed of Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta shares his views in these excerpts from an interview:

Question: The House of Representatives has finally censured President Abdurrahman Wahid, with 363 members voting for the censure, 52 rejecting it, and 42 abstaining. What would be the likely aftermath of this measure?

Answer: Well, 363 votes are too many compared with those who voted to reject ... A special session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) will be inevitable. There could be a compromise this month (before the President's time is up to give his response at the end of May) -- but without a special session the 363 House members will not be satisfied.

This is the time for the President's supporters, particularly the National Awakening Party (PKB), to go all out for a political compromise, for a face-saving measure in the interests of the President.

And PKB must realize that they are now dealing with a damage control situation with limited options ... The President has clearly suffered a severe political injury: the only choice left is how to stop the attack against him which could knock him out. So what's most likely to happen -- not that I'm recommending this -- is the MPR special session, but impeachment may be dropped, with a compromise.

What compromise?

That Abdurrahman remains as President, but he must abandon most of his authority and let Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri do the day-to-day policy making, particularly regarding two urgent problems: the threat of disintegration and the economic crisis. At the same time, the President and his men should find a few portfolios to be retained (for their camp) for the President's survival.

We must realize that President Abdurrahman is not a good administrator, despite his brilliance and conceptualization of the country's move towards democracy.

Would Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) accept such an arrangement, since its members have said the President has already violated his own decree on power sharing between himself and Megawati?

The effectiveness of power sharing would be much stronger if authorized through an MPR forum. The arrangement should also be spelt out in detail to ensure Gus Dur (Abdurrahman) does not violate it again.

PDI Perjuangan should also realize that it is impossible for Gus Dur to hand 100 percent of his authority to Megawati. That's why it is called "power sharing". Furthermore, PDI Perjuangan won only around 30 percent of the total votes in the 1999 general election.

How do you interpret the preparations currently being undertaken by the largest factions, PDI Perjuangan and the Golkar Party?

They are of course deliberating the possibility of an impeachment against Abdurrahman in the MPR special session. PDI Perjuangan and Golkar might also consider a coalition between them, which would be firm enough as the political basis of a strong government. But the problem is the likely unacceptability of such a coalition among PDI Perjuangan grassroots supporters.

Therefore, PDI Perjuangan should reconsider giving PKB another opportunity to implement (the above mentioned) face-saving measure for the President.

Face saving is very important for PKB as most of Gus Dur's supporters are Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) followers (claimed to total 30 million) who consider him more their spiritual leader than their President.

What about the military and police faction?

I don't think it will remain silent as it does not want to be left behind in politics ... the faction may eventually take the initiative and might appear as the hero in a political stalemate. Its abstention on the issuance of the second memorandum of censure did not represent its real stance.

The faction, especially the military, has as its interest the establishment of a good image for its political position within the country.

Back to power sharing. Do you think Megawati would have a stronger leaning toward military solutions to overcome unrest in the regions, given her reported closeness to some TNI hard- liners?

This is what I want to convey to her advisers. That they should be more proactive in offering solutions to overcome problems such as in Aceh and Irian Jaya -- to avoid Megawati having to choose a military solution, as preferred by TNI.

How can Gus Dur be expected to change his leadership style?

That's his style, moreover he was raised as a son of a kyai, a religious leader, with the title of "Gus" which is highly respected by NU. And anyway, how can you tell a leopard to change its spots? He can't be expected to stop issuing controversial statements. What can be done is to reduce the opportunities where he is able to make such statements.

I urge an end to the dialogs after Friday prayers, where he answers any question in his own inimitable style, without the replies being screened beforehand by a presidential spokesman. (Asip A. Hasani)