Safeguarding the Military Judiciary in a Democratic State
The discussion on revising the Military Judiciary Law has resurfaced. Several groups are pushing for all criminal acts committed by TNI soldiers, especially those of a general nature, to be transferred to civilian courts. Their argument is simple: for justice and equality before the law. However, this issue is not as straightforward as that. The state must not slip into simplification that could potentially weaken the national defence system.
The military judiciary is not an institution formed to protect lawbreakers. It arises from the state’s objective need to maintain discipline, effectiveness, and combat readiness in the armed forces. The military is not an armed civilian organisation. It operates within a strict command system, in extreme situations, even in war conditions and secret operations. In such contexts, legal violations are not merely individual matters but also impact unit safety, operational success, and even national sovereignty.
This is where the fundamental difference lies between civil law and military law. A soldier who disobeys orders during an operation, for example, is not just breaking the law but endangering the lives of comrades. A small negligence can have fatal consequences. Therefore, the military judicial system is designed to understand these operational dimensions—something that cannot always be fully grasped in general courts.
Moreover, it cannot be ignored that many military cases intersect with state secrets, defence strategies, and intelligence operations. Opening all such processes to the unlimited public space of general courts could pose serious security risks. The state has an obligation to protect not only individual justice but also its strategic interests.
It is important to note that Indonesia is not an exception. Advanced democratic countries still maintain military judicial systems. The United States has the Uniform Code of Military Justice with court-martial mechanisms. The United Kingdom retains the Court Martial. Singapore and Malaysia, known for their military discipline, also have similar systems. This fact shows that the existence of a military judiciary is not an anomaly but a universal need in state defence governance.
Nevertheless, criticism of military judicial practices cannot be ignored. Perceptions of lighter sentences or lack of transparency are signals that reform is needed. Here, we must clearly distinguish between implementation weaknesses and the institution’s relevance. If there are deficiencies, what must be improved is the oversight system, transparency, and quality of decisions—not by abolishing the military judiciary.
A wiser approach is to undertake measured reforms. For certain general criminal acts that are not related to military duties, involvement of civilian courts can be considered. However, for violations directly related to discipline, operations, and military command structure, the military judiciary must remain the primary forum. In this way, the principle of justice is maintained without sacrificing the effectiveness of national defence.
A strong state not only has fair laws but also mechanisms to ensure that its armed forces remain disciplined and controlled. The military judiciary is part of that mechanism. Abolishing it is not a solution but a potential new problem.
Therefore, the correct policy direction is not abolition but reform. We need a military judiciary that is more transparent, more accountable, and more trusted by the public—without losing its primary function as a guardian of discipline and combat readiness.
In the end, national sovereignty is not only guarded on the battlefield but also in legal spaces that ensure every soldier remains within the rule of law. The military judiciary is one of the important pillars in that structure. Safeguarding it means safeguarding the state itself.
AM Hendropriyono
Professor at the Military Law College