Russian jets fly Asian skies

Russian jets fly Asian skies

The Indonesian government announced last week that it would
buy 12 Russian-made SU-30K fighters and eight MI-17-IV
helicopters after canceling the purchase of F-16s from the United
States in May. Kusnanto Anggoro, a researcher at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, talks about the Russian
defense industry.

JAKARTA (JP): In today's Russia, arms sales are acquiring a
new multidimensional quality that transcends the bounds of
routine export operations.

Russia has been increasingly willing to break old patterns of
arms supply and compete in technology transfers to ensure a
minimal market share. Promotion, price slashing and extended
warranties are the main strategies of the Russian arms trade
offensive.

Moscow's dealers also provide 10 year warranties for customers
paying cash. Weapons have frequently been exported at dumping
prices, often through non-governmental channels.

The contract on the sale of 24 SU-27S to China was paid for
with barter trade. The authorities of the South Chinese province
of Hainan delivered mango juice in exchange for an Il-75 plane.
And MiG-29s were sold to Malaysia in exchange for deliveries of
palm-oil.

The economic imperative has of course been the most important
factor behind the drive for selling weapons. But the problems run
much deeper because sales influence Yeltsin's authority building
and, moreover, the nation's military modernization.

Support for Yeltsin's reforms, in the wake of the April 1993
referendum, for instance, came only after his visit to areas with
a heavy concentration of defense industries, such as the Udmurt
Republic and Nizhnii Novgorod.

Somehow, Yeltsin is in a precarious dilemma. The "palm-oil
approach" to arms export policy is not totally acceptable for
weapon producers. Most of them perceive this kind of export
activity as temporary tactics for survival in a transitional
period.

The defense industry leaders understand that exchanging arms
for goods does not provide hard currency. Nor does it stimulate
restructuring or the development of production. On the other
hand, hard currency earning is getting much more difficult as the
world's arms market is a competitive one.

Russians readily disclose that their army is on the verge of
collapse. Their armed forces consist of some three million men,
according to a recent statement by Yurii Batounine, Secretary to
the Defense Council of Russia.

Somehow they all have to be paid, officers and their families
must be housed and provided with decent quarters, reasonable food
and clothing.

Moreover, equipment must be maintained and the soldiers must
be trained. But even those essentials are beyond the grasp of
present realities and this could undermine Yeltsin's legitimacy.
The military supported Yeltsin's decree on special rule in 1993
only after the president gave them the green light to become one
of the biggest arms traders, selling additional weapons to
foreign countries.

Anyhow, Russia knows only too well that power is almost
everything in (global) politics. Russia's military might be only
a shell of its former self but the nation's defense industries
remain a formidable force. These industries have the necessary
skills and factories to update weaponry.

The range of new planes, missiles, rockets, submarines, and
other hardware produced by Russia's military industry belies the
extent of the nation's financial distress.

Examples include the long range SU-34 fighter bomber and SU-35
fighter. Like the new MiG-35, the Sukhoi will be, at least, a
match for any Western fighter well into the next century.

Similarly, the Khamov-50 "Black Shark" and the elegant Mil Mi-
28N, which looks like the American AH-64 Apache helicopter, are
formidable.

At a time when Russian soldiers are going hungry, and billions
of rubles are being funneled into expensive weaponry development
programs, Yeltsin is expecting a lot from the arms transfers. The
legitimacy of his leadership hangs on his ability to earn hard
currency and thereby enable the country to import consumer and
other civilian goods.

Perhaps more importantly, he also wants to prove a point with
the conservative nationalists. They argue that the eclipse of
Russia's share in the global arms market was a condition imposed
on the nation by the West and other foreign creditors in return
for financial and technical aid.

The defense industries too are trying to demonstrate their
viability through arms exports to escape demands for the
industry's conversion.

The nation's global arms market is on the road to recovery.
The weapons trade is a buyer's paradise because there are so many
alternative suppliers.

The Russian MiG and Sukhoi have already landed in Southeast
Asia. Malaysia has two squadrons of MiG-29s. And the MiG-21s have
been the avant garde of Laos and Cambodian air defenses. The
Vietnamese also count on the Sukhoi-27s. Now Indonesia is
extending the Russian link.

It is too early to talk about the Russification of the
Southeast Asian air force. But herein may rest the future of the
Russian military and a stronger legitimacy for the Kremlin
leadership.

Gone is the naive argument that arms transfer served the
important objective of acquiring and maintaining ideological and
political spheres of influence. Linking arms sales with human
rights records will be rendered ineffective. The only problem for
the buyers is that they should consider maintenance cost, the
availability of spare parts and adequate training.