Russian jets fly Asian skies

The Indonesian government announced last week that it would buy 12 Russian-made SU-30K fighters and eight MI-17-IV helicopters after canceling the purchase of F-16s from the United States in May. Kusnanto Anggoro, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, talks about the Russian defense industry.

JAKARTA (JP): In today's Russia, arms sales are acquiring a new multidimensional quality that transcends the bounds of routine export operations.

Russia has been increasingly willing to break old patterns of arms supply and compete in technology transfers to ensure a minimal market share. Promotion, price slashing and extended warranties are the main strategies of the Russian arms trade offensive.

Moscow's dealers also provide 10 year warranties for customers paying cash. Weapons have frequently been exported at dumping prices, often through non-governmental channels.

The contract on the sale of 24 SU-27S to China was paid for with barter trade. The authorities of the South Chinese province of Hainan delivered mango juice in exchange for an Il-75 plane. And MiG-29s were sold to Malaysia in exchange for deliveries of palm-oil.

The economic imperative has of course been the most important factor behind the drive for selling weapons. But the problems run much deeper because sales influence Yeltsin's authority building and, moreover, the nation's military modernization.

Support for Yeltsin's reforms, in the wake of the April 1993 referendum, for instance, came only after his visit to areas with a heavy concentration of defense industries, such as the Udmurt Republic and Nizhnii Novgorod.

Somehow, Yeltsin is in a precarious dilemma. The "palm-oil approach" to arms export policy is not totally acceptable for weapon producers. Most of them perceive this kind of export activity as temporary tactics for survival in a transitional period.

The defense industry leaders understand that exchanging arms for goods does not provide hard currency. Nor does it stimulate restructuring or the development of production. On the other hand, hard currency earning is getting much more difficult as the world's arms market is a competitive one.

Russians readily disclose that their army is on the verge of collapse. Their armed forces consist of some three million men, according to a recent statement by Yurii Batounine, Secretary to the Defense Council of Russia.

Somehow they all have to be paid, officers and their families must be housed and provided with decent quarters, reasonable food and clothing.

Moreover, equipment must be maintained and the soldiers must be trained. But even those essentials are beyond the grasp of present realities and this could undermine Yeltsin's legitimacy. The military supported Yeltsin's decree on special rule in 1993 only after the president gave them the green light to become one of the biggest arms traders, selling additional weapons to foreign countries.

Anyhow, Russia knows only too well that power is almost everything in (global) politics. Russia's military might be only a shell of its former self but the nation's defense industries remain a formidable force. These industries have the necessary skills and factories to update weaponry.

The range of new planes, missiles, rockets, submarines, and other hardware produced by Russia's military industry belies the extent of the nation's financial distress.

Examples include the long range SU-34 fighter bomber and SU-35 fighter. Like the new MiG-35, the Sukhoi will be, at least, a match for any Western fighter well into the next century.

Similarly, the Khamov-50 "Black Shark" and the elegant Mil Mi- 28N, which looks like the American AH-64 Apache helicopter, are formidable.

At a time when Russian soldiers are going hungry, and billions of rubles are being funneled into expensive weaponry development programs, Yeltsin is expecting a lot from the arms transfers. The legitimacy of his leadership hangs on his ability to earn hard currency and thereby enable the country to import consumer and other civilian goods.

Perhaps more importantly, he also wants to prove a point with the conservative nationalists. They argue that the eclipse of Russia's share in the global arms market was a condition imposed on the nation by the West and other foreign creditors in return for financial and technical aid.

The defense industries too are trying to demonstrate their viability through arms exports to escape demands for the industry's conversion.

The nation's global arms market is on the road to recovery. The weapons trade is a buyer's paradise because there are so many alternative suppliers.

The Russian MiG and Sukhoi have already landed in Southeast Asia. Malaysia has two squadrons of MiG-29s. And the MiG-21s have been the avant garde of Laos and Cambodian air defenses. The Vietnamese also count on the Sukhoi-27s. Now Indonesia is extending the Russian link.

It is too early to talk about the Russification of the Southeast Asian air force. But herein may rest the future of the Russian military and a stronger legitimacy for the Kremlin leadership.

Gone is the naive argument that arms transfer served the important objective of acquiring and maintaining ideological and political spheres of influence. Linking arms sales with human rights records will be rendered ineffective. The only problem for the buyers is that they should consider maintenance cost, the availability of spare parts and adequate training.