Rotten from the Inside

The readiness of prevention and mitigation systems to face the dry season remains a problem.

Five regents in Central Java were arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) within a short period. They are the Regent of Pati, the Regent of Pekalongan, the Regent of Cilacap, the Regent of Sukoharjo, and the Regent of Pemalang.

All of this occurred within 191 days, from the first arrest of the Pati Regent (19 January 2026) to the fifth, the Pemalang Regent (28 July 2026). On average, every 38.2 days one regent elected by the people of Central Java was imprisoned for corruption.

Judging from their party origins, it is clear that corruption is a pathology of power without discrimination. The Pati Regent is a Gerindra cadre. The Pekalongan Regent is a Golkar cadre. The Cilacap Regent is a PKB cadre. The Sukoharjo Regent is a PDIP cadre. The Pemalang Regent is a professional, a former director of a state-owned enterprise. Those four parties are top-tier parties, while the professional holds a master’s degree in management. Whatever their party, whatever their education, they all stole.

It is common knowledge that corruption is rampant because the cost of winning regional elections is extremely expensive. In small regencies it costs Rp30 billion–Rp50 billion. In medium regencies Rp50 billion–Rp100 billion. In large regencies Rp100 billion–Rp150 billion. The chance of winning is very difficult if the capital is below Rp20 billion–Rp40 billion.

If the measure of a large regency is a population of more than 500,000, the five regencies are large regencies. If the measure is a regional budget of more than Rp1.5 trillion and more than 6,000 employees, the five regencies are also classified as large regencies. That means, to become regent there, one must have at least Rp100 billion.

Those figures may be too large, or ‘crazy’ if too small. To obtain precision, the KPK could be relied upon to dig into the regents who are now suspects. How much money was spent in total? How much for party dowries? How much for the support of one seat in the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD)? How much for the campaign team? How much money to ‘persuade’ the people who have votes?

The KPK should not only operate in the legal realm for court purposes, but should also make these ‘rogue regents’ ‘research respondents’ on money politics. As a result, the KPK could speak with more weight than merely quoting figures from studies by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The basic salary of a regent is very small. Regulated in Government Regulation (PP) No. 109 of 2000, the basic salary is the same for all regents and mayors. It amounts to Rp2.1 million per month. What does that amount of money mean for the five regencies whose regents were arrested by the KPK?

The relevant and contextual answer is to compare it with the fate of the people they lead, namely the size of the regency minimum wage (UMK). Pati Regency: Rp2,485,000. Pekalongan Regency: Rp2,633,700. Cilacap Regency: Rp2,773,184. Sukoharjo Regency: Rp2,500,000. Pemalang Regency: Rp2,433,254.

That is the ‘mathematical’ reality: the basic salaries of the five regents are all below the UMK. Mathematical because the UMK is set using a mathematical formula by adding the new wage adjustment value to the current year’s UMK value.

The UMK always moves upward, while the ‘mathematics’ of the regent’s basic salary has been stagnant for 26 years. It stopped in place after PP No. 109 of 2000 was issued.

In reality, there has been neglect or indifference towards the regent’s basic salary. That is one of the factors causing corruption, rotten from within.

When viewed through the lens of the UMK with an average of Rp2,565,027.6 per month or a minimum of Rp85,500 per day in those five regencies, ‘wani piro’ money is quite tempting. If in one household earning only the UMK there are four voters, and they are given ‘wani piro’ of Rp120,000 (Rp30,000 per vote, according to one source), it is understandable that the money is accepted gladly. If two pairs of regent candidates compete in the regional election, that household could receive Rp240,000, or almost the equivalent of three days of minimum wage. Quite tempting. The low income of the people is linked to money politics.

At that point, it is important to revisit the view of former Vice President Boediono, who in his professorial inauguration speech at Gadjah Mada University (2007) said that the sustainability of a country’s democratic system is linearly correlated with the per capita income of its people. If per capita income is low, below US$1,500, the democratic system is very fragile and has a very high probability of failure. The transition zone is a per capita income of US$4,000. The safe limit, where democracy has a high chance of success, is a per capita income of US$6,000.

Based on the latest data from BPS released on 5 February 2026, Indonesia’s per capita income is Rp83.7 million per year, equivalent to US$5,083.4. Indonesia’s democracy is still in the transition zone. If per capita income does not rise higher to reach US$6,000, while money politics becomes increasingly entrenched and corruption increasingly pervasive, democracy will not reach the safe zone. Eroded from within, rotten from within, democracy has the potential to fail. Indonesia could even return to an authoritarian era.

State officials, including regents, are obliged to report their wealth to the KPK. Are they honest? That is their business with God. Based on those reports, the wealth of the ‘rogue regent’ of Pati is Rp31.52 billion. The wealth of the ‘rogue regent’ of Pekalongan is Rp85.6 billion. The wealth of the ‘rogue regent’ of Cilacap is Rp12.03 billion. The wealth of the ‘rogue regent’ of Sukoharjo is Rp9.11 billion. The wealth of the ‘rogue regent’ of Pemalang is Rp21.31 billion.

If all of it were staked entirely on the regional election, their wealth would not be enough to win. The question is, where did they get the capital loans? From political loan sharks who are repaid after they become regent.

Because the regent’s salary is small, the regent can only repay it from the proceeds of corruption. Rotten from within.

Among the nation’s children, there is a view that improving salaries has no effect on corruption. That view is correct. Research conducted by Leslie Palmier on bureaucratic corruption in Hong Kong, India, and Indonesia concluded that the level of bureaucratic corruption in a country is not determined by a single factor, but by the interplay of three main factors. Those three main factors are the size of corruption opportunities, the size of salaries, and the effectiveness of law enforcement.

If corruption opportunities are minimal, salaries are adequate, and law enforcement is effective, the level of corruption in that country is low. Conversely, if there are many corruption opportunities, salaries are low, and law enforcement is weak, corruption will be quite high in that country. The latter is Indonesia.

Palmier’s comparative research was published in 1985. Now, in 2026, after 41 years, the bad has become worse. The sign is that the Deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes, the highest law enforcement official for eradicating corruption, recently went to prison for alleged corruption involving kilograms of gold, piles of US dollars, and piles of Singapore dollars.

If the three main factors identified by Palmier are not improved simultaneously and per capita income does not reach what Boediono mentioned, changing the election of regents and mayors from direct election by the people to election by the DPRD is not the right therapy to eradicate corruption and save democracy.

Rotten from within cannot be cured by tinkering with the electoral system. That would only move ‘wani piro’ from the people’s level (and for the people) to ‘wani piro’ in the form of bargaining prices at the elite level (and for the elite), both party elites and parliamentary elites (DPRD members).