Riots becoming commonplace in Indonesia

By Ester I. Jusuf

The following is the second of two articles reviewing the riots that broke out in Indonesia throughout the year.

JAKARTA (JP): After November, riots broke out everywhere. Aceh was one of the most notably violent areas. The riots were almost always incited by clashes between military personnel and unarmed masses, although in one reported occasion the masses armed themselves (the kind of weapons was not reported, SMUR and Kontras reports, December 1998).

In Porsea, North Sumatra, on Nov. 23, 1998, mobs attacked Inti Indo Rayon plywood factory which had been a problem for the local population for a long time. This time, the captured provocateurs revealed that they were paid and at the same time threatened not to rebuke the wish of the men who had paid them (Antara, Nov. 24, 1998).

Between Dec. 25 and Dec. 30, a riot broke out in the Central Sulawesi town of Poso. There was not much data on this riot.

At about the same time, a riot broke out in Belawan, North Sumatra, which was incited by an individual quarrel between two locals over a pair of shoes. The police arrested both men but soon afterward, disenchanted relatives of the men came in hundreds and burned down the police station (Kompas, Jan. 27, 1999).

Then a real shock came about when the usually peaceful town of Karawang in West Java imploded into riot. The riot was sparked by a long time resentment of locals against the police. When the police apprehended one ojek (motorbike taxi) driver for an alleged traffic violation, rumors spread that the driver was tortured to death while in custody. Ojek drivers came in to take revenge and destroyed four police stations.

Clashes between the mobs and local police and military officers continued for three days running. Whenever the mobs were forced to retreat, which was usually handled by being shot at with live ammunition through the column of the masses, they burned and looted shops along the way. The mobs started to pelt speeding trains when they tried unsuccessfully to attack a police station near the railway. When the military opened fire and killed one man, the mobs retaliated in an arbitrary fashion. (Kompas, Jan. 9, 1999).

The second most significant area was Ambon, capital of Maluku islands in the eastern part of the archipelago, where a riot broke out on Jan. 19, 1999. This riot was incited, again, by a personal quarrel between members of rival thugs which turned into gang warfare. Rumors spread that mosques and churches were burned down and the gang war quickly turned into a racial and sectarian riot (Detikcom, Jan. 20, 1999).

What is interesting is that one of the alleged provocateurs confessed that there was involvement of "people from Jakarta", though the local police commander did not want to discuss it further. (Antara, Jan. 25, 1999).

As mentioned above, the word "riot" can mean three different things. The "riots" in Aceh, Porsea, Karawang, for example, were incited by a long-standing resentment against the police or the military in general. Thirty-two years of repressive political and economic policy taught people the culture of violence. A lot has to be done before people can be accustomed to a more democratic way of solving differences and disputes.

Only later were riots ignited by personal quarrels. It is rather strange that quarrels can lead to massive destruction. One possible explanation could be the severe impact of economic crisis is forcing ordinary people to constantly look for a way out, a safety valve which can keep their strength in their struggle to survive. This would explain the fact that people loot shops and places for things they cannot normally buy. It is also understandable that people are easily ignited as they were already under heavy stress.

But then we must also consider the fact that provocation is almost a constant factor in every mass movement in Indonesian history. Back in 1974, a peaceful student rally turned violent and ended in a mass riot. Later, it was fully acknowledged that Gen. Soemitro (then Chief of Command for Restoration of Security and Order or Kopkamtib) and Gen. Ali Moertopo (then Head of Opsus or Special Operation) were the two key actors behind the riot. They played their trump cards by exploiting the student rally.

Kopkamtib was Soeharto's front guard, playing intelligent services' covert war against all "enemies of the state" -- a very vague but potent definition. Under the legitimization of waging a psychological deterrent against Soeharto's political opposition, Kopkamtib was the field operative for carrying out clean-sweep operations across the country. Opsus, on the other hand was another intelligent service responsible for carrying out bribery, political intimidation, and forcing political players to bow to Soeharto's scenarios.

Apart from those two agencies, there were other agencies such as Army Intelligent Service (BAIS/BIA), Coordinating Body for Intelligent Services (BAKIN), Polri Police Directorate for Intelligent and Security Services (DitIntelPam), Intelligence Operations of the Attorney General (Opsin Kejagung), and Social and Political Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Ditsospol Mendagri). All these services were under direct or non-direct control of Soeharto himself.

The systematic use of violence by intelligent services can be summed up if we read the manual (Vademecum of Defense and Security) issued by Academy for Army Staff of Command (Seskoad) which usually produces top officers for these services. One of the chapters deals with rules for using tortures on captured prisoners.

It is also well known that these intelligent services make full use of local hoodlums to intimidate the oppositions. There are paramilitary groups supervised directly by local army commands: Siliwangi Youth (AMS) trained, armed, and supervised by the 3rd Military Region (code-named Siliwangi), Diponegoro Youth (AMD) by 4th Military Region (code-named Diponegoro).

When counter demonstrators (government supported) are deployed, the participants usually come from these youth organizations or other Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth) or Pemuda Panca Marga, two leading organizations whose leaders presumably had personal relations with Soeharto himself. This so- called "counter-demonstration" usually aimed for a violent physical contact with opposition demonstrators. Members of these youth organizations allegedly often carried weapons and at times guns.

It is uncomfortable to learn that some of the riots were instigated by disputes between local thugs. In Banyuwangi, East Java, there was a direct involvement of these criminals. In Porsea, North Sumatra, paid thugs carried out the whole job.

It is also highly possible that the ones who started the looting were also these criminals. They have the guts to rob people in broad daylight so they certainly would be the first to recognize that chaos is the best time to loot.

There is proof that there were provocateurs in the May 14 to May 15, 1998, riot. The possibility is very high that all other riots were also the work of provocateurs. And intelligent services are the best in this business.

The writer is chairwoman of Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa.