Riots becoming commonplace in Indonesia

Riots becoming commonplace in Indonesia

By Ester I. Jusuf

The following is the second of two articles reviewing the
riots that broke out in Indonesia throughout the year.

JAKARTA (JP): After November, riots broke out everywhere. Aceh
was one of the most notably violent areas. The riots were almost
always incited by clashes between military personnel and unarmed
masses, although in one reported occasion the masses armed
themselves (the kind of weapons was not reported, SMUR and
Kontras reports, December 1998).

In Porsea, North Sumatra, on Nov. 23, 1998, mobs attacked Inti
Indo Rayon plywood factory which had been a problem for the local
population for a long time. This time, the captured provocateurs
revealed that they were paid and at the same time threatened not
to rebuke the wish of the men who had paid them (Antara, Nov. 24,
1998).

Between Dec. 25 and Dec. 30, a riot broke out in the Central
Sulawesi town of Poso. There was not much data on this riot.

At about the same time, a riot broke out in Belawan, North
Sumatra, which was incited by an individual quarrel between two
locals over a pair of shoes. The police arrested both men but
soon afterward, disenchanted relatives of the men came in
hundreds and burned down the police station (Kompas, Jan. 27,
1999).

Then a real shock came about when the usually peaceful town of
Karawang in West Java imploded into riot. The riot was sparked by
a long time resentment of locals against the police. When the
police apprehended one ojek (motorbike taxi) driver for an
alleged traffic violation, rumors spread that the driver was
tortured to death while in custody. Ojek drivers came in to take
revenge and destroyed four police stations.

Clashes between the mobs and local police and military
officers continued for three days running. Whenever the mobs were
forced to retreat, which was usually handled by being shot at
with live ammunition through the column of the masses, they
burned and looted shops along the way. The mobs started to pelt
speeding trains when they tried unsuccessfully to attack a police
station near the railway. When the military opened fire and
killed one man, the mobs retaliated in an arbitrary fashion.
(Kompas, Jan. 9, 1999).

The second most significant area was Ambon, capital of Maluku
islands in the eastern part of the archipelago, where a riot
broke out on Jan. 19, 1999. This riot was incited, again, by a
personal quarrel between members of rival thugs which turned into
gang warfare. Rumors spread that mosques and churches were burned
down and the gang war quickly turned into a racial and sectarian
riot (Detikcom, Jan. 20, 1999).

What is interesting is that one of the alleged provocateurs
confessed that there was involvement of "people from Jakarta",
though the local police commander did not want to discuss it
further. (Antara, Jan. 25, 1999).

As mentioned above, the word "riot" can mean three different
things. The "riots" in Aceh, Porsea, Karawang, for example, were
incited by a long-standing resentment against the police or the
military in general. Thirty-two years of repressive political and
economic policy taught people the culture of violence. A lot has
to be done before people can be accustomed to a more democratic
way of solving differences and disputes.

Only later were riots ignited by personal quarrels. It is
rather strange that quarrels can lead to massive destruction. One
possible explanation could be the severe impact of economic
crisis is forcing ordinary people to constantly look for a way
out, a safety valve which can keep their strength in their
struggle to survive. This would explain the fact that people loot
shops and places for things they cannot normally buy. It is also
understandable that people are easily ignited as they were
already under heavy stress.

But then we must also consider the fact that provocation is
almost a constant factor in every mass movement in Indonesian
history. Back in 1974, a peaceful student rally turned violent
and ended in a mass riot. Later, it was fully acknowledged that
Gen. Soemitro (then Chief of Command for Restoration of Security
and Order or Kopkamtib) and Gen. Ali Moertopo (then Head of Opsus
or Special Operation) were the two key actors behind the riot.
They played their trump cards by exploiting the student rally.

Kopkamtib was Soeharto's front guard, playing intelligent
services' covert war against all "enemies of the state" -- a very
vague but potent definition. Under the legitimization of waging a
psychological deterrent against Soeharto's political opposition,
Kopkamtib was the field operative for carrying out clean-sweep
operations across the country. Opsus, on the other hand was
another intelligent service responsible for carrying out bribery,
political intimidation, and forcing political players to bow to
Soeharto's scenarios.

Apart from those two agencies, there were other agencies such
as Army Intelligent Service (BAIS/BIA), Coordinating Body for
Intelligent Services (BAKIN), Polri Police Directorate for
Intelligent and Security Services (DitIntelPam), Intelligence
Operations of the Attorney General (Opsin Kejagung), and Social
and Political Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs
(Ditsospol Mendagri). All these services were under direct or
non-direct control of Soeharto himself.

The systematic use of violence by intelligent services can be
summed up if we read the manual (Vademecum of Defense and
Security) issued by Academy for Army Staff of Command (Seskoad)
which usually produces top officers for these services. One of
the chapters deals with rules for using tortures on captured
prisoners.

It is also well known that these intelligent services make
full use of local hoodlums to intimidate the oppositions. There
are paramilitary groups supervised directly by local army
commands: Siliwangi Youth (AMS) trained, armed, and supervised by
the 3rd Military Region (code-named Siliwangi), Diponegoro Youth
(AMD) by 4th Military Region (code-named Diponegoro).

When counter demonstrators (government supported) are
deployed, the participants usually come from these youth
organizations or other Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth) or
Pemuda Panca Marga, two leading organizations whose leaders
presumably had personal relations with Soeharto himself. This so-
called "counter-demonstration" usually aimed for a violent
physical contact with opposition demonstrators. Members of these
youth organizations allegedly often carried weapons and at times
guns.

It is uncomfortable to learn that some of the riots were
instigated by disputes between local thugs. In Banyuwangi, East
Java, there was a direct involvement of these criminals. In
Porsea, North Sumatra, paid thugs carried out the whole job.

It is also highly possible that the ones who started the
looting were also these criminals. They have the guts to rob
people in broad daylight so they certainly would be the first to
recognize that chaos is the best time to loot.

There is proof that there were provocateurs in the May 14 to
May 15, 1998, riot. The possibility is very high that all other
riots were also the work of provocateurs. And intelligent
services are the best in this business.

The writer is chairwoman of Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa.