RI faces democratization challenge
RI faces democratization challenge
By Juwono Sudarsono
JAKARTA (JP): In the East Asian Miracle survey of economic growth and public policy 1965-1990, the World Bank attributed the success of eight High Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs) to getting the fundamentals right: stable macro-economic policy, high human capital investment, effective financial system, limiting price distortions, openness to foreign technology and sound agricultural policies. Overall economic performance was impressive: rapid growth of exports, transformation of agriculture, controlled population growth and rapid industrialization. Poverty was reduced and social indicators improved.
The World Bank left unsaid two other fundamentals that helped propel the HPAEs throughout 1965-1990: geographical proximity to Japan and the authoritarian style of government intervention. Japan was the powerhouse that pulled the seven other HPAEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia) at the fortuitous period: the 1965-75 Vietnam war, which in no small measure helped fuel economic growth throughout the region.
All eight economies had basically one-party states (the LDP in Japan was for all practical purposes even more dominant than Indonesia's ruling Golkar; Hong Kong was and remains until 1997 a colony; South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore throughout the 1970s and 1980s in no way reflected liberal democratic forms of governance. The lesson seems patently clear: there is no correlation and even less causality between political democracy and economic growth.
The question for the next 10 to 15 years is: how and to what degree will there be liberalization in the area of politics to sustain the projected average 5.5 percent annual growth rate in the Asia-Pacific region?
By and large, Indonesians are not overawed by the so-called "democratization" wave which reputedly began in Latin America in the 1980s and "swept" across Africa and Asia through the early 1990s. A careful examination of how most Latin American and African nations have fared since adopting "civilian politics" and "free elections" over the past 10-15 years shows that the vast majority of the poor have not done well economically. Maldistribution of income, abject poverty and civil unrest continue to prevail among the urban and rural poor.
Even allowing for the fact that inflation remains under control in Brazil and Argentina, for example, the benefits have largely been confined to the middle class in the cities. Chile's "Pinochet option" of maintaining tight political control as a precondition to economic growth is another version of the South Korea experience of the same period: Roh Tae Woo's transitional government to Kim Young Sam's contemporary "democracy".
The ASEAN situation reveals some striking differences. At one end of the spectrum is Singapore's current debate on political liberalization in a prosperous economic environment. The Philippines' relative progress on both the economic and political fronts has recently been touted as a viable alternative to the disciplinarian model of Lee Kuan Yew. But the Philippines went through its "pinochet option" during the latter years of Ferdinand Marcos's rule as president, when not a few of the current establishment in Manila benefited from his patronage. Today's civilian-led government in Bangkok masks the real, albeit discreet, business and political clout of the Thai military and police behind the scenes.
President Soeharto's recent appeal for a more competitive Indonesia may or may not have a hidden political agenda. What is clear is that as the country moved towards "APEC 2020", two entirely new generations of Indonesians will come to the fore, particularly in the professions. Pressures to establish a civil society will be more evident as these young Indonesians come of age.
Ultimately, a nation's true merit will be judged by how the more fortunate treat the least fortunate members of society. As skilled professionals who take Indonesian unity for granted, young Indonesians reflect values and attitudes commensurate with the realities with which Indonesia must come to grips: opening fairer competition in domestic trade, business and services, fostering a credible legal system in order to distribute economic benefits more equitably, establishing credit structures which provide fair opportunity to those in small businesses; the all important role of maintaining a viable agricultural base to support industrialization.
Above all, Indonesia faces the democratization challenge of germinating leadership skills that often can only come from trial and error on the ground: sustaining economic growth together with broadening political participation -- without spinning out of control.
The writer of this article is professor of International Relations at the University of Indonesia.