Reformist leaders fight authoritarianism
Frans H. Winarta, Jakarta
We are now in the lead-in to the next phase of the 2004 electoral process: namely, the first round of elections for the presidency and vice presidency two months from now. With the deadline fast approaching for registration of presidential and vice-presidential candidates at the General Elections Commission (KPU), the political parties are busy searching for candidates with the potential to win on July 5.
The search for a vice-presidential candidate is particularly important because our current multiparty system means that it is not possible for a single party to win 50 percent or more of the vote. Given the condition that it is necessary for a candidate to obtain more than 50 percent of the national vote and at least 20 percent of the vote in at least half the provinces in Indonesia (Article 66, Law No. 23/2003 on elections), coalition-making cannot be avoided as a strategy for success.
Ironically, the recently concluded, peaceful, legislative elections demonstrated the consolidation of Indonesia's emerging democracy; yet, at the same time, the system has resulted in the emergence of two former military figures. In a development that would have been almost impossible to predict a year ago, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Wiranto have emerged as the two leading contenders for the presidency.
However, since one emerged as leader of a party that is likely to finish only fifth in the legislative elections and the other through a congress held after the general election, in which his party is likely to score its lowest vote in history (albeit as winner), the real popularity of these two men has yet to be tested.
To what extent voters in 70,000 villages scattered through Indonesia's vast archipelago actually know them has yet to be proven. And the extent of their support among urban civilian communities who still remember the excesses of military domination during the Soeharto regime will also be interesting to observe. Have the people of Indonesia already forgotten the dark history of human rights abuses suffered at the hands of a brutal regime for 32 years?
In the words of Plato, authoritarian government is effective because it can muzzle its critics, create artificial stability and even significant economic growth (although far from evenly shared). Take the government of Chun Do Hwan of South Korea as an example, or even Soeharto's Indonesia, which was relatively stable and safe and enjoyed around 7 percent growth per year and a significant flow of foreign investment. However, democratic development, respect for human rights and the rule of law were almost completely ignored.
By ignoring these latter aspects of development, Indonesia paid a high price. From this military regime, we inherited an economic crisis, a crisis in leadership, violent societal conflict, crimes against humanity (for which we have been held responsible in East Timor), lack of preparedness of civilian leaders, legal disarray, an economy in tatters and a banking system open to massive abuse -- among other things.
The extent to which these former military candidates are able to change the image from what was experienced from the military during the Soeharto regime is something that we will wait to observe at the July 5 polls. The new president's commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law will be tested throughout the five-year term.
It must be admitted that democracy requires patience, sacrifice and often results in government that is not so effective in producing short term results. But that is the price that must be paid to create a government and community that guarantees and protects human rights, a free press, freedom of expression, just law enforcement, protection of minority rights and free and fair elections. Impatience, and the desire for fast results, could result in a return to authoritarian rule.
The country's fate will be in the hands of the election winner. It is for this reason that our reformist leaders must be skillful in using this momentum to remind the people of the ramifications of a return to military power, the dwifungsi paradigm and the old ways of running the country. Reform leaders must unite to prevent a return to repressive government that caused such great suffering, the effects of which are still felt to the present day.
It is not fair to compare the effectiveness of the New Order regime with the governments that followed. The latter emerged out of a 32-year authoritarian political climate that systematically stifled the emergence of new leaders. New civilian community leaders were suddenly thrust onto the political stage with the fall of Soeharto in 1998.
The lack of development of leadership within political parties during the New Order regime meant that Indonesia has found it difficult to produce civilian leaders who are seasoned and tough enough to tackle the nation's problems. Political careers were not allowed to be nurtured as they were in developed countries.
Before becoming British prime minister, Tony Blair had to join a Labor Party that had spent 18 years in opposition before he could seize the nation's highest political office through a general election in 1997. Politicians in developed countries, like Tony Blair, must groom themselves and be tested through open debate in parliament, policy deliberations, the rough and tumble of political life, a rigid system of meritocracy and clear platforms that need to be sold to one's party as well as to the electorate.
Indonesia has never really had such a system. It should come as no surprise, therefore, if civilian politicians sometimes seem to lack toughness, have no long-term vision for the country's future and are poor in crisis and conflict management. This situation can only improve if our leaders unite for the future of the country, forget about short-term personal gain and focus on the broad picture of how to strengthen our nascent democracy. They need to be aware of the dangers of falling back into the trap of authoritarianism with its false promise of short-term stability.
Reconciliation between reform leaders like Megawati Soekarnoputri and Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid is needed so that Indonesia does not slip back into militarism. This can still happen because politics is the art of the possible. It should be remembered that one of the key points of the reform agenda was the eradication of the military's sociopolitical role.
Although Wiranto and Susilo are now retired generals, the military command structure that sits uncomfortably with democracy is difficult to eradicate from their way of thinking. It may be different in developed democracies where retired military personnel entering politics are fully acquainted with democratic processes in their everyday lives and are unlikely to impose military-type solutions to national problems.
The recent statement of Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, in which he refused to accept a vice presidential nomination from any political party, was the right move and worthy of a professional soldier who safeguards civilian supremacy and the neutrality of the armed forces in domestic politics.
The Sukarno name that she wears is Megawati's principal capital for reelection. For the last five years, her photo has been displayed across the villages of the nation as Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) leader, vice president and then president, to make her an easily recognizable figure for tens of millions of farmers, fishermen, laborers and small traders. Gus Dur is also sufficiently close to the people such that these two figures, were they to unite, would become a formidable and popular force as compared with the other candidates.
Is it possible for them to unite again, given their troubled history? Reconciliation between the two could prevent the reemergence of old forces that may jeopardize Indonesia's democratic development. If they can forget their past differences and unite for the greater good, they would truly represent a force to be reckoned with.
The writer is Advocate and Member of IBA Human Rights Institute Advisory Board.