Reflecting on the internationalization of the Papuan issue

Aleksius Jemadu, Bandung

It was surprising that two members of the U.S. Congress launched a campaign aimed at the establishment of a bill questioning the legitimacy of the 1969 Act of Free Choice on the grounds that the participants in the referendum did not represent the popular will of the Papuans. The reaction of Indonesian government officials has been mixed.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono expressed his dissatisfaction with the move and urged the U.S. government to support Indonesia's territorial integrity. Members of the House of Representatives reacted strongly to the move, calling it blatant interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs.

Compared to the conflict resolution of Aceh, the issue of Papuan independence is actually more complicated for the Indonesian government for at least three reasons.

First, anthropologically the Papuans belong to the Melanesian ethnic group and they have quite different physical characteristics compared to other Indonesians.

On top of that, unlike Aceh, the province of Papua is unique in that it is close to countries that support its independence struggle. Our diplomats find it difficult to approach the governments of countries in the South Pacific to lead them to accept Indonesia's sovereignty over the province.

Second, the issue of Papuan independence has been made more complicated by the existence of the 1969 Act of Free Choice which has invited conflicting interpretations by the Indonesian government and the Papuan protagonists. It is a normal practice among separatist movements all over the world to make a problem out of any international agreement that can be used to justify the demand for self-determination.

Third, the Papuan activists abroad have a greater chance of getting support from Western societies as the Indonesian government cannot associate the rebels in the predominantly Christian territory with any religion-inspired terrorism.

Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono acted prudently when he made a statement that the Indonesian people should stay calm in responding to the move made by the U.S. congressmen.

However, there is also no reason for the government to take things lightly. The course of events in Papua since the fall of Soeharto's regime has been characterized by policy inconsistencies and an endless struggle for resources among different political groups who are keen to take advantage of the loosening of Jakarta's control over the province through special autonomy.

The contradiction between the special autonomy status and the division of the province is an indication that Jakarta lacks a coherent policy platform on Papua.

The assassination of Theys Eluay, the former chairman of the Presidium of Papuan Council, allegedly by members of the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus) in November 2001 was particularly damaging to the whole strategy of Indonesian diplomacy on Papua. As far as the mother state is concerned one thing the government cannot afford is the creation of a hero on the part of the rebel group. Indonesia's diplomatic struggle over East Timor in the late 1990s was made more difficult when the Indonesian security authorities detained Xanana Gusmao in Jakarta.

All these events lead us to a very clear conclusion that the Indonesian government has never been serious about making the Papuans feel comfortable within the framework of the Indonesian unitary state. Leaders in Jakarta are only concerned with taking advantage of the backwardness of the Papuans so that their natural resources can be exploited.

To make things worse, Papuan local leaders themselves have used the special autonomy law to enrich themselves at the expense of the grass roots.

It was recently shown on television how the National Police were brutal toward demonstrators who were protesting against the trial of their friends. All these events lead us to a foregone conclusion that the Indonesian authorities have never been serious with the improvement of the wellbeing of the Papuan people.

It is no exaggeration to say that currently Indonesian diplomacy on Papua has had to face dual pressure. On the domestic level the central government has failed to formulate an integrated policy on Papua, hence our diplomats abroad find it difficult to make a strong argument against aggressive questions from their fellow diplomats or human rights activists.

In the normal practice of global diplomacy, most of the time diplomats who are in the defensive position tend to lose the game especially when they come from a weak state.

The second pressure comes from the fact that the internationalization of the Papuan conflict is initiated by foreign parties which are beyond Indonesia's control. We should not underestimate the powerful impact of collaboration between members of the U.S. Congress and the international networks of Papuan activists.

Those who are dissatisfied with the Indonesian government in the U.S. Congress would be keen to use the Papuan issue as an instrument to increase the political stake should Indonesia be seen as an unreliable partner in the global fighting against terrorism.

The Papuan independence activists abroad will continue to capitalize on the shortcomings of government policies in Papua. This is a great challenge for the Indonesian government to review all its policies for Papua and then come up with a more integrated policy for the sake of the Papuans themselves. Thus, the real battle is not in the U.S. Congress or anywhere else but here within the reach of our wisdom and statesmanship.

Aleksius Jemadu is Head of the Department of International Relations Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung. He can be reached at aleks@home.unpar.ac.id.