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Reconciliation a must in East Timor

| Source: The Jakarta Post

Reconciliation a must in East Timor

By Olle Tornquist

This is the second of two articles analyzing the historic
changes unfolding in East Timor.

OSLO (JP): The United Nations, as already mentioned in the
first part of this article, could well have referred to Article 7
of the May agreement and immediately sent in more personnel to
strengthen its presence.

Here the UN itself failed and cannot blame its member states.
Initially the UN chose to pull out. This was a serious mistake
not just for the East Timorese, but for the UN itself.

Apparently it was primarily thanks to the brave staff at its
Dili headquarters, who refused to leave, that the UN retained
some presence in East Timor -- while it should have been quite
the other way around, with volunteers, diplomats and others
moving in.

The only thing remaining, then, was economic and other
diplomatic measures. But the process was slow. The major actors
were apparently afraid of losing out in Indonesia, including
economically -- even if the official arguments mainly referred to
the risk of derailing the process of democratization, a risk
which may be disputed and which I shall return to.

However, there was enough pressure on Indonesia to cause a
major split within its government. We do not know if Habibie
intended to allow foreign intervention, but he himself -- and
many of his ministers and vital parts of the legislature --
clearly first resisted Minister of Defense and
Security/Indonesian Military Commander Gen. Wiranto's demand for
martial law in East Timor, and then he rapidly gave up and
allowed Wiranto to go ahead.

To my understanding, the rumors about a coup was, thus,
baseless. Why would that have been necessary? The military
already dominated. Rather, it needed civilians. The rumors were
best suited to scare the West, and the democratic opposition,
from putting too much pressure on the regime.

There is one positive consequence of the crisis: by now it
should be fully clear to the entire world, and many Indonesians,
how the political violence works: First, the state-cum-military
worsening of various local conflicts and promotion of
thugs/militias in clamping down on people; second, giving the
military/police itself an opportunity to intervene.

But there is an additional logic as well. When first having
created this climate of death -- which make people fight each
other and fear each other -- the state-cum-military must then
also put itself in command of this fear and death and even be
able to claim that it is the only force that can save the nation
and save people against their own evilness.

In the case of East Timor, however, it went too far. Wiranto,
never approved of by East Timor veterans in the field, lost
control. At that point his entire career, as well as the prestige
of the military as a whole, rested with its capacity to regain
control of the wild beasts in East Timor, including sections of
Lt. Gen. (ret) Prabowo Subianto's old security forces and the
Dili governor, who said he would continue to fight and that he
rejected Habibie's acceptance of the results from the referendum
since "he is just the President, he has never been in the field".

It took just a few days to prove that Wiranto and the central
armed forces was not capable of doing this. And by now accepting
an international peacekeeping mission they have, to my
understanding, got a new lease on life that rests with their
ability to cooperate and forcefully contribute to the tasks of
the mission in East Timor.

But an additional question is, of course, is this kind of
stability in Indonesia, and this kind of "law and order" and
"stability" in East Timor, acceptable to the East Timorese and
Indonesian democrats, and to the international community?

It is essential to remember that sanctions against
authoritarian rulers may indeed backfire and not be very
successful, as happened during the crisis in late 1997 and early
1998, and instead generate a conservative nationalist movement --
in the case of international concern not being coordinated with
the democratic opposition.

There is a lesson to learn from South Africa and realize the
importance of supporting Indonesian and East Timorese democrats
in their struggle for human rights and democracy.

For instance, even Megawati Soekarnoputri, who is eager to
retain the support of the military and did not want East Timor to
become independent, has recently accused Habibie and his
administration of double standards, a democratic referendum
combined with "undercover methods ... including allowing the
spread of violence".

She has promised to respect all international agreements and
said that if she becomes president she would "help East Timor
develop as a peaceful nation and become a 'brother'" to
Indonesia. Moreover, she has appealed to especially the military
and police to not undermine this.

Also, the National Commission on Human Rights urged the
government to lift martial law and invite a UN peacekeeping force
to restore order.

Further, it is essential to remember that it is not only a
question of putting an end to the open violence and terror in
East Timor. We do not know how many, but probably some hundreds
of thousands of people have fled into the mountains where there
is a lack of food and water. And many have taken refugee
elsewhere, including in militia-cum-military controlled camps in
West Timor.

The UN must immediately extend its own representation in East
Timor, not pull out of it, so that it can monitor the situation,
pave the way for humanitarian relief, and enable Jose Alexandre
"Xanana" Gusmao and Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo to return
and take the lead in a process of reconciliation.

Finally it is essential to return to the argument that the
point of departure for international concerns must be to support
Indonesian and East Timorese democrats in their struggle for
human rights and democracy.

This is not just to prevent a nationalistic backlash and more
military power. This is primarily because foreign intervention,
even with the best of intentions and no matter whether it is
armed or not, simply does not make sense if there are no local
roots and propelling forces to guide and take the fundamental
decisions.

The fate of East Timor depends on Indonesia, and the fate of
both East Timor and Indonesia depends on the ability of the
Indonesian democratic movement to counter authoritarian
nationalism through a renaissance of the original nationalist
project and especially its ideals of freedom and justice.

The bottom line, then, is that the forces of violence cannot
be allowed to first run wild and then be the same forces to calm
the situation.

There cannot be democracy, nor even stability in Indonesia
before the history and current forces of violence are dealt with,
domestically as well as in East Timor. Truth and reconciliation
is a must. This goes beyond the current crisis. This includes the
massacres of the mid-1960s. But East Timor must come first.

The writer is professor of politics and development at
University of Oslo, Norway.

More from 28 September 1999 โ†’

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/reconciliation-a-must-in-east-timor-1447893297-1416073)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post
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