Reading the Direction of Indonesia–South Korea Defence Industry Cooperation
The signing of an agreement between Naval Group and PT PAL Indonesia to explore a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) programme for DSME 209/1400 submarines was not a surprise, as signs pointing in that direction had been apparent for two years.
The development is highly disappointing for Hanwha Ocean, DSME’s successor. In the same week the agreement was signed, Hanwha Ocean’s chief executive visited Jakarta to explore involvement in MRO work for the South Korean-made submarines.
For several years, there has been a tendency for South Korean companies not to accept submarine MRO contracts, given Indonesia’s concerns about the vessels’ performance. Historically, the DSME 209/1400 submarine case was the first to trigger distrust between Indonesia and South Korea in defence industry cooperation.
The second case of distrust concerns the development programme for the fourth-generation-plus KFX/IFX fighter, which became known as the KF-21 after entering production. Compared with the DSME 209/1400 submarine issue, mutual distrust between Indonesia and South Korea runs much deeper over the KFX/IFX programme, with each side dissatisfied with the other.
Distrust peaked after Indonesia delayed its 20 per cent cost-sharing payments for years. This was followed by the detention of several Indonesian engineers in South Korea for more than a year over a careless incident involving a flash drive.
From Indonesia’s perspective, there are several shortcomings in its fulfilment of commitments to the KFX/IFX programme, beyond the issue of cost-sharing payments, that have never been disclosed to the public.
For those closely familiar with defence industry cooperation between the two countries over the past decade, the last six years have been particularly challenging for both Indonesia and South Korea.
In South Korea, distrust of Indonesia has emerged in recent years because of the KFX/IFX programme. Within Indonesia, distrust of South Korea has also grown, fuelled by the DSME 209/1400 submarine case and the KFX/IFX programme. This situation poses a particular challenge to the two countries’ defence industries as they seek to explore deeper partnerships.
At present, opportunities for commercial cooperation between the two countries’ defence firms appear limited to the aerospace sector. For example, KAI’s offer to move production facilities for the KT-1 turboprop trainer aircraft to PT Dirgantara Indonesia was not well received, owing to technical and marketing issues considered detrimental to the Indonesian state-owned company.
Meanwhile, the implementation of the Industrial Collaboration Agreement (ICA) between KAI and PT Dirgantara Indonesia for the KF-21 programme depends heavily on both external factors and conditions within Indonesia. A review of Indonesia–South Korea defence industry relations over the past six years highlights several issues that cannot be ignored.
First, mutual distrust. This is the main challenge to advancing defence industry cooperation between the two countries, and it runs both ways. Can decision-makers in both countries and executives at defence companies overcome a decade of entrenched distrust?
It is worth noting that in the defence industry, government and industry actors are like two sides of the same coin: positions adopted or decisions made by government actors are also taken up by defence industry players.
Second, the sectors covered by industrial cooperation. So far, cooperation appears to be limited to aerospace, while activity in other sectors is largely commercial. Could manufacturers in the two countries explore cooperation in defence electronics beyond commercial transactions?
What about cooperation on land systems, such as Poongsan’s plan to establish an ammunition factory in Indonesia, which appears to have stalled?
Third, stronger regulation. Defence industry cooperation is highly influenced by politics, given the sensitivity of defence technology to the countries that own it.
In this context, South Korea remains particularly concerned about Indonesia’s regulations and its capacity to safeguard technology originating in South Korea. It is an undisputed fact that Indonesia has yet to establish national rules on defence technology, let alone an integrated system spanning the Ministry of Defence and defence equipment factories to ensure the security of technology obtained from foreign partners.
Fourth, a level playing field. The Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas) has allocated US$34.8 billion in foreign loans for the Ministry of Defence under its 2025–2029 strategic plan.
Will South Korean defence companies have a level playing field when procurement in Jakarta tends to be conducted through brokers? And will the decision-making climate in Jakarta benefit all South Korean firms, or only certain companies?
These four issues, directly or indirectly, will shape this week’s Indonesia–South Korea Defense Industry Cooperation Committee (DICC) meeting in Jakarta. According to the initial plan, several South Korean defence industry giants, including KAI and LIG Defense & Aerospace, will attend the bilateral forum.
The chief executives of some of those firms will also take part in activities at the Ministry of Defence, reflecting their desire to secure a significant foothold in Indonesia’s defence market. Will the DICC produce agreements that meet the expectations of the two governments and South Korean defence companies amid the four issues outlined above?
Among South Korea’s expectations for this year’s DICC is certainty over a US$3 billion contract for the acquisition of 16 KF-21 Block II aircraft. Some time ago, Indonesian officials responsible for defence procurement said Jakarta would sign the purchase contract this year.
With 2026 set to end in less than two months, South Korea is certain to raise the fighter acquisition at the DICC. If Indonesia’s response falls short of South Korea’s expectations, one consequence could be a further erosion of South Korean confidence in Indonesia’s commitments to defence industry cooperation.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/reading-the-direction-of-indonesia-south-korea-defence-industry-cooperation-1794153055)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20261108221204-14-783330/menebak-arah-kerja-sama-industri-pertahanan-indonesia--korea-selatan), translated from Indonesian