Raids may foreclose chances of Moro peace talks's success

Raids may foreclose chances of Moro peace talks's success

By Amando Doronila

MANILA: President Joseph Estrada has confirmed that the
military offensive to take the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF)'s main base, Camp Abubakar, has been unleashed.

The confirmation came after days of air and artillery
bombardment of the camp. The MILF correctly predicted that the
bombardment was a prelude to an attack on the camp by ground
troops.

The offensive took off after the MILF failed to agree to an
interim peace agreement on June 30, which laid down impossible
conditions for the MILF to meet. These conditions were, first the
MILF should explicitly renounce its goal of a Bangsamoro
independent state; second, the MILF should stop all "terroristic"
acts; and, third, the MILF should lay down its arms within six
months.

The government knew these were impossible conditions to meet.
The MILF considered these conditions equivalent to unconditional
surrender. The government insisted on these unrealistic
conditions because it was determined to bring the war to a
decisive military solution -- i.e., taking all MILF bases
culminating in the occupation of Abubakar. The attack on the MILF
camps was carried out while the peace talks between the
government and MILF panels were under way.

The attacks foreclosed the chances of success of the peace
talks. They poisoned the atmosphere and corroded confidence
building necessary for a peace pact based on compromise.

The peace talks are as good as dead, after the Abubakar
offensive was launched and after government's deadline of June 30
to produce an interim agreement at gunpoint lapsed.

A last-minute effort by the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference
in Tagaytay at the weekend to appeal for a moratorium for five
days in the military offensive on Abubakar during which the "very
serious plight of refugees, women and children" would be
addressed, fell on deaf ears.

Jose Concepcion Jr., national co-chair of the conference,
delivered the letter to appeal to President Estrada who was
meeting his Cabinet at the Tagaytay Highlands. The President and
Cabinet were in no mood to listen. The hawkish mode had seized
the Cabinet. They believed that a decisive battle taking Abubakar
was at the grasp of the Armed Forces, and the seizure of the camp
would dictate the terms of the peace agreement according to
government conditions. What the President was interested in from
the bishops and businessmen was their cooperation in "fast-
tracking" an aid program for Muslim Mindanao.

Fast-tracking a Mindanao economic recovery program is putting
the cart before the horse. Any effort to pour aid on the war-torn
areas before peace is restored would be a waste. International
donor countries made this clear to the President two weeks ago in
Tagaytay that while the ODA (Official Development Assistance)
countries had pledged an additional $2.6 billion for the
reconstruction of Mindanao, the aid will be a waste if there is
no peace on the ground. They emphasized that donor staff would
not be safe when they monitor and inspect the progress of the aid
projects.

The Abubakar offensive was launched against a broad and strong
sentiment to have a cessation of hostilities as a precondition
for a political settlement. Church and businessmen's group, as
well as Mindanao civil society, have all called for a ceasefire.

The Organization of Islamic Conference last week passed a
resolution urging both the government and the MILF to immediately
halt hostilities to establish an environment for a peace
agreement.

What really happened in Tagaytay was that the government was
fast-tracking the military solution and the Mindanao economic
rehabilitation, but not fast-tracking the peace negotiations. The
government's assumption was described by Finance Secretary Jose
Pardo, as the "quick, violent scenario." This is translated into
action by the attacks on the MILF camps, climaxed by the takeover
of Abubakar. Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado calls this the
"total approach" that leads to "rapid war conclusion."

The problem with this scenario is that the conflict is not
developing into a "rapid war conclusion."

The fall of Abubakar is not likely to be a decisive government
victory. Thus, if the seizure of Abubakar does not end in a
military victory, the scenario is fouled up because without
security and peace on the ground, no ODA donor will throw good
money after bad.

Archbishop Orlando Quevedo, president of the Bishops-
Businessmen's Conference and archbishop of Cotabato, gave an
empirical assessment of the Mindanao conflict, noteworthy for its
lack of ecclesiastical hocus-pocus. He said that the assumptions
of the "total approach" and "rapid war conclusion" were "not
taking place in Central Mindanao."

So far, he said, the MILF forces, estimated at 14,000 armed
men, "had simply withdrawn, keeping their numbers substantially.
Thus our forces came to occupy those camps almost without
resistance. This indicates a MILF tactic of avoiding frontal
battle while splitting into groups and keeping their forces
intact to wherever they wish.

Thus we have reached a new, uncertain and protracted stage of
war. Hence also, more evacuees, more displacement, not only
sporadically but regularly, as skirmishes move around and erupt
in several places."

What we have to watch closely is whether the MILF would put up
a strong resistance to defend Abubakar. If they do, the opposing
forces are likely to take more casualties than in any previous
camp-taking operations.

Then the question arises: After the occupation of Abubakar,
how much military presence will be garrisoned in a sea of hostile
inhabitants? The military likes to claim that it is discharging
the duty of regaining national territory and in "protecting" the
civil population. But the Muslim inhabitants of Abubakar do not
consider the military as their "protector."

-- The Philippine Daily Inquirer/Asia News Network