Questioning the Legality and Special Treatment of Yaqut Cholil Qoumas's House Arrest?
Reflecting on the polemic of changing the detention status from being held in a Detention Centre (Rutan) to house arrest for former Minister of Religious Affairs Yaqut Cholil Qoumas (YCQ), from the perspective of Criminal Procedure Law, several issues have come to the surface. This article focuses on the review of: (i) the concept of house detention as one type of detention according to the KUHAP (Law No. 20 of 2025); and (ii) the application of the presumption of innocence principle to suspects and defendants, including its implications for the selection and change of detention types. Such a perspective is compiled to assess and affirm whether the transfer of the Defendant YCQ’s detention status from state detention house (rutan) to house detention by the KPK Investigator is a lawful action according to the 2025 KUHAP and in line with the presumption of innocence principle, or the opposite?
In the position of the YCQ case as a former Minister of Religious Affairs who has been designated as a Defendant in the alleged criminal act of corruption in the distribution of additional Hajj quotas for 2023-2024. He was initially placed as a detainee in the KPK State Detention Centre. Upon a request from the family, the KPK Investigator then transferred that detention status to house detention for several days, before finally being returned to rutan detention due to polemic and public criticism. In its statement, the KPK emphasised that the transfer was carried out based on a family request but not due to illness reasons, and that all steps had been taken in accordance with mechanisms and applicable legal regulations.
On the other hand, the step of transferring YCQ’s detention raised objections and reports to the KPK Supervisory Board, which questioned, among others: (i) alleged intervention by external parties; (ii) statements from the KPK spokesperson regarding health conditions; and (iii) the speed of the release process from rutan which was deemed “hasty”. Public criticism then developed into a narrative that YCQ received “special treatment” in the form of house detention that is not easily accessible to other suspects/defendants.
In that framework, the legal questions are: (1) does the 2025 KUHAP normatively justify house detention and the change of detention type from rutan to home? (2) does such a transfer principally align with or contradict the presumption of innocence principle? and (3) how to position the accusation of “special treatment” in the analysis of the legality of the detention transfer from the perspective of criminal procedure law?
Discourse on the Position of House Detention in the 2025 KUHAP Detention System
The 2025 KUHAP introduces new and more detailed regulations regarding detention, distinguishing types of detention into: (a) state detention house detention; (b) house detention; and (c) city detention. State detention house detention is carried out in the state detention house (rutan) managed by the ministry responsible for social rehabilitation affairs or other institutions coordinated with it. House detention is carried out at the residence or dwelling of the Suspect/Defendant with supervision. City detention is carried out in the city of residence with reporting obligations at specified times.
Thus, house detention is explicitly positioned as one form of lawful detention, not merely an “administrative leniency”. It remains a form of deprivation or restriction of a person’s freedom by the state, with characteristics: subject (suspect/defendant), place (residence), and obligations (being under supervision and complying with certain prohibitions/conditions). The 2025 KUHAP also stipulates that the period of house detention is counted towards sentence reduction, although not fully (converted at 1/3 of the detention period), which once again shows that dogmatically, house detention is treated as part of the valid “detention period”.
The existence of house detention as an explicitly regulated type of detention reflects a paradigm shift in the 2025 KUHAP that is closer to the due process of law principle and human rights protection. Detention is no longer viewed solely as “putting in rutan”, but as a spectrum of freedom restrictions, where the state can choose the most proportional level of restriction with the needs of the process. In this spectrum, state detention house is the most restrictive form; house detention is at an intermediate level; and city detention at a lighter level. Conceptually, the existence of this spectrum is also closely related to the presumption of innocence principle, as it provides room for law enforcement to balance process interests with individual rights.
Authority for Changing Detention Types and Formal Requirements
The 2025 KUHAP not only regulates types of detention but also opens the possibility of transfers between those types. Transfers can be carried out by the investigator, public prosecutor, or judge according to the examination stage through a warrant or determination, with copies sent to the Suspect/Defendant, family, and related institutions (rutan, correctional institutions, etc.). This regulation provides a legal umbrella for adjusting the form of detention during the judicial process.
Formally, there are three important elements:
Authority of the official. Changing the type of detention from rutan to home falls within the scope of authority of certain legal subjects (investigator/public prosecutor/judge). As long as it is carried out by officials as regulated in the 2025 KUHAP, the transfer action cannot be deemed ultra vires.
Form of action. The transfer must be documented in a written warrant or determination that can be accounted for, containing at least the identity of the Suspect/Defendant, legal basis, reasons for transfer, as well as the date and place of implementation of the new detention. The absence or formal defect in the warrant can be the basis for filing a pre-trial or similar legal remedy, but as long as the written procedure is fulfilled, the transfer has legal force.
Notification and supervision. Provision of noti