Powell to visit Southeast Asia amid reduce human rights focus

Powell to visit Southeast Asia amid reduce human rights focus

Marvin Ott, Professor, National Security Policy National War College, Washington, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Kuala Lumpur

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell will be visiting Southeast Asia at the end of the month at a time of flux for American policy.

For over a quarter of a century, the region has been a kind of stepchild in U.S. strategy, not ignored but always on the periphery.

There have been a number of reasons for this, including the enduring legacy of the Vietnam War that has overshadowed and dampened any strategic initiatives in the region.

The end of the Cold War and the general disorientation this produced in the American security community tended to reinforce the sense of strategic drift.

The loss of American bases in the Philippines in the same time period removed the southern anchor of U.S. power in East Asia - leaving the American military presence heavily weighted to the north.

The embedded assumption that East Asia's two potential flashpoints were Korea and Taiwan nicely reinforced this central/northern bias.

The Seventh Fleet and its air assets continued to ply Southeast Asian sea-lanes but U.S. officials sometimes had difficulty articulating the purpose of this substantial (and expensive) mobile presence.

The rationale tended to take two forms: - U.S. forces acted as a kind of security guarantor for Southeast Asia, preventing many historic and not-so-hidden rivalries and disputes within the region from spiraling out of control; - These forces acted as a counterweight (and barrier) to emerging Chinese strategic ambition focused on the lands and seas to the south.

Taken together (so the argument went), the net effect was to provide Southeast Asia with a relatively peaceful and secure environment in which economic development could proceed and political stability could be nurtured.

At its best, this added up to a reasonably persuasive and even sophisticated expression of U.S. strategic interests. But it lacked the immediacy and clarity that can only be provided by a tangible and credible threat.

That was provided on Sept. 11 and, in the weeks following, when the authorities in Singapore uncovered a clandestine terrorist network with apparent connections to militant Muslim organizations and individuals in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.

President George W. Bush declared Southeast Asia a "second front" in America's global war on terrorism, and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Manila responded positively and quickly to U.S. overtures seeking cooperative action.

Ironically, the most visible manifestation of this new cooperation - U.S. military support to the Philippine army campaign against the Abu Sayyaf - was also the most marginal.

Available evidence suggests that the Abu Sayyaf is little more than a criminal gang specializing in kidnappings and beheadings, with only tangential connections to international terrorism.

Nevertheless, U.S. participation in the hunt for the Abu Sayyaf served two purposes. It demonstrated American seriousness about terrorism in the region and it served to rebuild cooperation quickly between the Pentagon and the Philippine armed forces, which had atrophied severely since American forces left Subic Bay in 1991.

In the case of Malaysia, no U.S. forces are or will be involved on its soil. But the course of events in recent months has been no less dramatic.

Over the last two decades, U.S.-Malaysian relations - if judged by commercial/economic, defense and intelligence standards - have been close and productive.

But on the political/diplomatic dimension, it has been very different, with rancor, in public or barely below the surface, the order of the day.

For years, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has used the sharp edge of his tongue to lacerate U.S. policy for neocolonial bullying (among many other sins).

But when the Bush administration took office, Kuala Lumpur initiated efforts to repair relations. That process received a decisive boost from the events of Sept. 11.

To the surprise of many in Washington, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad quickly staked out a position of common cause with America in the global struggle against terrorism. Senior Malaysian officials spoke publicly of the value of military cooperation with the United States.

Meanwhile, Malaysia assumed a high-profile role as advocate for energetic multilateral cooperation against terror.

From Washington's standpoint, all this established Malaysia as an increasingly valuable and effective voice for the war on terrorism within Islamic and Third World councils.

In sum, the startling effect of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has been to put U.S.-Malaysian relations on the strongest footing in a generation.

In the case of Singapore, no such policy pyrotechnics were necessary. Security cooperation, already close with the United States, has been further strengthened.

It is in the nature of terrorism that the most effective countermeasures are likely to be out of the public eye, involving primarily police and intelligence entities.

In one of the few public initiatives, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs announced the stationing of U.S. agents in Singapore to inspect U.S.-bound cargo, the first time such postings have occurred outside North America.

Indonesia has also generated much policy attention.

Since the militia rampages in East Timor, U.S. security policy towards Indonesia has been one of coercive neglect.

Congressionally imposed provisions bar a restoration of comprehensive contact between the United States and Indonesian armed forces until those responsible in East Timor have been identified and brought to book.

The effect of Sept. 11 has been to pit new terrorist concerns against these prohibitions.

The U.S. ambassador and Pentagon officials have been outspoken in calling for a restoration of military-to-military contacts.

Underlying all this is a growing concern that the dramatic erosion of state authority and government (including military) effectiveness in Indonesia is creating dangerous opportunities for al-Qaeda-type penetration.

The net effect is to recast U.S. relations with Southeast Asia, focusing on security in general and counter-terrorism in particular.

A logical consequence is that human rights concerns that have animated so much of American policy toward the region will be de- emphasized.

China provides an interesting sidebar. Arguably, the surprising alacrity with which the region has responded to the call to arms against terrorism is due, at least in some part, to China's desire to align itself similarly.

Southeast Asian governments have not had to choose between Washington and Beijing on this issue.

Where this is all heading is unclear. The capacity of counter- terrorism to reorient and strengthen U.S. diplomatic and security relations in the region has already been demonstrated.

But there are familiar hazards along this road. Unless carefully managed, one danger is that, once again, Washington will find itself collaborating with police, intelligence and military organizations that are running roughshod over the rights of their own citizens.

A second peril lies in the potential for being drawn into essentially domestic conflicts involving militant Muslim groups. Does the word "quagmire" ring a bell?

But that is why you send an able and experienced secretary of state to the region - to exploit the upside potential in a unique historical moment while sidestepping the minefields.