Powell to visit Southeast Asia amid reduce human rights focus
Powell to visit Southeast Asia amid reduce human rights focus
Marvin Ott, Professor, National Security Policy
National War College, Washington, The Straits Times, Asia News Network,
Kuala Lumpur
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell will be visiting Southeast
Asia at the end of the month at a time of flux for American
policy.
For over a quarter of a century, the region has been a kind of
stepchild in U.S. strategy, not ignored but always on the
periphery.
There have been a number of reasons for this, including the
enduring legacy of the Vietnam War that has overshadowed and
dampened any strategic initiatives in the region.
The end of the Cold War and the general disorientation this
produced in the American security community tended to reinforce
the sense of strategic drift.
The loss of American bases in the Philippines in the same time
period removed the southern anchor of U.S. power in East Asia -
leaving the American military presence heavily weighted to the
north.
The embedded assumption that East Asia's two potential
flashpoints were Korea and Taiwan nicely reinforced this
central/northern bias.
The Seventh Fleet and its air assets continued to ply
Southeast Asian sea-lanes but U.S. officials sometimes had
difficulty articulating the purpose of this substantial (and
expensive) mobile presence.
The rationale tended to take two forms:
- U.S. forces acted as a kind of security guarantor for Southeast
Asia, preventing many historic and not-so-hidden rivalries and
disputes within the region from spiraling out of control;
- These forces acted as a counterweight (and barrier) to emerging
Chinese strategic ambition focused on the lands and seas to the
south.
Taken together (so the argument went), the net effect was to
provide Southeast Asia with a relatively peaceful and secure
environment in which economic development could proceed and
political stability could be nurtured.
At its best, this added up to a reasonably persuasive and even
sophisticated expression of U.S. strategic interests. But it
lacked the immediacy and clarity that can only be provided by a
tangible and credible threat.
That was provided on Sept. 11 and, in the weeks following,
when the authorities in Singapore uncovered a clandestine
terrorist network with apparent connections to militant Muslim
organizations and individuals in Malaysia, the Philippines and
Indonesia.
President George W. Bush declared Southeast Asia a "second
front" in America's global war on terrorism, and Singapore, Kuala
Lumpur and Manila responded positively and quickly to U.S.
overtures seeking cooperative action.
Ironically, the most visible manifestation of this new
cooperation - U.S. military support to the Philippine army
campaign against the Abu Sayyaf - was also the most marginal.
Available evidence suggests that the Abu Sayyaf is little more
than a criminal gang specializing in kidnappings and beheadings,
with only tangential connections to international terrorism.
Nevertheless, U.S. participation in the hunt for the Abu
Sayyaf served two purposes. It demonstrated American seriousness
about terrorism in the region and it served to rebuild
cooperation quickly between the Pentagon and the Philippine armed
forces, which had atrophied severely since American forces left
Subic Bay in 1991.
In the case of Malaysia, no U.S. forces are or will be
involved on its soil. But the course of events in recent months
has been no less dramatic.
Over the last two decades, U.S.-Malaysian relations - if
judged by commercial/economic, defense and intelligence standards
- have been close and productive.
But on the political/diplomatic dimension, it has been very
different, with rancor, in public or barely below the surface,
the order of the day.
For years, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has used
the sharp edge of his tongue to lacerate U.S. policy for
neocolonial bullying (among many other sins).
But when the Bush administration took office, Kuala Lumpur
initiated efforts to repair relations. That process received a
decisive boost from the events of Sept. 11.
To the surprise of many in Washington, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad
quickly staked out a position of common cause with America in the
global struggle against terrorism. Senior Malaysian officials
spoke publicly of the value of military cooperation with the
United States.
Meanwhile, Malaysia assumed a high-profile role as advocate
for energetic multilateral cooperation against terror.
From Washington's standpoint, all this established Malaysia as
an increasingly valuable and effective voice for the war on
terrorism within Islamic and Third World councils.
In sum, the startling effect of the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon has been to put U.S.-Malaysian relations
on the strongest footing in a generation.
In the case of Singapore, no such policy pyrotechnics were
necessary. Security cooperation, already close with the United
States, has been further strengthened.
It is in the nature of terrorism that the most effective
countermeasures are likely to be out of the public eye, involving
primarily police and intelligence entities.
In one of the few public initiatives, the Commissioner of U.S.
Customs announced the stationing of U.S. agents in Singapore to
inspect U.S.-bound cargo, the first time such postings have
occurred outside North America.
Indonesia has also generated much policy attention.
Since the militia rampages in East Timor, U.S. security policy
towards Indonesia has been one of coercive neglect.
Congressionally imposed provisions bar a restoration of
comprehensive contact between the United States and Indonesian
armed forces until those responsible in East Timor have been
identified and brought to book.
The effect of Sept. 11 has been to pit new terrorist concerns
against these prohibitions.
The U.S. ambassador and Pentagon officials have been outspoken
in calling for a restoration of military-to-military contacts.
Underlying all this is a growing concern that the dramatic
erosion of state authority and government (including military)
effectiveness in Indonesia is creating dangerous opportunities
for al-Qaeda-type penetration.
The net effect is to recast U.S. relations with Southeast
Asia, focusing on security in general and counter-terrorism in
particular.
A logical consequence is that human rights concerns that have
animated so much of American policy toward the region will be de-
emphasized.
China provides an interesting sidebar. Arguably, the
surprising alacrity with which the region has responded to the
call to arms against terrorism is due, at least in some part, to
China's desire to align itself similarly.
Southeast Asian governments have not had to choose between
Washington and Beijing on this issue.
Where this is all heading is unclear. The capacity of counter-
terrorism to reorient and strengthen U.S. diplomatic and security
relations in the region has already been demonstrated.
But there are familiar hazards along this road. Unless
carefully managed, one danger is that, once again, Washington
will find itself collaborating with police, intelligence and
military organizations that are running roughshod over the rights
of their own citizens.
A second peril lies in the potential for being drawn into
essentially domestic conflicts involving militant Muslim groups.
Does the word "quagmire" ring a bell?
But that is why you send an able and experienced secretary of
state to the region - to exploit the upside potential in a unique
historical moment while sidestepping the minefields.