Port calls signal a U.S. return of sorts
Port calls signal a U.S. return of sorts
By Joaquin L Gonzalez III
SINGAPORE: When the USS Belleau Wood sailed away from Subic Bay on Nov. 24, 1992, many believed this historic event symbolized something greater -- the end of more than 400 years of foreign military presence in the Philippines.
However, on that day, many of those present recall, prior to the amphibious assault ship's departure, a number of American servicemen had vowed, reassuringly, that "We will be back" to the crowds that had gathered to bid them farewell.
This reassurance paralleled the famous "I shall return" promise made by general Douglas MacArthur to the people of the Philippines before he left Corregidor for Australia on March 11, 1942.
The legendary U.S. armed forces chief took two years and seven months to fulfill his vow and, as a parallel, the officers and men of the frigate USS Curts called into Subic Bay in May last year, two and a half years after the departure of the last American warship.
Arriving in Subic Bay even earlier than the U.S. navy were warships from Australia and New Zealand's navies.
The first foreign vessels to anchor at the former U.S. military installation was the Adelaide-class frigate HMAS Melbourne, which made its port call only three months after the U.S. navy's withdrawal. This initial trip was followed by the visits of the destroyer HMAS Hobart and the tanker HMAS Success on May 4 and May 8.
In September last year, New Zealand's HMNZS Waikato also visited for a day.
Since then, the trend has changed significantly, that is, foreign warships docking at Subic have come mainly from the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
According to arrival-departure records at the Subic Bay Management Authority, 18 combat ships and seven attack submarines from the U.S. fleet, which was once based there, have made calls to some of their former berths.
The significance of the U.S. port calls will never equal the muscle and strength of the Seventh Fleet's elite carrier strike force and other combat units which were once stationed permanently in Subic Bay and elsewhere in the Philippines.
But the message the Americans are trying to get across to all parties, both friendly and hostile, seems clear we have returned to once again ensure peace and security in this part of the world.
Not surprisingly, most of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region quietly endorse these recent visits by the U.S. navy to the Philippines and other Asean states.
The installations in the Philippines may have been phased out, but the main justification for America's continued appearance in the maritime heart of Asia has not changed -- regional stability for the Pacific and external defense support for the Philippines.
Near skirmishes in the region during the last two years have highlighted the region's continuing need for the United States to maintain stability in the Pacific.
As a result, the frequency of U.S. port calls at Subic started to grow immediately after the Mischief Reef incident in February and March last year, when it was discovered that China had occupied the Philippines-claimed reef.
These visits continued to increase during and after the Taiwan Strait standoff in March this year.
As a matter of fact, at the height of the showdown, the United States dispatched the Independence and Nimitz carrier battle groups to the region, and some of their ships passed through or even lingered within Philippine territorial waters.
Aside from these two potential danger zones, the Asia-Pacific region is sprinkled with other flash points which include the Senkaku islands or Diaoyutai (between Japan and China/Taiwan), Takeshima islet or Tokdo (between Japan and South Korea) and the Kurile Islands or Northern Territories (between Russia and Japan), among others.
Moreover, U.S. economic dependency on the Asia-Pacific continues to deepen. According to a New York Times report, U.S. navy officers assigned to the Pacific region have been trained to rattle these economic facts: Asian economies are responsible for more than one-third of all American trade, and Asian trade is linked directly to an estimated three million jobs in the United States.
Moreover, the loss of major Asian sea-lanes could stem the flow of much-needed foreign oil to American ports.
The Philippines still needs all the help it can get from U.S. naval forces in Asia. With a fleet strength of only 161 led by one frigate and 10 corvettes, most of which are of World War II vintage, the Philippine navy and coast guard will not be able to realistically guarantee the security of an archipelago that is composed of more than 7,100 islands spanning 650,000 square nautical miles of sea territory.
A high-ranking military officer observed that the Philippine navy is still far from attaining "blue water" capability, so it cannot effectively patrol the sea-lanes around the Philippines. He added that the most the Philippine navy and coast guard could do right now is to prevent piracy and smuggling in the narrow passageways between islands.
Hence, the Philippine government continues to allow unlimited access to American warships by virtue of a Continued Access Agreement of 1992 signed before the departure of the last U.S. ship. This agreement grants the U.S. navy docking rights to some 27 Philippine ports, using a "pay as you come in" scheme.
It took the Mischief Reef incident to convince the Philippine Congress to pass a long-delayed Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Modernization Act which President Fidel Ramos signed into law on Feb. 23 last year.
This act put into motion an ambitious US$1.85 billion five- year military development plan that "would enable the AFP to uphold the sovereignty and preserve the patrimony of the Republic of the Philippines" in the post-U.S. bases era.
It is hoped that this money, which will be divided among the three major armed services, will put the Philippine navy on par with the navies of the country's Asean neighbors, most of which have already started beefing up their sea-based defense capabilities.
Nevertheless, the Philippine government hopes that allocations to the AFP will increase further as the country is able to generate the necessary income from its current economic investments. At the moment, however, there is a strong need for the U.S. to help its former "landlord" and vice versa.
Table: Log of visits to the Philippines (May 1995 to August 1996)
Ship Name Type Month of Visit -------------------------------------------------------------- 1 USS Curts frigate May 1995 2 USNS Narragansett ocean tug July 1995 3 USS Tautog attack submarine July 1995 4 USS Rodney M Davis frigate September 1995 5 USS Hewitt destroyer September 1995 6 USS Chicago attack submarine October 1995 7 USS Beaufort salvage/diving November 1995 8 USS Curts frigate February 1996 9 USS Columbus attack submarine February 1996 10 USS Guadalupe oiler March 1996 11 USS Niagara Falls supply April 1996 12 USS O'Brien destroyer April 1996 13 USS McClusky guided missile frigate April 1996 14 USS La Jolla attack submarine April 1996 15 USS George Philip frigate May 1996 16 USS Mahlon S Tisdale frigate May 1996 17 USS Germantown landing ship May 1996 18 USS Guadalupe oiler May 1996 19 USS Bunker Hill guided missile cruiser May 1996 20 USS Jefferson City attack submarine June 1996 21 USNS Kilauea ammunition June 1996 22 USS Asheville attack submarine July 1996 23 USNS San Jose supply July 1996 24 USS Rodney M Davis frigate July 1996 25 USS San Francisco attack submarine August 1996 -------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Subic Bay Management Authority
Dr. Joaquin L. Gonzalez III is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore.