Port calls signal a U.S. return of sorts

Port calls signal a U.S. return of sorts

By Joaquin L Gonzalez III

SINGAPORE: When the USS Belleau Wood sailed away from Subic
Bay on Nov. 24, 1992, many believed this historic event
symbolized something greater -- the end of more than 400 years of
foreign military presence in the Philippines.

However, on that day, many of those present recall, prior to
the amphibious assault ship's departure, a number of American
servicemen had vowed, reassuringly, that "We will be back" to the
crowds that had gathered to bid them farewell.

This reassurance paralleled the famous "I shall return"
promise made by general Douglas MacArthur to the people of the
Philippines before he left Corregidor for Australia on March
11, 1942.

The legendary U.S. armed forces chief took two years and seven
months to fulfill his vow and, as a parallel, the officers and
men of the frigate USS Curts called into Subic Bay in May last
year, two and a half years after the departure of the last
American warship.

Arriving in Subic Bay even earlier than the U.S. navy were
warships from Australia and New Zealand's navies.

The first foreign vessels to anchor at the former U.S.
military installation was the Adelaide-class frigate HMAS
Melbourne, which made its port call only three months after
the U.S. navy's withdrawal. This initial trip was followed by the
visits of the destroyer HMAS Hobart and the tanker HMAS Success
on May 4 and May 8.

In September last year, New Zealand's HMNZS Waikato also
visited for a day.

Since then, the trend has changed significantly, that is,
foreign warships docking at Subic have come mainly from the U.S.
Pacific Fleet.

According to arrival-departure records at the Subic Bay
Management Authority, 18 combat ships and seven attack submarines
from the U.S. fleet, which was once based there, have made calls
to some of their former berths.

The significance of the U.S. port calls will never equal the
muscle and strength of the Seventh Fleet's elite carrier strike
force and other combat units which were once stationed
permanently in Subic Bay and elsewhere in the Philippines.

But the message the Americans are trying to get across to all
parties, both friendly and hostile, seems clear we have returned
to once again ensure peace and security in this part of the
world.

Not surprisingly, most of the countries in the Asia-Pacific
region quietly endorse these recent visits by the U.S. navy to
the Philippines and other Asean states.

The installations in the Philippines may have been phased out,
but the main justification for America's continued appearance in
the maritime heart of Asia has not changed -- regional stability
for the Pacific and external defense support for the Philippines.

Near skirmishes in the region during the last two years have
highlighted the region's continuing need for the United States to
maintain stability in the Pacific.

As a result, the frequency of U.S. port calls at Subic started
to grow immediately after the Mischief Reef incident in February
and March last year, when it was discovered that China had
occupied the Philippines-claimed reef.

These visits continued to increase during and after the Taiwan
Strait standoff in March this year.

As a matter of fact, at the height of the showdown, the United
States dispatched the Independence and Nimitz carrier battle
groups to the region, and some of their ships passed through or
even lingered within Philippine territorial waters.

Aside from these two potential danger zones, the Asia-Pacific
region is sprinkled with other flash points which include the
Senkaku islands or Diaoyutai (between Japan and China/Taiwan),
Takeshima islet or Tokdo (between Japan and South Korea) and the
Kurile Islands or Northern Territories (between Russia and
Japan), among others.

Moreover, U.S. economic dependency on the Asia-Pacific
continues to deepen. According to a New York Times report, U.S.
navy officers assigned to the Pacific region have been trained to
rattle these economic facts: Asian economies are responsible for
more than one-third of all American trade, and Asian trade is
linked directly to an estimated three million jobs in the United
States.

Moreover, the loss of major Asian sea-lanes could stem the
flow of much-needed foreign oil to American ports.

The Philippines still needs all the help it can get from U.S.
naval forces in Asia. With a fleet strength of only 161 led by
one frigate and 10 corvettes, most of which are of World War II
vintage, the Philippine navy and coast guard will not be able to
realistically guarantee the security of an archipelago that is
composed of more than 7,100 islands spanning 650,000 square
nautical miles of sea territory.

A high-ranking military officer observed that the Philippine
navy is still far from attaining "blue water" capability, so it
cannot effectively patrol the sea-lanes around the Philippines.
He added that the most the Philippine navy and coast guard could
do right now is to prevent piracy and smuggling in the narrow
passageways between islands.

Hence, the Philippine government continues to allow unlimited
access to American warships by virtue of a Continued Access
Agreement of 1992 signed before the departure of the last
U.S. ship. This agreement grants the U.S. navy docking rights to
some 27 Philippine ports, using a "pay as you come in" scheme.

It took the Mischief Reef incident to convince the Philippine
Congress to pass a long-delayed Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Modernization Act which President Fidel Ramos signed into
law on Feb. 23 last year.

This act put into motion an ambitious US$1.85 billion five-
year military development plan that "would enable the AFP to
uphold the sovereignty and preserve the patrimony of the Republic
of the Philippines" in the post-U.S. bases era.

It is hoped that this money, which will be divided among the
three major armed services, will put the Philippine navy on par
with the navies of the country's Asean neighbors, most of which
have already started beefing up their sea-based defense
capabilities.

Nevertheless, the Philippine government hopes that allocations
to the AFP will increase further as the country is able to
generate the necessary income from its current economic
investments. At the moment, however, there is a strong need for
the U.S. to help its former "landlord" and vice versa.

Table: Log of visits to the Philippines (May 1995 to August 1996)

Ship Name Type Month of Visit
--------------------------------------------------------------
1 USS Curts frigate May 1995
2 USNS Narragansett ocean tug July 1995
3 USS Tautog attack submarine July 1995
4 USS Rodney M Davis frigate September 1995
5 USS Hewitt destroyer September 1995
6 USS Chicago attack submarine October 1995
7 USS Beaufort salvage/diving November 1995
8 USS Curts frigate February 1996
9 USS Columbus attack submarine February 1996
10 USS Guadalupe oiler March 1996
11 USS Niagara Falls supply April 1996
12 USS O'Brien destroyer April 1996
13 USS McClusky guided missile frigate April 1996
14 USS La Jolla attack submarine April 1996
15 USS George Philip frigate May 1996
16 USS Mahlon S Tisdale frigate May 1996
17 USS Germantown landing ship May 1996
18 USS Guadalupe oiler May 1996
19 USS Bunker Hill guided missile cruiser May 1996
20 USS Jefferson City attack submarine June 1996
21 USNS Kilauea ammunition June 1996
22 USS Asheville attack submarine July 1996
23 USNS San Jose supply July 1996
24 USS Rodney M Davis frigate July 1996
25 USS San Francisco attack submarine August 1996
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Source: Subic Bay Management Authority

Dr. Joaquin L. Gonzalez III is a Lecturer in the Department of
Political Science, National University of Singapore.