Political and legal aspects of Kompolnas's executive authority

Until now, Kompolnas oversight has been largely administrative and complaint-based. Yet operational areas remain the most vulnerable to abuse of authority.

JAKARTA (ANTARA) – One of the key recommendations from the Police Reform Acceleration Commission (KPRP) that has drawn public attention concerns the need to strengthen the position of the National Police Commission (Kompolnas) as an external watchdog of the Indonesian National Police (Polri).

This recommendation did not emerge in a vacuum. It responds to an unavoidable structural reality: Polri is placed directly under the President under Article 8(1) of Law No. 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police.

Constitutionally, this means Kompolnas does not fall under parliamentary or judicial oversight within the broader accountability ecosystem.

This position creates an inherent need: since Polri cannot be directly supervised by the DPR like other ministries, a structured, independent, and legally empowered external oversight mechanism is essential.

Is a Separate Law Needed?

In this context, some parties, particularly former Kompolnas commissioners, have proposed that Kompolnas be governed by a separate law to safeguard its independence.

This argument is based on state institution theory that a strong oversight body must have a constitutional mandate not easily revoked through executive rule changes.

Conversely, Police Chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo – also a member of KPRP – has suggested that Kompolnas’s enhanced authority could be accommodated through amendments to the Police Law, without the need for a separate law to ensure better integration.

His argument is pragmatic: legislative processes are more efficient when conducted within existing legal instruments while substantially strengthening oversight clauses.

Theoretically, the debate ultimately hinges on a key question: does the legal strength of a norm determine an institution’s effectiveness?

Referring to the hierarchy of regulations under Article 7 of Law No. 12 of 2011, laws hold a far higher authority than presidential regulations. Meanwhile, presidential regulations can be issued by the President without DPR approval. This is where Kompolnas’s institutional weakness has traditionally lain.