PM Howard's recent visit and its future impact
PM Howard's recent visit and its future impact
Hilman Adil, Research Professor, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta
The prevailing mood in government circles in Canberra after Prime Minister Howard's visit to Jakarta, as reported in the Australian press, was of a lack of interest and empathy for Indonesia. There seems to be a deliberate -- although implicit -- attempt to demote the primacy of Australia's strategic ties with its northern neighbor. A relationship once characterized by constructive partnership has been replaced by skepticism and mutual indifference on both sides.
The only concrete result of Howard's visit was a memorandum of understanding to share intelligence and cooperate against international terrorism that was dismissed by an editorial of The Straits Times in Singapore, as nothing more than a public- relations exercise. On the other hand, one cluster of opinion in Australia saw it as a drawback to the process of reform in Indonesia. It is believed that under American pressure, it is the latest sign of a dramatic shift from human rights toward the war on terrorism.
This shift in opinion, along with the stalling of domestic pressures to reform, has contributed to a resurgence of confidence in the most unreformed elements in the military? Military reform has virtually ceased and senior officers have openly defied human rights investigators. A recent example is the refusal of some generals to heed the summons of the National Commission on Human Rights. Security forces have increasingly openly pursued the military option in Aceh and Papua.
There seems to be a growing tendency in Canberra that given the political instability and worsening economic situation the Indonesian government is now facing, no longer merits intensive investment like in the mid-1990s. It is therefore recommended that the Howard government take a more vigorous and self- interested approach toward the bilateral relationship. However, such an approach would show insensitivity to Indonesian feelings, the more so if it is based on the assumption that Indonesia needs Australia more than vice versa. It will renew skepticism about Australia's sincerity in desiring to develop a policy of comprehensive engagement in the region, and in the perception that Australia had reversed or at least backtracked from that policy.
The question is how do we assess this new development. It seems that the Howard government is increasingly inclined to adopt a balance of power approach in its relationship with the region. It requires a diplomacy to be flexible, able to respond quickly to shifts in power balances, and dedication to developing working relationships with countries in the region, which it can subsequently call on in the context of the evolving balance. "Special relationships" are to be shunned, as is "emotionalism" in foreign policy.
Prime Minister John Howard emphasized this in a television interview on Australia's Channel 9 after his visit to Jakarta: "We have got to be realistic. In the past, especially under the Keating government, there was unreal prominence given to the relationship. We invested too much in it and therefore we were bound to suffer disappointment when those expectations were not realized." He seems to convey the message that if Australia maintained a special relationship with Indonesia it would not necessarily improve its policy choices, but would only constraint them.
There has been an inevitable emergence of a "balance of power" in the Asia-Pacific region in which particularly China, Japan, Russia and India are bent on gaining on the United States in power, with the aim of balancing predominant American power in the region. The regional power race is also likely to be heightened by rivalry between China, India and a Japan increasingly unsure about the U.S. security commitment.
The Asia-Pacific region, although not in the immediate future, is likely to see a full economic recovery from the effects of the Asian crisis but still to be troubled by both old and new tensions, rivalries and instability. A five-power balance will most likely not emerge initially. The signing of the Sino-Russian communique in December 1999 urging all nations to join a "balanced, multipolar world order" is evidence of an increasing willingness of former rivals to join together in balancing U.S. power.
There will be little prospect of reconciling the competing powers where permanent interests will supersede permanent friendships. It is essential in this context for all states in the region to ensure that open conflict does not break out between these states as four of them have nuclear capabilities. In this context, China will likely be one of the great powers in the Asia-Pacific region, and its regional strategy will be driven by its overriding rivalry with the U.S.
It would be vital for the smaller states of the region to avoid being trampled in the course of great power competition. The question is, what will be Australia's role in this balance of power in its quest for security?
From the outset, it should be stated, however, that "power" as related to security should be characterized as multidimensional, including the economic aspect as one of the dominant elements that will determine the future of the region. In anticipation of this development, already during previous Labor governments there was a shift from a defense-oriented foreign policy toward a policy preoccupied with economic security within Asia. Two reports commissioned by the government became known as the Dibb Report on defense and the Garnaut Report on economic relations.
The Ross Garnaut inquiry identified northeast Asia as the most important center in the new world economy and thus the key region to which Australia had to relate if it was to achieve economic security. Paul Dibb, a reputable defense specialist, downgraded Australia's continuing obsession with threats by declaring it one of the most secure countries in the world.
His report effectively discarded forward defense, a key concept in Australia's defense planning for years. Forward defense means fighting, or being ready to fight, in the countries of Southeast Asia or beyond if necessary so it can deal with threats before they even reach Australia's shores. There still remains the question, however, whether these two reports will be influential in shaping the foreign policy of the Howard government.