PM Howard's recent visit and its future impact

PM Howard's recent visit and its future impact

Hilman Adil, Research Professor, Indonesian Institute
of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta

The prevailing mood in government circles in Canberra after
Prime Minister Howard's visit to Jakarta, as reported in the
Australian press, was of a lack of interest and empathy for
Indonesia. There seems to be a deliberate -- although implicit --
attempt to demote the primacy of Australia's strategic ties with
its northern neighbor. A relationship once characterized by
constructive partnership has been replaced by skepticism and
mutual indifference on both sides.

The only concrete result of Howard's visit was a memorandum of
understanding to share intelligence and cooperate against
international terrorism that was dismissed by an editorial of The
Straits Times in Singapore, as nothing more than a public-
relations exercise. On the other hand, one cluster of opinion in
Australia saw it as a drawback to the process of reform in
Indonesia. It is believed that under American pressure, it is the
latest sign of a dramatic shift from human rights toward the war
on terrorism.

This shift in opinion, along with the stalling of domestic
pressures to reform, has contributed to a resurgence of
confidence in the most unreformed elements in the military?
Military reform has virtually ceased and senior officers have
openly defied human rights investigators. A recent example is the
refusal of some generals to heed the summons of the National
Commission on Human Rights. Security forces have increasingly
openly pursued the military option in Aceh and Papua.

There seems to be a growing tendency in Canberra that given
the political instability and worsening economic situation the
Indonesian government is now facing, no longer merits intensive
investment like in the mid-1990s. It is therefore recommended
that the Howard government take a more vigorous and self-
interested approach toward the bilateral relationship. However,
such an approach would show insensitivity to Indonesian feelings,
the more so if it is based on the assumption that Indonesia needs
Australia more than vice versa. It will renew skepticism about
Australia's sincerity in desiring to develop a policy of
comprehensive engagement in the region, and in the perception
that Australia had reversed or at least backtracked from that
policy.

The question is how do we assess this new development. It
seems that the Howard government is increasingly inclined to
adopt a balance of power approach in its relationship with the
region. It requires a diplomacy to be flexible, able to respond
quickly to shifts in power balances, and dedication to developing
working relationships with countries in the region, which it can
subsequently call on in the context of the evolving balance.
"Special relationships" are to be shunned, as is "emotionalism"
in foreign policy.

Prime Minister John Howard emphasized this in a television
interview on Australia's Channel 9 after his visit to Jakarta:
"We have got to be realistic. In the past, especially under the
Keating government, there was unreal prominence given to the
relationship. We invested too much in it and therefore we were
bound to suffer disappointment when those expectations were not
realized." He seems to convey the message that if Australia
maintained a special relationship with Indonesia it would not
necessarily improve its policy choices, but would only constraint
them.

There has been an inevitable emergence of a "balance of power"
in the Asia-Pacific region in which particularly China, Japan,
Russia and India are bent on gaining on the United States in
power, with the aim of balancing predominant American power in
the region. The regional power race is also likely to be
heightened by rivalry between China, India and a Japan
increasingly unsure about the U.S. security commitment.

The Asia-Pacific region, although not in the immediate future,
is likely to see a full economic recovery from the effects of the
Asian crisis but still to be troubled by both old and new
tensions, rivalries and instability. A five-power balance will
most likely not emerge initially. The signing of the Sino-Russian
communique in December 1999 urging all nations to join a
"balanced, multipolar world order" is evidence of an increasing
willingness of former rivals to join together in balancing U.S.
power.

There will be little prospect of reconciling the competing
powers where permanent interests will supersede permanent
friendships. It is essential in this context for all states in
the region to ensure that open conflict does not break out
between these states as four of them have nuclear capabilities.
In this context, China will likely be one of the great powers in
the Asia-Pacific region, and its regional strategy will be driven
by its overriding rivalry with the U.S.

It would be vital for the smaller states of the region to
avoid being trampled in the course of great power competition.
The question is, what will be Australia's role in this balance of
power in its quest for security?

From the outset, it should be stated, however, that "power" as
related to security should be characterized as multidimensional,
including the economic aspect as one of the dominant elements
that will determine the future of the region. In anticipation of
this development, already during previous Labor governments there
was a shift from a defense-oriented foreign policy toward a
policy preoccupied with economic security within Asia. Two
reports commissioned by the government became known as the Dibb
Report on defense and the Garnaut Report on economic relations.

The Ross Garnaut inquiry identified northeast Asia as the most
important center in the new world economy and thus the key region
to which Australia had to relate if it was to achieve economic
security. Paul Dibb, a reputable defense specialist, downgraded
Australia's continuing obsession with threats by declaring it one
of the most secure countries in the world.

His report effectively discarded forward defense, a key
concept in Australia's defense planning for years. Forward
defense means fighting, or being ready to fight, in the countries
of Southeast Asia or beyond if necessary so it can deal with
threats before they even reach Australia's shores. There still
remains the question, however, whether these two reports will be
influential in shaping the foreign policy of the Howard
government.