Pilkada and the Paradox of Regional Autonomy Design
The debate over direct versus indirect regional elections (Pilkada) is often viewed merely as a procedural matter, yet it ignores the election’s role as a mechanism of popular legitimacy within the framework of autonomy, which is frequently overlooked. The Constitutional Court (MK) recently closed a long chapter of debate on Pilkada. Through Decision Number 195/PUU-XXIV/2026, the MK affirmed that regional elections must continue to be conducted directly by the people. Many have called it a victory for democracy. But a victory for which regions?
In its ruling, the MK acknowledged exceptions: Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Aceh, and Papua are allowed their own mechanisms due to their special or privileged status. But what about the hundreds of other regions that also possess their own histories, social structures, and political needs, yet have never received similar recognition? The decision provides legal certainty, but it does not answer a more fundamental question: can a single electoral design truly be fair for all?
On the ground, these differences are not merely philosophical. They manifest in the technicalities of implementation. The stages of a regional election in a special autonomy region cannot simply be equated with those in a regular region. When national regulations impose uniformity, the burden of adjustment falls on the organisers at the grassroots level, not on the lawmakers who designed the system from Jakarta.
Every time this issue arises, the public debate revolves around the same axis: direct elections versus elections by the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD). One is considered more democratic but costly and prone to polarisation, the other more efficient but elitist. The debate is not wrong, but it answers the wrong question. Pilkada is not an end in itself, but an instrument. Its sole function is to fill the leadership positions that will exercise regional autonomy. The more honest question, therefore, is not how a regional head is chosen, but what kind of autonomy they are chosen to run.
Our regional autonomy was designed asymmetrically from the outset, recognising that regions have different histories, capacities, and political needs. Yet our Pilkada is designed uniformly. Unwittingly, we impose an assumption that all regions are equal. This is the very assumption that the entire edifice of regional autonomy was meant to refute.
The Constitution has already given the green light. Articles 18A and 18B of the 1945 Constitution acknowledge that our regions are not identical and therefore need not be treated identically. If autonomy is built on an asymmetrical logic, then Pilkada, as the instrument for filling its leadership, should follow the same logic. Evidence of this already exists, albeit half-heartedly. Jakarta elects its governor in two rounds due to the scale and complexity of its constituency. Yogyakarta does not elect its governor at all; legitimacy comes from a centuries-old sultanate lineage. In parts of Papua, the people’s voice is sometimes conveyed through the ‘noken’ system, where customary social structures frame legitimacy, rather than through a voting booth. Aceh operates under the framework of the Helsinki MoU, born from a long history of conflict. These four regions prove one thing: Pilkada can be, and already is, designed differently. What we have failed to do is make this a principle, rather than an exception.
Behind these four exceptions lies a question we have never honestly answered: why are the most ‘different’ regions given the space to adapt, while hundreds of other regions, each with their own unique characteristics, are forced into a single mould? The legitimacy of a Jakarta governor elected directly by millions of urban voters is not the same as that of a Yogyakarta governor whose authority derives from a sultanate lineage, not a ballot box. Both differ again from Papua, where the people’s voice may be expressed through the ‘noken’, a reflection of indigenous social structures. We are accustomed to viewing legitimacy as uniform: whoever wins the most votes is legitimate. But these three examples show otherwise. They are all ‘legitimate’, yet the source of their legitimacy differs. When we force a single electoral model on all regions, we implicitly assume that popular sovereignty has only one face. The Constitution already disagrees; Articles 18A and 18B recognise that our regions are not identical. What we have yet to do is translate that recognition consistently into the design of Pilkada.
Without integration, local democracy becomes merely a process of filling positions. A paradox exists that we have long ignored. The Pilkada Law speaks of popular sovereignty. The Regional Government Law speaks of governance and national standards. Nothing bridges the two. These two laws exist in separate realms. One governs the method of election, the other governs what can be done after being elected. Nothing ensures they speak the same language. Nothing ensures that the mandate a regional head receives from the people is commensurate with the authority they hold once elected. This gap is not abstract. A regional head can win an election with a strong majority mandate, only to find that their authority is far narrower than the mandate they received, because that authority is designed by a different law, crafted by different hands, with a different logic. The result, visible today, is regional heads with strong mandates from the people, yet governing within corridors uniformly determined by the central government, as if they are all managing identical entities. The negative effects can be seen in regional instability, which in certain circumstances is actually a consequence of central government policy.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/pilkada-and-the-paradox-of-regional-autonomy-design-1783133502)
Originally published by detikcom (https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-8559079/pilkada-dan-paradoks-desain-otonomi-daerah), translated from Indonesian