People want more than reduced ABRI representation
People want more than reduced ABRI representation
By Syamsuddin Haris
JAKARTA (JP): The Armed Forces (ABRI) have expressed its
readiness to relinquish 25 of its 100 seats in the House of
Representatives (DPR). The bill is being prepared and the 500-
strong DPR is gearing up to pass it into an act. What are the
implications of this change to democracy and to the
democratization of Indonesia?
First, the decision to reduce the number of ABRI's
representatives in the DPR is a welcome gesture. At any rate, it
symbolizes goodwill and a willingness to participate in a gradual
reformation. Furthermore, it also improves the image of ABRI's
socio-political role, the role which is still viewed as
stabilizing rather than dynamizing. In addition, the move can
also be viewed as a joint effort by the government and ABRI to
continue improving the performance of the ABRI's dual function in
the face of all the pressure for more political openness.
On the other hand, the initiative, which came from the top, as
well as the finalization of the number of the remaining 75 seats,
has indirectly pre-emptied and discouraged bottom-up aspiration
and the initiatives that might have come from the people or at
least the DPR. There has been hardly any opportunity for the DPR
to deliberate on the already fixed number. Thus, the opportunity
for elements in the society to work for democracy, which is
perfectly in line with the principles and ideals of the people's
sovereignty, becomes more limited.
The outcome might have been different if the government and
ABRI had not predetermined the number of remaining seats and had
instead left it to the people to discuss and decide. It would
have been more meaningful if the people could have issued a
figure they deem proper and realistic for gradual political
transformation. Thus, the principle of tut wuri handayani (giving
encouragement from behind), which, according to Gen. Feisal
Tanjung, all future socio-political roles of ABRI will be based
on, still hasn't had the chance to be put into practice.
Secondly, if we agree that the true ideals of sovereignty
hinge on the strengthening of the people's political position
vis-vis the state, then there would hardly be any significant
impact of the decision to reduce the number of ABRI seats on
democratization. This stems from the fact that the reduction of
ABRI's representation will have no direct influence on the
quality of public control over the state, on the one hand, and on
the mechanism that ensures government accountability on the
other. The failure to give more power to the people and to
improve the mechanism that guarantees government accountability
will not enhance the political structure of the New Order.
While it is true that the reduction of ABRI's seats gives an
opportunity to the three socio-political organizations to
increase the number of its representatives in the DPR, as long as
the structure of the political parties and the electoral system
are not changed there will be no significant improvement in the
public's controlling power or the government's accountability.
Therefore, the pressing agenda that the New Order has to
fulfill remains unchanged: to provide more opportunity for the
people through their representatives in the DPR, as well as in
the 1,000-strong People's Consultative Assembly, to exercise
control over the government in a mechanism of accountability that
truly works. The issue is not limited merely to the reduction of
the number of ABRI's seats, but it also includes the opportunity
for the DPR to function optimally.
The reduction of the seats could perhaps be viewed as a fait
accompli by ABRI before a proposal on more fundamental political
reformation ever comes from the people in the form, for example,
of the result of the study by the Indonesian Institute of
Sciences. As the most strategic political power during the New
Order era, it seems as if ABRI is reluctant to let its "fate" and
its future socio-political role be determined by powers other
than itself.
Thirdly, regardless of all the above, by agreeing on the seat
reduction, the government and ABRI wish to demonstrate that they
don't differ in opinion, a situation that is widely suspected by
many experts and observers of the New Order. As commonly known,
quite a few contemporary analyses on the New Order government
have underscored the "conflicts" between the government,
particularly the presidential office, and ABRI. These conflicts,
analysts say, were reflected in the Santa Cruz (1991) and Liquiza
(1995) cases. In both cases, they noted, the government felt it
necessary to set up a Military Honorary Council and an Officer
Honorary Council. In the Santa Cruz case, the President even set
up a National Investigation Commission. These analyses were then
enriched and supported by the emergence of the Moslem
Intellectuals Organization as a new pressure group which is
considered -- as opposed to other socio-political forces in the
society -- more capable of influencing President Soeharto in his
choice of cabinet members as well as members of Golkar's central
committee.
In addition, the step to reduce the number of military
personnel in the legislative body also seems to have been
intended as an attempt by the government and ABRI to disprove the
view that there will never be any reform initiatives from the
top.
As a central and strategic political force in the New Order
government, ABRI could have done more than just reduce the number
of its seats in the DPR. What society actually expects is ABRI to
be proactive and dynamic in order to anticipate the snowballing
of the democratization process at the societal level. The urgency
of this attitude comes from the fact that there has been
relatively no reduction in the repressive approaches used by
Armed Forces' personnel in the field when handling the emergence
of alternative views and discourses. This is reflected in the
return of the "required permit" and the restriction on certain
public figures to leave town, which has befallen even the chair
of the Indonesian Democratic Party in East Jawa. All these cases
strongly indicate the trend. As long as the repressive security
approach remains a ABRI tool when tackling various problems,
ABRI's socio-political role at society level will continue to be
debated.
It is high time ABRI adopted a more relaxed attitude towards
global and domestic demands for reform, most of which tend to
push for the formation of a political format that is more just,
open, fair and democratic. What this boils down to is that the
questions surrounding ABRI's socio-political roles have not been
answered by simply reducing the number of its seats. There needs
to be a review of the formulation and implementation of these
roles, including the actual agenda of the military in
participating in democracy and democratization projects.
The second expectation is closely related to the new
generation ABRI to be accepted. Legitimacy should naturally come
from the clear boundaries of its dual function. The dual function
needs to be redefined so that it will remain actual and relevant
and so that it can respond to the demands from the next non-ABRI
generation in the future, at the time when historical
legitimation may no longer suffice.
As we all know, ABRI's dual function is based on its
involvement in defending and constructing the country during the
struggle for independence, during the periods of regional
separatists, and at the time of the treason by the Communist
Party in its "September 30" movement. The point is, the coming
generation of ABRI cannot use these as the basis of its
legitimation. In due time, the new generation of ABRI will need a
different but still relevant legitimation basis that is
acceptable to the new generation of non-ABRI.
One possible solution for this problem is for ABRI to redefine
the boundaries and the scope of its socio-political role based on
the aspirations of the people. Such a redefinition will not only
result in a more favorable acceptance by the latter and thereby
give ABRI a stronger legitimation basis, it will also repeal the
view that ABRI, taking advantage of the issue of stability, unity
and solidarity, has allowed itself to penetrate into all aspects
of life whenever it wishes.
Is ABRI now willing to be more proactive in anticipating all
the above agenda items?
The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of
Sciences and Insan Politika Foundation.