People want more than reduced ABRI representation

People want more than reduced ABRI representation

By Syamsuddin Haris

JAKARTA (JP): The Armed Forces (ABRI) have expressed its readiness to relinquish 25 of its 100 seats in the House of Representatives (DPR). The bill is being prepared and the 500- strong DPR is gearing up to pass it into an act. What are the implications of this change to democracy and to the democratization of Indonesia?

First, the decision to reduce the number of ABRI's representatives in the DPR is a welcome gesture. At any rate, it symbolizes goodwill and a willingness to participate in a gradual reformation. Furthermore, it also improves the image of ABRI's socio-political role, the role which is still viewed as stabilizing rather than dynamizing. In addition, the move can also be viewed as a joint effort by the government and ABRI to continue improving the performance of the ABRI's dual function in the face of all the pressure for more political openness.

On the other hand, the initiative, which came from the top, as well as the finalization of the number of the remaining 75 seats, has indirectly pre-emptied and discouraged bottom-up aspiration and the initiatives that might have come from the people or at least the DPR. There has been hardly any opportunity for the DPR to deliberate on the already fixed number. Thus, the opportunity for elements in the society to work for democracy, which is perfectly in line with the principles and ideals of the people's sovereignty, becomes more limited.

The outcome might have been different if the government and ABRI had not predetermined the number of remaining seats and had instead left it to the people to discuss and decide. It would have been more meaningful if the people could have issued a figure they deem proper and realistic for gradual political transformation. Thus, the principle of tut wuri handayani (giving encouragement from behind), which, according to Gen. Feisal Tanjung, all future socio-political roles of ABRI will be based on, still hasn't had the chance to be put into practice.

Secondly, if we agree that the true ideals of sovereignty hinge on the strengthening of the people's political position vis-vis the state, then there would hardly be any significant impact of the decision to reduce the number of ABRI seats on democratization. This stems from the fact that the reduction of ABRI's representation will have no direct influence on the quality of public control over the state, on the one hand, and on the mechanism that ensures government accountability on the other. The failure to give more power to the people and to improve the mechanism that guarantees government accountability will not enhance the political structure of the New Order.

While it is true that the reduction of ABRI's seats gives an opportunity to the three socio-political organizations to increase the number of its representatives in the DPR, as long as the structure of the political parties and the electoral system are not changed there will be no significant improvement in the public's controlling power or the government's accountability.

Therefore, the pressing agenda that the New Order has to fulfill remains unchanged: to provide more opportunity for the people through their representatives in the DPR, as well as in the 1,000-strong People's Consultative Assembly, to exercise control over the government in a mechanism of accountability that truly works. The issue is not limited merely to the reduction of the number of ABRI's seats, but it also includes the opportunity for the DPR to function optimally.

The reduction of the seats could perhaps be viewed as a fait accompli by ABRI before a proposal on more fundamental political reformation ever comes from the people in the form, for example, of the result of the study by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences. As the most strategic political power during the New Order era, it seems as if ABRI is reluctant to let its "fate" and its future socio-political role be determined by powers other than itself.

Thirdly, regardless of all the above, by agreeing on the seat reduction, the government and ABRI wish to demonstrate that they don't differ in opinion, a situation that is widely suspected by many experts and observers of the New Order. As commonly known, quite a few contemporary analyses on the New Order government have underscored the "conflicts" between the government, particularly the presidential office, and ABRI. These conflicts, analysts say, were reflected in the Santa Cruz (1991) and Liquiza (1995) cases. In both cases, they noted, the government felt it necessary to set up a Military Honorary Council and an Officer Honorary Council. In the Santa Cruz case, the President even set up a National Investigation Commission. These analyses were then enriched and supported by the emergence of the Moslem Intellectuals Organization as a new pressure group which is considered -- as opposed to other socio-political forces in the society -- more capable of influencing President Soeharto in his choice of cabinet members as well as members of Golkar's central committee.

In addition, the step to reduce the number of military personnel in the legislative body also seems to have been intended as an attempt by the government and ABRI to disprove the view that there will never be any reform initiatives from the top.

As a central and strategic political force in the New Order government, ABRI could have done more than just reduce the number of its seats in the DPR. What society actually expects is ABRI to be proactive and dynamic in order to anticipate the snowballing of the democratization process at the societal level. The urgency of this attitude comes from the fact that there has been relatively no reduction in the repressive approaches used by Armed Forces' personnel in the field when handling the emergence of alternative views and discourses. This is reflected in the return of the "required permit" and the restriction on certain public figures to leave town, which has befallen even the chair of the Indonesian Democratic Party in East Jawa. All these cases strongly indicate the trend. As long as the repressive security approach remains a ABRI tool when tackling various problems, ABRI's socio-political role at society level will continue to be debated.

It is high time ABRI adopted a more relaxed attitude towards global and domestic demands for reform, most of which tend to push for the formation of a political format that is more just, open, fair and democratic. What this boils down to is that the questions surrounding ABRI's socio-political roles have not been answered by simply reducing the number of its seats. There needs to be a review of the formulation and implementation of these roles, including the actual agenda of the military in participating in democracy and democratization projects.

The second expectation is closely related to the new generation ABRI to be accepted. Legitimacy should naturally come from the clear boundaries of its dual function. The dual function needs to be redefined so that it will remain actual and relevant and so that it can respond to the demands from the next non-ABRI generation in the future, at the time when historical legitimation may no longer suffice.

As we all know, ABRI's dual function is based on its involvement in defending and constructing the country during the struggle for independence, during the periods of regional separatists, and at the time of the treason by the Communist Party in its "September 30" movement. The point is, the coming generation of ABRI cannot use these as the basis of its legitimation. In due time, the new generation of ABRI will need a different but still relevant legitimation basis that is acceptable to the new generation of non-ABRI.

One possible solution for this problem is for ABRI to redefine the boundaries and the scope of its socio-political role based on the aspirations of the people. Such a redefinition will not only result in a more favorable acceptance by the latter and thereby give ABRI a stronger legitimation basis, it will also repeal the view that ABRI, taking advantage of the issue of stability, unity and solidarity, has allowed itself to penetrate into all aspects of life whenever it wishes.

Is ABRI now willing to be more proactive in anticipating all the above agenda items?

The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences and Insan Politika Foundation.