Peace process in Aceh looks set to fail if truce breaches continue
Peace process in Aceh looks set to fail if truce breaches continue
P. Ramasamy, Political Science Professor, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia,
The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore
Third-party interventions in conflict resolution are
important. They tend to provide a broad framework for the
resolution of ethnic and nationalist conflicts, but the cessation
of hostilities alone is no guarantee of permanent peace.
Sri Lanka and Aceh, Indonesia, provide good examples of such
mediations.
A year ago, it was an initiative by the Norwegian government
that succeeded in brokering a ceasefire between the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government of Sri Lanka.
In December last year, the Henry Dunant Centre based in Geneva
brokered the cessation of hostilities between the Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka, or Free Aceh Movement, and the government of Indonesia.
Both ceasefire agreements stopped longstanding ethnic or
nationalist conflicts that had raged on for more than two
decades. But they do not provide for actual peace.
On the contrary, they merely lay the ground rules for the
parties to work out the modalities for peace through the
protracted process of constructive engagement. They serve to
bring about conditions of normalcy, whereby the parties can talk
without worrying about the actual conflict.
In Sri Lanka, the ceasefire paved the way for the LTTE and the
government to negotiate an acceptable political solution.
Although a final settlement is still far away, peace talks have
given some impetus to the process. After a year of no
hostilities, both sides continue to commit to peace.
The ceasefire agreement between the Free Aceh Movement and the
Indonesian government is only a few months old. But despite
complaints of breaches by both sides, things seem to be on
course.
The establishment of the Joint Security Committee provides an
effective means for the registration of complaints, resolution of
disputes and establishment of peace zones in Aceh.
Although there is a provision in the pact for elections to be
held next year, this remains a contentious issue for the rebels.
They see this as providing for a referendum for the people of
Aceh to decide if they want to be part of Indonesia, whereas the
government views it as a mechanism for the restoration of
Acehnese autonomy.
Thus, the third-party mediations in Sri Lanka and Aceh are
important, but hardly perfect. Their success very much depends on
how the parties use conditions of normalcy to debate, discuss and
engage in constructive negotiations.
Most importantly, it is essential for them to be sincere and
committed to the peace process, even if problems emerge.
In Sri Lanka, both the LTTE and the government are committed
to the peace process. However, they do acknowledge some serious
problems.
The Liberation Tigers believe some of the issues standing in
the way of peace have not been resolved, among them the heavy
presence of armed forces in the Jaffna peninsula, intimidation of
their cadres, the presence of landmines and the slow
rehabilitation of affected areas.
For its part, the government continues to blame the Tigers for
arms smuggling, the recruitment of child soldiers and
intimidation of government personnel.
In Aceh, too, the situation is not clear-cut. Although both
sides give the appearance of being committed to the peace
process, serious violations of the agreements continue to take
place.
The rebels have accused the Indonesian armed forces of killing
and arresting some of their members, in clear violation of the
terms of the ceasefire, and intimidating members of non-
governmental organizations and some sections of the government
for trying to manipulate and misinterpret significant provisions
of the peace agreement.
In one sense, the political position of the rebels is simple
and straightforward -- the peace agreement with the government
should provide an opportunity for the people of Aceh to decide,
once and for all, what kind of political links they should have
with Indonesia.
In this respect, they think that a solution could be reached
through a referendum.
Retaliatory acts by the rebels, however, have also breached
some of the provisions of the ceasefire.
The armed forces have blamed them for several killings, though
whether they were really involved is not clear.
Anyway, for the present, at least, complaints about violations
can be lodged with the Joint Security Committee -- a body that
consists of representatives of the Free Aceh Movement and the
Indonesian military, set up to resolve problems that emerge from
any breaches of the peace pact.
While the Acehnese rebels want their political fate decided
through a referendum, what the Liberation Tigers in Sri Lanka
want is autonomy.
As they argued during the first round of peace talks in
Thailand last year, if substantial autonomy is given to Tamils in
the north and east of the country, then they will not push for a
separate state.
It was on the basis of this conditional offer that the
dialogue proceeded full steam ahead, resulting in five rounds of
peace talks to date.
Ultimately, whether the Tamils will be able to enjoy
substantial autonomy will depend on a number of factors,
including the recognition of a homeland and of some of the
existing Tamil institutions; their right to self-determination;
and whether the Sinhala political parties are able to reach
consensus on amending the country's Constitution to allow for a
decentralized federal system.
Ultimately, a durable peace can be reached only if all parties
involved are sincere.
In Sri Lanka, despite the many problems, both the Liberation
Tigers and the government appear to be committed to the process.
In Aceh, it is not that the parties lack commitment, but
rather that too many violations of the ceasefire terms are taking
place.
If such breaches continue, there is a possibility that the
actual peace process might be derailed.