Peace process in Aceh looks set to fail if truce breaches continue
Peace process in Aceh looks set to fail if truce breaches continue
P. Ramasamy, Political Science Professor, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore
Third-party interventions in conflict resolution are important. They tend to provide a broad framework for the resolution of ethnic and nationalist conflicts, but the cessation of hostilities alone is no guarantee of permanent peace.
Sri Lanka and Aceh, Indonesia, provide good examples of such mediations.
A year ago, it was an initiative by the Norwegian government that succeeded in brokering a ceasefire between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government of Sri Lanka.
In December last year, the Henry Dunant Centre based in Geneva brokered the cessation of hostilities between the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or Free Aceh Movement, and the government of Indonesia.
Both ceasefire agreements stopped longstanding ethnic or nationalist conflicts that had raged on for more than two decades. But they do not provide for actual peace.
On the contrary, they merely lay the ground rules for the parties to work out the modalities for peace through the protracted process of constructive engagement. They serve to bring about conditions of normalcy, whereby the parties can talk without worrying about the actual conflict.
In Sri Lanka, the ceasefire paved the way for the LTTE and the government to negotiate an acceptable political solution. Although a final settlement is still far away, peace talks have given some impetus to the process. After a year of no hostilities, both sides continue to commit to peace.
The ceasefire agreement between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government is only a few months old. But despite complaints of breaches by both sides, things seem to be on course.
The establishment of the Joint Security Committee provides an effective means for the registration of complaints, resolution of disputes and establishment of peace zones in Aceh.
Although there is a provision in the pact for elections to be held next year, this remains a contentious issue for the rebels.
They see this as providing for a referendum for the people of Aceh to decide if they want to be part of Indonesia, whereas the government views it as a mechanism for the restoration of Acehnese autonomy.
Thus, the third-party mediations in Sri Lanka and Aceh are important, but hardly perfect. Their success very much depends on how the parties use conditions of normalcy to debate, discuss and engage in constructive negotiations.
Most importantly, it is essential for them to be sincere and committed to the peace process, even if problems emerge.
In Sri Lanka, both the LTTE and the government are committed to the peace process. However, they do acknowledge some serious problems.
The Liberation Tigers believe some of the issues standing in the way of peace have not been resolved, among them the heavy presence of armed forces in the Jaffna peninsula, intimidation of their cadres, the presence of landmines and the slow rehabilitation of affected areas.
For its part, the government continues to blame the Tigers for arms smuggling, the recruitment of child soldiers and intimidation of government personnel.
In Aceh, too, the situation is not clear-cut. Although both sides give the appearance of being committed to the peace process, serious violations of the agreements continue to take place.
The rebels have accused the Indonesian armed forces of killing and arresting some of their members, in clear violation of the terms of the ceasefire, and intimidating members of non- governmental organizations and some sections of the government for trying to manipulate and misinterpret significant provisions of the peace agreement.
In one sense, the political position of the rebels is simple and straightforward -- the peace agreement with the government should provide an opportunity for the people of Aceh to decide, once and for all, what kind of political links they should have with Indonesia.
In this respect, they think that a solution could be reached through a referendum.
Retaliatory acts by the rebels, however, have also breached some of the provisions of the ceasefire.
The armed forces have blamed them for several killings, though whether they were really involved is not clear.
Anyway, for the present, at least, complaints about violations can be lodged with the Joint Security Committee -- a body that consists of representatives of the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian military, set up to resolve problems that emerge from any breaches of the peace pact.
While the Acehnese rebels want their political fate decided through a referendum, what the Liberation Tigers in Sri Lanka want is autonomy.
As they argued during the first round of peace talks in Thailand last year, if substantial autonomy is given to Tamils in the north and east of the country, then they will not push for a separate state.
It was on the basis of this conditional offer that the dialogue proceeded full steam ahead, resulting in five rounds of peace talks to date.
Ultimately, whether the Tamils will be able to enjoy substantial autonomy will depend on a number of factors, including the recognition of a homeland and of some of the existing Tamil institutions; their right to self-determination; and whether the Sinhala political parties are able to reach consensus on amending the country's Constitution to allow for a decentralized federal system.
Ultimately, a durable peace can be reached only if all parties involved are sincere.
In Sri Lanka, despite the many problems, both the Liberation Tigers and the government appear to be committed to the process.
In Aceh, it is not that the parties lack commitment, but rather that too many violations of the ceasefire terms are taking place.
If such breaches continue, there is a possibility that the actual peace process might be derailed.