Participation, the gist of regional autonomy

Participation, the gist of regional autonomy

Viewed from the perspective of reform and good governance, the real issue of regional autonomy is not the distribution of power and financial balance between the central and regional government.

Without a system that guarantees the participation of people, communities and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the decision making over the distribution of resources and control over government programs in the regions, democratic reform is not going to take place.

Law No 22/1999 and 25/1999 and the debates surrounding them have focussed on the redistribution of power and finance from the central to regional governments. Without redistribution of power and financial resources between the regional government and communities, authority is just transferred from the central government to the regional government, complete with its centralized character and possibilities for abuse.

At the regional level, political lobbies between the executive branch on the one hand and the legislative branch on the other have revolved around the allocation of the regional state budget (APBD).

Examples abound, and they have been taking place in both rich and poor regions alike. In the wealthy Jakarta area, for example, it was suspected that Governor Sutiyoso's decision to allocate a significant portion of the APBD for car allowances in 2000 and new cars in 2001 for all members of the legislative council (DPRD) was related to the acceptance of his Accountability Report by the DPRD.

In the poor district of Kebumen, which recently suffered from serious flooding and landslides, the DPRD asked for a 100 percent increase in budget allocation for the regional legislative for the year 2002. It was in contrast to the fact that in 2001 the taxpaying public of Kebumen pitched in to rebuild 300 school buildings because the APBN's fund allocated for the school rebuilding effort was quite small.

Lack of finances, whether it is real or politically engineered, has made locally generated revenues (PAD) the buzzword of regional autonomy. For resource rich regions, the concern is how to increase PAD by securing a much larger proportion of their income from the hands of the central government. For poorer regions, the concern is how to increase PAD at all costs in order to fill in the declining subsidy from the central government. How to develop a system that promotes clean governance and public participation on the one hand, and a competitive economy that can attract investors on the other hand are hardly on the agenda.

Sometimes, the reason to gain control over resources is not as noble as to increase PAD for the good of the region. The failure of the central government to sell its majority share in Semen Gresik (plus Semen Padang and Semen Tonasa) to Cemex, for example, could be seen as the triumph of local politicians to keep state-owned enterprises as a cash cow. With Cemex holding a majority share, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for local politicians from the regional government or the DPRD to squeeze cash from the company.

Do communities benefit more from Indonesian ownership? Not necessarily. With Cemex holding a majority share, local communities could get a helping hand from international NGO networks to put pressure on the headquarters of the multinational cement company to legally respect the community's customary rights, control pollution and assist community development.

The combination of the blinding urge to increase PAD and the practice of corruption, either for personal or institutional enrichment, has often hurt business competitiveness.

A Medan furniture businessman was puzzled when he visited a furniture company on the outskirts of Bangkok in mid-2001. The Bangkok company used Indonesian wood and rattan supplied by a Singaporean company. What baffled him was that his calculation showed that he could not match the price offered by the Singapore company because he would have to ship the wood and rattan first from Kalimantan to Medan before exporting it to Thailand. And inter-insular shipments were subject to so many legal and illegal retributions that it wiped out his chance of competing, even in the regional market of Southeast Asia.

The above power contests over the control of resources take place just among the elite at the regional level. There is a big danger that regional autonomy does not only keep people away from decision making and control over government programs.

More than that, people are also mobilized, in the name of gotong royong (working together) and keswadayaan (self-help), to raise money to help run services and develop public facilities that actually should be the responsibility of the regional government. Meanwhile, in many regions the regional executive and legislative fight over the allocation of APBD, not for the sake of increasing the competitiveness of the regional economy, but to finance their own political interests and agendas.

However, there is no reason to feel pessimistic.

The above accounts show that regional autonomy is currently plagued by two sets of problems: poor representation and participation, transparency and accountability. But in each of the problem areas, there are already efforts being carried out to solve the problem. Representation is related to the ability of the public to control their representatives in the DPRD.

One way to make DPRD members listen to their constituents is to change the electoral system for the 2004 election from the indirect proportional system, where people vote for a political party, to a direct proportional system. In a direct election system, the names of DPRD candidates are listed on the ballot next to their political party. Compared to a district system, where the winner takes all the seats, the direct proportional system is more suitable for a plural society like Indonesia.

Participation is related to the ability of communities to influence decision making at the district/city level, both in determining public policy and in making APBD. In this field, both the government and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have offered solutions to the problem.

The newly formed nationwide Village Representative Body (BPD) could accommodate communities that want to revitalize their long suppressed customary institutions. Monitoring and control over the BPD election is needed so that BPD members are directly elected by the people.

The district of Kebumen has gone one step further by attempting to revive the bottom up planning process through the institution of Musbangdes (advisory council) at the village level, to UDKP at the subdistrict level and Rakorbang (a body to coordinate development) at the district level. Previously, the bottom-up institutions established by former president Soeharto in a top-down manner did not work.

CSOs have also been active in facilitating communities to engage in the bottom-up planning process. Since the fall of Soeharto, foreign and domestic donors have been very keen to finance NGOs that facilitate the formation of citizen forums at the village level.

A citizen forum facilitates people in the community to formulate their needs, problems and potentials, and then to apply pressure on the village administration and BPD to accept their aspirations.

At the city level, efforts have been conducted to develop a multi-stakeholders forum, which could function as a decision- making forum between the regional government, DPRD, CSOs and communities. Transparency and accountability in the regions have also become a rich field for many CSOs. There are many watchdog organizations that monitor government programs, government services and the making and implementation of APBD.

2002 is a crucial year as political forces will start gearing up toward the preparation for the 2004 election. On the one hand, political parties and politicians will have to find ways to raise campaign funds. Self-interested politicians at the regional level feel optimistic that government programs, the private sector, APBD and state-owned enterprises can be manipulated to serve their own interests.

On the other hand, proponents of good governance from within the executive and legislature are increasing in number. They are driven by the awareness that clean governance is necessary to develop the economic competitiveness of their region, and that competitiveness needs political stability, which only accountability and participation can provide.

It is expected that the proponents of good governance from the CSOs, the regional government and DPRD would be able to join hands more in resisting the short term and narrow-minded interests of local politicians.