Participation, the gist of regional autonomy

Participation, the gist of regional autonomy

Viewed from the perspective of reform and good governance, the
real issue of regional autonomy is not the distribution of power
and financial balance between the central and regional
government.

Without a system that guarantees the participation of people,
communities and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the
decision making over the distribution of resources and control
over government programs in the regions, democratic reform is not
going to take place.

Law No 22/1999 and 25/1999 and the debates surrounding them
have focussed on the redistribution of power and finance from the
central to regional governments. Without redistribution of power
and financial resources between the regional government and
communities, authority is just transferred from the central
government to the regional government, complete with its
centralized character and possibilities for abuse.

At the regional level, political lobbies between the executive
branch on the one hand and the legislative branch on the other
have revolved around the allocation of the regional state budget
(APBD).

Examples abound, and they have been taking place in both rich
and poor regions alike. In the wealthy Jakarta area, for example,
it was suspected that Governor Sutiyoso's decision to allocate a
significant portion of the APBD for car allowances in 2000 and
new cars in 2001 for all members of the legislative council
(DPRD) was related to the acceptance of his Accountability Report
by the DPRD.

In the poor district of Kebumen, which recently suffered from
serious flooding and landslides, the DPRD asked for a 100 percent
increase in budget allocation for the regional legislative for
the year 2002. It was in contrast to the fact that in 2001 the
taxpaying public of Kebumen pitched in to rebuild 300 school
buildings because the APBN's fund allocated for the school
rebuilding effort was quite small.

Lack of finances, whether it is real or politically
engineered, has made locally generated revenues (PAD) the
buzzword of regional autonomy. For resource rich regions, the
concern is how to increase PAD by securing a much larger
proportion of their income from the hands of the central
government. For poorer regions, the concern is how to increase
PAD at all costs in order to fill in the declining subsidy from
the central government. How to develop a system that promotes
clean governance and public participation on the one hand, and a
competitive economy that can attract investors on the other hand
are hardly on the agenda.

Sometimes, the reason to gain control over resources is not as
noble as to increase PAD for the good of the region. The failure
of the central government to sell its majority share in Semen
Gresik (plus Semen Padang and Semen Tonasa) to Cemex, for
example, could be seen as the triumph of local politicians to
keep state-owned enterprises as a cash cow. With Cemex holding a
majority share, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for
local politicians from the regional government or the DPRD to
squeeze cash from the company.

Do communities benefit more from Indonesian ownership? Not
necessarily. With Cemex holding a majority share, local
communities could get a helping hand from international NGO
networks to put pressure on the headquarters of the multinational
cement company to legally respect the community's customary
rights, control pollution and assist community development.

The combination of the blinding urge to increase PAD and the
practice of corruption, either for personal or institutional
enrichment, has often hurt business competitiveness.

A Medan furniture businessman was puzzled when he visited a
furniture company on the outskirts of Bangkok in mid-2001. The
Bangkok company used Indonesian wood and rattan supplied by a
Singaporean company. What baffled him was that his calculation
showed that he could not match the price offered by the Singapore
company because he would have to ship the wood and rattan first
from Kalimantan to Medan before exporting it to Thailand. And
inter-insular shipments were subject to so many legal and illegal
retributions that it wiped out his chance of competing, even in
the regional market of Southeast Asia.

The above power contests over the control of resources take
place just among the elite at the regional level. There is a big
danger that regional autonomy does not only keep people away from
decision making and control over government programs.

More than that, people are also mobilized, in the name of
gotong royong (working together) and keswadayaan (self-help), to
raise money to help run services and develop public facilities
that actually should be the responsibility of the regional
government. Meanwhile, in many regions the regional executive and
legislative fight over the allocation of APBD, not for the sake
of increasing the competitiveness of the regional economy, but to
finance their own political interests and agendas.

However, there is no reason to feel pessimistic.

The above accounts show that regional autonomy is currently
plagued by two sets of problems: poor representation and
participation, transparency and accountability. But in each of
the problem areas, there are already efforts being carried out to
solve the problem. Representation is related to the ability of
the public to control their representatives in the DPRD.

One way to make DPRD members listen to their constituents is
to change the electoral system for the 2004 election from the
indirect proportional system, where people vote for a political
party, to a direct proportional system. In a direct election
system, the names of DPRD candidates are listed on the ballot
next to their political party. Compared to a district system,
where the winner takes all the seats, the direct proportional
system is more suitable for a plural society like Indonesia.

Participation is related to the ability of communities to
influence decision making at the district/city level, both in
determining public policy and in making APBD. In this field, both
the government and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have
offered solutions to the problem.

The newly formed nationwide Village Representative Body (BPD)
could accommodate communities that want to revitalize their long
suppressed customary institutions. Monitoring and control over
the BPD election is needed so that BPD members are directly
elected by the people.

The district of Kebumen has gone one step further by
attempting to revive the bottom up planning process through the
institution of Musbangdes (advisory council) at the village
level, to UDKP at the subdistrict level and Rakorbang (a body to
coordinate development) at the district level. Previously, the
bottom-up institutions established by former president Soeharto
in a top-down manner did not work.

CSOs have also been active in facilitating communities to
engage in the bottom-up planning process. Since the fall of
Soeharto, foreign and domestic donors have been very keen to
finance NGOs that facilitate the formation of citizen forums at
the village level.

A citizen forum facilitates people in the community to
formulate their needs, problems and potentials, and then to apply
pressure on the village administration and BPD to accept their
aspirations.

At the city level, efforts have been conducted to develop a
multi-stakeholders forum, which could function as a decision-
making forum between the regional government, DPRD, CSOs and
communities. Transparency and accountability in the regions have
also become a rich field for many CSOs. There are many watchdog
organizations that monitor government programs, government
services and the making and implementation of APBD.

2002 is a crucial year as political forces will start gearing
up toward the preparation for the 2004 election. On the one hand,
political parties and politicians will have to find ways to raise
campaign funds. Self-interested politicians at the regional level
feel optimistic that government programs, the private sector,
APBD and state-owned enterprises can be manipulated to serve
their own interests.

On the other hand, proponents of good governance from within
the executive and legislature are increasing in number. They are
driven by the awareness that clean governance is necessary to
develop the economic competitiveness of their region, and that
competitiveness needs political stability, which only
accountability and participation can provide.

It is expected that the proponents of good governance from the
CSOs, the regional government and DPRD would be able to join
hands more in resisting the short term and narrow-minded
interests of local politicians.