Papua New Guinea's climax relieves Canberra

By Dewi Anggraeni

MELBOURNE (JP): After 10 days of crisis, Papua New Guinea's Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan announced on March 26 that he and two of his ministers, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Chris Haiveta and Defense Minister Mathias Ijape would step aside and appoint a caretaker government.

However, Chan retains his dignity, because he only stepped aside after securing a vote of confidence from parliament. There was no military coup, and the constitution has not been rent asunder.

Australia breathed a sigh a relief.

If there have been crises that draw Australia's Prime Minister John Howard and Opposition leader Kim Beazley into a united front, the recent debacle in Papua New Guinea has been one of them.

Apart from the fact that Australia has historically had a bipartisan policy towards PNG, both Howard and Beazley claim to adhere to an Australian notion of giving people a fair go. And hiring mercenaries to fight a group -- secessionist or not -- would give Howard, Beazley and many Australians the creeps, to say the least.

Of course, the issue was a complex one. And Australia did not have the luxury of distance, in a moral or geographic sense. The reactions of Australians, ranging from outrage to squirmishness made it imperative for Howard to express his strong objections to his PNG counterpart's use of mercenaries in fighting the civil war.

It was politically expedient for Howard to do so, because morality aside, the electorate wanted to know if any of the US$255 million of Australia's annual aid had been used to pay the reported sum of $36 million to Sandline International, the company which supplied the mercenaries. There was no way of knowing for sure, because Australia's aid is general budgetary assistance.

This was why Beazley, as Labor leader, was also politically bound to prevent implementation of the plan. It was a Labor government in the 1980s that changed the nature of aid to PNG from project-related to general budgetary aid. It was then regarded as a gesture of recognition to the PNG government, and a sign of Australia's increasing respect for PNG's ability to run its own country.

Howard had to walk a political tightrope. On the one hand he had to show his electorate that he was capable of taking strong action, by exerting pressure on Chan to drop the plan to use mercenaries.

On the other hand, he could not afford to be seen as being too patronizing or interventionist in PNG's internal affairs. This might justify Chan's defiance. If Chan came across as a strong leader defending his country's right to run its own affairs hence his people's self-respect, he would have an advantage, leaving a clear way to implement his strategy.

Chan's strategy was definitely contrary to the one favored by Australia, namely non-military peaceful solutions. In fact, last month, several days before the news of the mercenaries broke out in the media, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer had just announced that Australia was ready to unfreeze $3.2 million in emergency aid to PNG towards peaceful negotiation efforts with the BRA rebel leaders.

To complicate matters, in a surprise move on March 17, the then Chief of PNG Defense Force, Brig. Gen. Jerry Singirok and Police Commissioner Bob Nenta, called on PNG Governor-General Sir Wiwa Korowi to sack Chan. Commissioner Nenta distanced himself from the call not long after, but Gen. Singirok stood firm. On television he said that by hiring the mercenaries, Chan had shown that he had no confidence in his own Defense Force.

Since the PNG constitution does not allow the governor-general to dismiss the prime minister, Chan turned the tables and sacked Gen. Singirok instead.

But in practice, it was not that easy. Gen. Singirok was well respected in the PNG Defense Force. Yauka Liria, a former PNG intelligence officer, in his 1989 book, Bougainville Campaign Diary, describes Major Singirok, "as a reliable, competent and truly professional officer".

He also describes Singirok as instrumental in maintaining morale. "... I felt that there was a lack of purpose, mission tempo, and very low morale in the contingent, a potentially dangerous situation as we commenced our operations against the BRA. If there was an officer who could remedy the position, I knew it was Major Singirok. A hard-nosed, intelligent infantry officer, who commanded the respect of his juniors and seniors alike.

Major Singirok tried to cultivate in his juniors, and impress on his seniors, a professional and dedicated attitude towards their work. His was one of the success stories of the PNG Defense Force. Having topped all his courses, he had risen to the rank of major in just under 10 years. He had proven leadership skills, matched by only a few in the Defense Force".

Beyond the border, BRA leader Francis Ona also described the deposed commander as his only hope of ever achieving peaceful negotiations.

While the danger of an all-out coup was allayed by the renewed loyalty of the police force, Howard's task was becoming increasingly difficult. While Gen. Singirok was seen as instigating the revolt, Howard had to oppose him, though Gen. Singirok had also been an instrumental in efforts for peace.

In brief, Howard had to express strong opposition to both parties. Now he could not back down from his tough stand against the mercenary plan.

Meanwhile, in Australia, Chan's credibility was far from rock solid. The discrepancy between the poorly paid, poorly armed PNG soldiers and the $36 million he was willing to pour on the 70 strong mercenary force was too obvious to ignore. This was reinforced by Gen. Singirok's subsequent allegations of corruption in the body of the government, which led to the hiring of the mercenaries. Unfortunately for Chan, Gen. Singirok, no longer bound by discretion regulations, disclosed the vital information.

PNG was almost plunged into constitutional crisis. The opposition coalition supported Gen. Singirok, calling for Chan to step aside. Demands for judicial enquiry into the mercenary affair followed, with Chan refusing to comply. The tense, two-day sitting of parliament came to a remarkable conclusion, with Chan able to step aside with dignity.

A relieved Howard told journalists that he was glad that PNG had been able to resolve the crisis within constitutional boundaries. Foreign Minister Downer gave three reasons why this outcome was good for PNG. Firstly, The mercenaries had left the country. Secondly, a military solution for the Bougainville crisis was undesirable, and finally, the country's constitution had been able to resolve the political impasse.

In the meantime, Gen. Singirok told Mary-Louise O'Callaghan, PNG correspondent for The Australian, that he was going on a fishing holiday in his home village of Madang. He denied being a hero. 'Everybody who supported me was a hero,' he said. He did not personally discredit anyone. "I have the greatest respect for Sir Julius Chan."

And about Lt. Col. Tim Spicer, CEO of Sandline International, "A totally professional soldier. He just shouldn't have come to Papua New Guinea to make a lot of money."

Will Singirok be reinstated as Chief of PNG's Defense Force?

That's another chapter in this running history.