Overcoming democratic deficits

Overcoming democratic deficits

By Juwono Sudarsono

The following is the first of two articles on the undertaking
of developing countries in coming to terms with democratic wave
sweeping the globe after the Cold War.

JAKARTA (JP): Five years ago, observers in the West mistakenly
believed that the demise of communism and state socialism in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union would provide clear
vindication for a "global democratic wave" based on the precepts
of Western forms of government.

This mistaken view of the triumph of liberal democracy --
whether of the North American or the West European variety --
colors the subsequent "values debate" between countries of the
North and developing nations of the South. Developing nations
were taken to task for their "democratic deficits": lack of
political pluralism, muzzled media, authoritarianism, and subdued
labor organizations.

The recent parliamentary gains by transfigured communist
parties in Poland and Russia have dampened elation over the
liberal democratic model. Although it is unlikely that the
reformed communists will revert to old-style command economic
planning, the tribulations and disquiet arising from undertaking
simultaneously economic and political reform have given rise to
nostalgia for stability, predictability and order. The much
vaunted benefits of opening up market forces resulted in
highlighting the seamier sides of unfettered capitalism:
profiteering, pornography, protectionism, prostitution.

In much of the developing world, the processes of defining the
appropriate scope and pace of political and economic reforms
continue to be matters of practical concern. In vast
agglomerations that make up the People's Republic of China,
India, Brazil, Indonesia and Nigeria, the urge and determination
to remain as a unified nation-state remain constant imperatives.

Instability arising from interethnic and interracial violence
in postapartheid South Africa has underscored the need to be wary
of separating the mechanics of political democracy from its
cultural and socioeconomic context. "Democratic deficits" are
rooted as much from dire economic, social and cultural
circumstances as from lack of civil and political guarantees.
Periodic political and cultural violence in India, Brazil and the
Philippines show that changing forms of political regimes do not
automatically lead to functioning democracies.

Whereas in industrialized countries children begin from grade
school to learn at first hand the elementary forms of elective
government, in most developing nations decisions are reached in
consensus largely through elders who are not necessarily elected
but aged into their positions. Consensual decisions that are
normally provided by established parliamentary procedures are
reached at village, provincial and national levels.

Deliberative decision-making is often more acceptable than
those in advanced industrialized countries would think proper.
Innate traditional values come into play in various layers of
society and at different stages of political and economic change.

Defeat in local or national elections is much more difficult
to accept precisely because it is a deeply disillusioning and all
too often traumatic experience, underlining dangerous divisions
that are often fatal to the unity and cohesion of the community,
and, in some instances, to the integrity of the nation-state
itself.

Consequently, many leaders in developing countries are not
overawed by political discourse in advanced industrialized
countries on the imperative to restrict state authority in a
democratic context. They are generally more concerned with the
ability of the state to secure the survival of the country as a
multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious society. Applying
precepts of liberal democracy without regard to cultural values
often debilitates the state performing those essential tasks of
authoritative action, control and regulation.

The problem of coming to terms with democratic waves, values
and deficits becomes more acute if one appreciates that in most
developing countries leaders have to operate in a general
environment of massive poverty, widespread illiteracy and severe
deprivation.

Governing becomes that much more difficult as a result of
heightened expectations emanating from the gaudiness of global
commercial advertising.

Feelings of economic failure, deprivation and insecurity make
societies that much more ungovernable. People in poverty and
desperation have weak inclinations to abide by rules and little
stake in the progress of the community or their political system.
Fear and prejudice are easily exploited by irresponsible and
opportunistic demagogs. Racial, religious and ethnic
exclusiveness are easily directed against social, cultural and
economic minorities.

The contrary argument, that concern for maintaining stability
can all too often be manipulated by power hungry cliques to
prolong their corrupt practices and suppress legitimate dissent,
is well taken.

Nevertheless, for many governments in developing countries,
the problem is not so much restricting the power of the state in
order to safeguard the civil and political liberties of
individuals or civic organizations. The most crucial issues have
always been the fundamental lack of state power to maintain
political cohesion; the weakness of state authority to harness
forces of conciliation among disparate ethnic and religious, as
well as provincial groups; and the inability of the state to
provide rudimentary tasks of providing the basics: public order,
food, clothing, shelter, minimal health care.

Governments in many developing nations tend to encourage
predictability, order and stability. Not because they are
necessarily averse to individuality or the virtuoso performances
by their more creative individuals. But rather because, as events
in India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Brazil have shown, unfettered
openness and freedom can be dangerous and futile in societies and
cultures where "agreement on fundamentals" and "rules of the
game" tend to be easily manipulated by the privileged few.

Clamors for freedom of expression and a vigorous civil society
is fine if one is perched high and dry in the upper and middle
echelons of the social ladder. Down below, in the zones of
poverty -- where life is often brutish and short -- there cannot
be any inclination to debate the finer points of good governance.

Another important dimension to understanding the difficulties
of building a democracy is the international context. A hundred
years ago, advanced industrialized countries pursued their
respective political and economic developments in an
international setting virtually devoid of scrutiny by outsiders.