Overcoming democratic deficits

Overcoming democratic deficits

By Juwono Sudarsono

This is the second of two articles on developing countries
coming to terms with the democratic wave sweeping the globe after
the Cold War.

JAKARTA (JP): Local and national governments in North
America and Western Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries
proceeded without interference by the intrusive glare of today's
modern mass media, such as satellite television.

Economic progress within North America and Europe did not have
to take into account today's globalized business and trade
environment. The commerce and agriculture departments and
ministries of the United States and Western Europe unabashedly
provided protection for their domestic markets without having to
face the barrage of present day "free and fair trade" rulings
from the GATT/WTO, working to their particular disadvantage.

Leaders in North America and Western Europe were able to
provide groundwork which decades later resulted in the
strengthening of traditions and sustenance of civic government.
The American founding fathers may have debated ending barriers at
state borders, but the Constitutional Convention at least planned
a federal system and went way beyond that to create a sovereign
national government. Crucially, and in contrast to today's
governments in most of the developing world, that national
government exercised a far greater degree of sovereignty in
foreign affairs.

Even Western European states in the 1940s did not have to
bother much with foreign scrutiny over treatment of their
citizens (not to speak of citizens of colonial origin) within
their borders. After all, Britain, France, Spain, and the
Netherlands were colonial powers when they signed the United
Nation's Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Today's competitive international political and economic
system throughout the world works to the political and economic
disadvantage of most developing nations. In this era of global
sourcing, global production and global marketing, these nations
and their fragile economies not only have to compete for market
access, trade expansion and investments inflows. They are at the
same time under relentless pressure from powerful business
interests, unions and lobbies in the legislatures of the
developed countries to a wide range of accusations ranging from
undemocratic government, violation of labor standards,
infringement of intellectual property rights and environmental
degradation.

In all fairness, the question has to be asked: Is it realistic
and fair to demand of Asian, African and other developing
countries to adhere to standards of civil and political rights
when the basic ingredients of nation formation and national
cohesion have still to be set firmly in place?

It has also to be asked whether in this complex world of
international competition for markets, investments and trade it
can be only coincidental that the attention of governments,
parliaments, the press and non-governmental organizations as well
as other self-styled concerned citizens of the industrialized
world be focused on those governments and economies that are
increasingly becoming more competitive in international trade and
business? Have Congressmen and parliamentarians in developed
countries enforced their civil, political and economic codes
within their own constituencies? Human rights must be truly
universal, not selectively applied to perceived recalcitrant
developing nations.

Indonesians do not harbor any particular conspiracy theory on
the machinations of the industrialized North. At the same time,
there is justifiable concern that the periodic spate of the
international blame game more often than not works in favor of
the advanced industrialized countries.

Even the agenda setting of United Nations "summit conferences"
invariably tend to reflect the interests of the industrialized
North to apply political pressure on the developing South as
competition in the economic sphere bite into the markets and
paychecks of the Group of Seven industrialized economies.

The Environmental summit in Brazil in 1992, the 1993
conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the Population conference
in Cairo in 1994 and the 1995 Social Summit in Copenhagen extend
this important dimension of the perennial debate about what
constitutes good governance.

Developing nations do not have the luxury accorded advanced
industrialized of the North centuries ago in forming the bed in
which the seeds of democratic government could steadily flourish.
Because the contemporary international political and economic
environment is so much more intense, there are even more reasons
to emphasize deliberate forms of democratic modernization.

At times, irrespective of the historical context or the
particular strategic context of a country, a nation needs to
redefine its cultural reference points in order to better
understand accelerated changes taking place. Sometimes that task
is entrusted to a particularly strong and dominant figure. At
other stages, that task must be borne by a resourceful, committed
and organized political party, bureaucracy or the military.
Whether it is Deng Xiaoping in China, Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore
or Soeharto in Indonesia, a political leader's imprint often has
much bearing to the course of his nation's future progress.

In Indonesia, the decision to plant firmly a single state
identity to decide the basis of the Indonesian state owe in no
small part to the vision of Indonesia's army officers in 1966 in
devising once and for all the ideological basis of the Indonesian
nation-state. A generation later, Indonesia is still determined
to continue this nation-building within its chosen political and
economic arenas.

The transition from a dominant political figure to one that
establishes firm rules of parliamentary compromise and
institutionalized government is never an easy one. Yet the
nations and cultures of Asia, Africa and Latin America cannot
avoid the turbulence of accelerated twists and turns that are
inherent in the process of political change and economic
development.

In some instances, just as reform and change for the better
seem to be on the way, some nations may temporarily revert to
that maddening polarization between radical and reactionary views
to which any country is prone. The zig-zagging of the trajectory
of political development depends on the strategic setting,
geographical make-up of the state and obviously economic factors.
Above all, the leadership factor in identifying goals,
implementing programs and adapting to change is decisive.

Contractual relationships between rulers and ruled, often
taken for granted in the industrialized North, have to be
continuously nurtured in most of Asia and Africa. The cumulative
interaction of tradition and modernity have patiently
accumulated, honored and defended. For many in the developing
world, one generation is only the beginning.

In this age of globalized information, trade, and markets, the
debate contrasting Western versus Asian values is a false one.

Ultimately each country and culture must pursue its particular
political and economic growth path within specific time frames.
There cannot be an all encompassing wave within which all nations
and all economies surge in similar fashion. Neither American,
West European nor East Asian experiences are models for other
countries and cultures to emulate.

Depending on the country's leadership acumen and commitment,
each nation must find the right balance between traditional and
modern values as well as in overcoming its specific democratic
deficits at its own pace.

Juwono Sudarsono is Vice Governor of the National Resilience
Institute (Lemhannas), Jakarta.

Window: Neither American, West European nor East Asia experiences
are models for other countries and cultures to emulate.