Overcoming democratic deficits

Overcoming democratic deficits

By Juwono Sudarsono

This is the second of two articles on developing countries coming to terms with the democratic wave sweeping the globe after the Cold War.

JAKARTA (JP): Local and national governments in North America and Western Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries proceeded without interference by the intrusive glare of today's modern mass media, such as satellite television.

Economic progress within North America and Europe did not have to take into account today's globalized business and trade environment. The commerce and agriculture departments and ministries of the United States and Western Europe unabashedly provided protection for their domestic markets without having to face the barrage of present day "free and fair trade" rulings from the GATT/WTO, working to their particular disadvantage.

Leaders in North America and Western Europe were able to provide groundwork which decades later resulted in the strengthening of traditions and sustenance of civic government. The American founding fathers may have debated ending barriers at state borders, but the Constitutional Convention at least planned a federal system and went way beyond that to create a sovereign national government. Crucially, and in contrast to today's governments in most of the developing world, that national government exercised a far greater degree of sovereignty in foreign affairs.

Even Western European states in the 1940s did not have to bother much with foreign scrutiny over treatment of their citizens (not to speak of citizens of colonial origin) within their borders. After all, Britain, France, Spain, and the Netherlands were colonial powers when they signed the United Nation's Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Today's competitive international political and economic system throughout the world works to the political and economic disadvantage of most developing nations. In this era of global sourcing, global production and global marketing, these nations and their fragile economies not only have to compete for market access, trade expansion and investments inflows. They are at the same time under relentless pressure from powerful business interests, unions and lobbies in the legislatures of the developed countries to a wide range of accusations ranging from undemocratic government, violation of labor standards, infringement of intellectual property rights and environmental degradation.

In all fairness, the question has to be asked: Is it realistic and fair to demand of Asian, African and other developing countries to adhere to standards of civil and political rights when the basic ingredients of nation formation and national cohesion have still to be set firmly in place?

It has also to be asked whether in this complex world of international competition for markets, investments and trade it can be only coincidental that the attention of governments, parliaments, the press and non-governmental organizations as well as other self-styled concerned citizens of the industrialized world be focused on those governments and economies that are increasingly becoming more competitive in international trade and business? Have Congressmen and parliamentarians in developed countries enforced their civil, political and economic codes within their own constituencies? Human rights must be truly universal, not selectively applied to perceived recalcitrant developing nations.

Indonesians do not harbor any particular conspiracy theory on the machinations of the industrialized North. At the same time, there is justifiable concern that the periodic spate of the international blame game more often than not works in favor of the advanced industrialized countries.

Even the agenda setting of United Nations "summit conferences" invariably tend to reflect the interests of the industrialized North to apply political pressure on the developing South as competition in the economic sphere bite into the markets and paychecks of the Group of Seven industrialized economies.

The Environmental summit in Brazil in 1992, the 1993 conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the Population conference in Cairo in 1994 and the 1995 Social Summit in Copenhagen extend this important dimension of the perennial debate about what constitutes good governance.

Developing nations do not have the luxury accorded advanced industrialized of the North centuries ago in forming the bed in which the seeds of democratic government could steadily flourish. Because the contemporary international political and economic environment is so much more intense, there are even more reasons to emphasize deliberate forms of democratic modernization.

At times, irrespective of the historical context or the particular strategic context of a country, a nation needs to redefine its cultural reference points in order to better understand accelerated changes taking place. Sometimes that task is entrusted to a particularly strong and dominant figure. At other stages, that task must be borne by a resourceful, committed and organized political party, bureaucracy or the military. Whether it is Deng Xiaoping in China, Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore or Soeharto in Indonesia, a political leader's imprint often has much bearing to the course of his nation's future progress.

In Indonesia, the decision to plant firmly a single state identity to decide the basis of the Indonesian state owe in no small part to the vision of Indonesia's army officers in 1966 in devising once and for all the ideological basis of the Indonesian nation-state. A generation later, Indonesia is still determined to continue this nation-building within its chosen political and economic arenas.

The transition from a dominant political figure to one that establishes firm rules of parliamentary compromise and institutionalized government is never an easy one. Yet the nations and cultures of Asia, Africa and Latin America cannot avoid the turbulence of accelerated twists and turns that are inherent in the process of political change and economic development.

In some instances, just as reform and change for the better seem to be on the way, some nations may temporarily revert to that maddening polarization between radical and reactionary views to which any country is prone. The zig-zagging of the trajectory of political development depends on the strategic setting, geographical make-up of the state and obviously economic factors. Above all, the leadership factor in identifying goals, implementing programs and adapting to change is decisive.

Contractual relationships between rulers and ruled, often taken for granted in the industrialized North, have to be continuously nurtured in most of Asia and Africa. The cumulative interaction of tradition and modernity have patiently accumulated, honored and defended. For many in the developing world, one generation is only the beginning.

In this age of globalized information, trade, and markets, the debate contrasting Western versus Asian values is a false one.

Ultimately each country and culture must pursue its particular political and economic growth path within specific time frames. There cannot be an all encompassing wave within which all nations and all economies surge in similar fashion. Neither American, West European nor East Asian experiences are models for other countries and cultures to emulate.

Depending on the country's leadership acumen and commitment, each nation must find the right balance between traditional and modern values as well as in overcoming its specific democratic deficits at its own pace.

Juwono Sudarsono is Vice Governor of the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas), Jakarta.

Window: Neither American, West European nor East Asia experiences are models for other countries and cultures to emulate.