Operation Barbarossa vs Rasputitsa and Indonesia's Defence
Hitler signed Führer Directive No. 21, a German plan to bring down the Soviet Union, on 18 December 1940. From that moment, the Hitler-Stalin Pact agreed a year earlier, on 23 August 1939, became worthless. The pact, which stated that Germany and the Soviet Union would not attack each other for ten years, was violated by Hitler.
Only six months after signing Führer Directive 21, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa. On 22 June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Indonesia had not yet become a country when the operation took place. Yet Operation Barbarossa offers many important lessons for us, the Indonesian nation.
Blitzkrieg and the supply chain
Through lightning war (Blitzkrieg), the Wehrmacht, the German armed forces, encircled the Soviet Union. Before the Soviet Red Army withdrew into the vast Russian interior, German forces cut off the Soviet troops’ retreat routes.
The Wehrmacht attacked the Soviet Union with a strategy of ‘three Wehrmacht war machines’. First, Army Group North was tasked with silencing Leningrad. Second, Army Group Centre thrust directly at the political heart in Moscow. Third, Army Group South seized the breadbasket region of Ukraine.
In the initial assault, German forces enjoyed extraordinary illusory success. Through Blitzkrieg tactics, Nazi Panzer armoured divisions tore through Soviet defensive lines, leaving thousands of Red Army troops trapped in giant encirclement pockets.
The Red Army’s command structure was completely paralysed because Joseph Stalin was reportedly in shock. He did not believe the reports of the attack, even though Soviet air bases had already been destroyed and thousands of Soviet tanks had been knocked out. The situation suggested chaotic coordination caused by the surprise.
While retreating, Soviet forces were forced to implement a ‘scorched earth’ strategy: burning entire villages, harvests and factories so they would not fall into enemy hands. The Red Army was also busy relocating its entire military industry beyond the Ural Mountains by rail, an emergency mobilisation that consumed extraordinary energy.
Millions of Soviet civilians became casualties, far exceeding military losses, in keeping with the character of the war itself, which was declared a Vernichtungskrieg or ‘war of annihilation’.
However, the euphoria of German success soon turned into a logistical nightmare. Hitler’s soldiers had to face the reality that Russia’s infrastructure was extremely poor and did not support the German attack. How poor was Soviet infrastructure? Russians called the condition rasputitsa.
In Russian, the word means ‘season without roads’. This ‘season’ occurs at least twice a year, when snow melts in spring and when heavy rain falls in autumn. The autumn rasputitsa of 1941 began paralysing German movement in early October, precisely as Army Group Centre was advancing on Moscow through the area around Vyazma and Bryansk as part of Operation Typhoon.
This was not merely a geographical coincidence. According to the Imperial War Museum, in 1941 there were only four all-weather paved roads in the western Soviet Union. The rest were dirt roads only passable in the dry season. Once the rain fell, Soviet war correspondent Vasily Grossman described them: ‘the roads turned into bottomless liquid swamps, churned by thousands of boots, wheels and armoured vehicle tracks.’
The sea of thick mud also crippled the tracks of German panzers. The most affected were the Panzer III and Panzer IV, Germany’s two main medium tanks at the time. The tracks on both tank types were relatively narrow compared with the Soviet T-34 tank, so German panzer tracks repeatedly became stuck in the rasputitsa and their tanks sank into the thick mud.
By contrast, the Soviet T-34 tank, with its wide tracks, crossed the rasputitsa safely. The wider the track surface, the lower the ground pressure it produces, making it far more capable of crossing soft ground without sinking.
It was this design difference that led German officers such as General Heinz Guderian, after inspecting a captured T-34 in November 1941, to demand that the next German tank be redesigned with wider tracks. That demand eventually produced the German Panther tank.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/operation-barbarossa-vs-rasputitsa-and-indonesias-defence-1787788254)
Originally published by Republika (https://analisis.republika.co.id/berita/tkeeup451/operasi-barbarossa-vs-rasputitsa-dan-pertahanan-indonesia), translated from Indonesian