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Nuclear Power in Halmahera: Seven Decades of Waiting, and Still No Plant

| Source: CNBC Indonesia Translated from Indonesian | Energy
Nuclear Power in Halmahera: Seven Decades of Waiting, and Still No Plant
Image: CNBC Indonesia

At the end of October 2026, global energy markets once again showed their vulnerability. Brent crude briefly stayed above US$110 a barrel, before easing slightly to around US$111.84 in early November amid negotiations involving Iran and Qatar.

That figure is more than a statistic for Indonesia. In the context of the national budget, assuming an exchange rate of Rp18,000 to the dollar and a 0.65 yield for petrol, the economically justified petrol price reaches Rp19,200 per litre, while the retail price at filling stations remains around Rp15,950 per litre. This disparity weighs on state finances and businesses alike: a burden that is not visible on the surface but is felt over the long term.

At the same time, government officials announced that Indonesia could not export electricity in the near future because domestic demand had not yet been met. The state investment agency was also told not to entertain approaches from foreign parties seeking to buy Indonesian electricity.

The principle is sound: energy sovereignty must come first. Yet a deeper irony emerges when this statement is compared with the actions of a neighbouring country. Singapore, which has long been a prospective destination for Indonesian electricity exports, has moved further ahead in preparing its energy infrastructure.

In June 2026, Indonesia’s nuclear regulatory authority and Singapore’s environmental authority signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen cooperation on nuclear oversight, covering policy exchanges, joint training and radiation emergency preparedness.

A few days earlier, the National Energy Council had hosted a Singaporean delegation that explicitly discussed potential cooperation on nuclear power development and regional clean-energy integration ahead of Singapore’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2027. Singapore has not yet decided whether to build a nuclear power plant, but it has already developed the regulatory, safety and human-resource capabilities required.

Indonesia, which has had three research reactors since 1965 and a longer nuclear-safety tradition, is still waiting for a presidential regulation on the agency responsible for implementing its nuclear energy programme to be signed.

The latest news came from Moscow, not Jakarta. In mid-October 2026, a national electricity company signed a power supply agreement with Russia’s nuclear energy corporation for two floating nuclear power plant units, with a total capacity of 200 megawatts, in North Halmahera.

The domestic private sector has stressed that the project is strictly business-to-business and will not burden the state budget. If the contract proceeds, Indonesia’s first nuclear-generated electricity could flow within five years of the key terms taking effect.

The news is welcome because Indonesia now has a concrete entry point into nuclear power. But behind the ceremony lies a question older than the republic itself: why does Indonesia’s nuclear sector always emerge as a project, but never mature into an industry?

70 years without a nuclear power plant

Indonesia is no newcomer to the nuclear field. Its first research reactor began operating in Bandung in 1965, followed by a research reactor in Yogyakarta in 1979 and a larger multipurpose reactor in Serpong, inaugurated in 1987.

For more than six decades, Indonesia has had research infrastructure, human resources and a nuclear-safety tradition that should not be underestimated. What it has never had is a commercial nuclear power plant.

The state-owned enterprise (SOE) that should underpin the nuclear supply chain is instead on the brink of closure after accumulating losses and negative equity, with only a handful of contract employees remaining. An SOE that should form the foundation of the industry is in decline while the state talks of a nuclear revival.

In healthcare, access to radiotherapy and nuclear medicine services remains concentrated on Java, while the need among cancer patients in other regions continues to grow. Focus group discussions on radiopharmaceuticals and the development of nuclear healthcare services continue to be held, but their impact on expanding public access remains inadequate. Nuclear medicine has stalled at seminars and pilot studies, without a leap in capacity commensurate with need.

Three partners, one lesson

Historical research shows that Indonesia has worked with three major powers on nuclear matters, but the results have almost always stopped at agreements or joint laboratories. With the United States, the most concrete milestone was a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement signed in 1980.

With China, Indonesia established a joint laboratory in 2017 to research high-temperature gas-cooled reactors. With Russia, an agreement on the peaceful use of atomic energy was signed in 2006.

The two decades between the signing of that agreement and the 2026 power supply deal measure how slowly diplomacy becomes infrastructure. The same pattern keeps recurring: agreements are signed, laboratories inaugurated and training held, but projects stop before reaching commercial scale.

This is not simply a matter of technology or funding. It reflects the absence of an institutional engine capable of turning political commitments into supply chains, a trained workforce and a sustained pipeline of projects.

Energy sovereignty and the shadow of the market

A quiet shift took place in the downstream energy sector at the end of October 2026. A foreign energy company’s fuel distribution network was officially transferred to a domestic consortium, covering hundreds of filling stations and supporting facilities.

More concerningly, several fuel grades in the network were reportedly in short supply throughout 2026, and by early November only the diesel grade was generally available.

This is not merely a corporate transaction. It signals that fossil-fuel supplies are becoming less certain and that global players are restructuring their portfolios to move away from short-term supply risks.

If fossil fuels are becoming more expensive and less reliable, while the transition to renewable energy takes time, nuclear power is no longer an ideological choice. It is a strategic necessity. Countries with nuclear capabilities will have an advantage over those that rely solely on imports.

Regulation at a standstill

The main legal framework still rests on a law drafted more than two decades ago, which was not designed to accelerate the construction of commercial nuclear power plants. The agency responsible for implementing the nuclear energy programme, as recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency, is to be established through a presidential regulation. As of early November 2026, the draft was still awaiting approval across ministries and agencies.

The government is targeting the first nuclear power plant to begin operating in 2032, with an initial capacity of around 250 megawatts using small modular reactor technology. But that target rests on a plan with no definitive implementing agency, no designated site and no agreed final design. Without concrete deadlines that are legally binding, 2032 will meet the same fate as previous target years: remaining a figure on paper.

Recommendations

First, the government should promptly establish firm legal deadlines through a presidential regulation and amendments to the nuclear energy law. These should cover the deadlines for site selection, design approval, construction permits and the groundbreaking of the first nuclear power plant. Amid global energy uncertainty, legal deadlines are the most concrete way to safeguard energy sovereignty.

Second, the nuclear-sector SOE should be rescued and repositioned as part of the supply chain for nuclear fuel elements and technology services. Closing the country’s only nuclear SOE while announcing plans for dozens of reactors is an untenable contradiction.

Third, research incentives should be redirected towards commercialisation. Nuclear research funding should be tied to cooperation contracts with electricity companies, industry and nuclear power projects. Nuclear professors should be structurally involved in project engineering teams.

The author, who previously served on the Ministry of Home Affairs’ National Priority Programme Implementation Oversight Team, urges the Presidential Working Unit for Climate and Energy (UKP Iklim dan Energi) and the Special Development Control and Investigation Agency (Bappisus) to take a more proactive role.

These two entities should ensure that plans to build a nuclear power plant in the Riau Islands, currently at the study and site-preparation stage, do not remain mere talk. UKP and Bappisus should co-ordinate ministries, agencies and local governments so that every cross-sector decision is followed up within clear deadlines, rather than simply recorded in meeting minutes.

Seventy years after the door to the nuclear era opened, Indonesia is still waiting for its first nuclear-generated electricity. Halmahera and the Riau Islands could mark a turning point if there are clear deadlines, a functioning state-owned company and research that ends up on the electricity grid rather than on journal shelves.

More from 2 November 2026 →

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/nuclear-power-in-halmahera-seven-decades-of-waiting-and-still-no-plant-1793613113)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20261102155702-14-781607/nuklir-di-halmahera-tujuh-dekade-penantian-yang-tak-kunjung-tiba), translated from Indonesian
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