Nostalgia the only thing PBB has to offer voters

Anton Doni, Head Research and Development Unit, The Jakarta Post

It may not be possible for the handsome Yusril Ihza Mahendra to lead his Crescent Star Party (PBB) to an improved position in this April's legislative elections, compared to the 1999 election. At that time the party was only able to secure 2.05 million votes, or less than two percent of all votes. It was able to pass the minimum threshold for eligible parties of 2 percent of legislative seats, however.

Yusril, the current justice minister, who usually exudes a lot of self-confidence, must face the reality that in this election battle, PBB is even less solid than it was five years ago, following several internal party conflicts and the dismissal of several "rebellious" executives.

One of biggest rivals for this party is the small, but well organized Muslim-based Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

Strong nostalgic sentiment about the good old days of the hard-line Islamist Masjumi Party in the 1950s will likely be the most that PBB can offer to voters. In the country's first general elections in 1955, Masjumi came in second overall. Masjumi strongly campaigned for the establishment of an Islamic state with full implementation of Islamic laws. PBB is regarded as the rebirth of Masjumi, which was outlawed by then president Sukarno in 1960s.

In the party's first congress in 2000, Yusril invited three other small parties, which also claimed themselves as the heritage of Masjumi to jointly establish a united Muslim party. The parties he invited were the Islamic People's Party (PUI), the Indonesian Islamic Political Party of Masyumi (PPII Masyumi), and New Masyumi Party. None of those three became eligible for the 2004 election.

Even if Yusril, former president Soeharto's speech writer, could reach an agreement with those three parties, it does not mean much, because they represented, in total, less than one million voters nationwide in the 1999 election.

More often appearing as a secular Muslim intellectual, Yusril cannot escape ideological jargon in his speeches. But it is a risk that he will take, hoping to tap into a greater voter base of hard-line Muslims.

His party is hoping that more Muslim voters will choose PBB instead of the secular nationalist parties like the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the Golkar Party, as well as the increasingly secular Muslim-based parties, like the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN).

In terms of popularity, Yusril still cannot compete with the leaders of other major political parties. Recent history has thrust figures like PDI-P chairperson Megawati Soekarnoputri, PAN's Amien Rais, and PKB founder Abdurrahman Wahid, several steps ahead and the current polls confirm their leading position.

PBB will also face serious competition in trying to sway a bigger share of modern, liberal Muslims. Voters of this type will be more likely choose PAN and Amien Rais.

PBB's platform is quite simply not conducive to building broad-based support. Different from the tolerant PAN and PKB, who accommodate non-Muslims around this ethnically and religiously diverse country, PBB has declared that it would never accommodate non-Muslims. Its jargon is consistently and purely Islamic, including their call for the enforcement of sharia.

Its definitions of "being Islamic" and "struggling for Islam" seem to be overly formal. This is, to a certain extent, manifested in Yusril's effort, in his capacity as minister of justice, to incorporate Islamic doctrines in the draft criminal code, including sexual behavior. His attempt has received strong opposition, including from many Muslim groups.

PBB's strategy is different from PKS. A "system" with strong Islamic ideology is for the long-term agenda, but value-weighted activities are what PKS is showing nowadays. PBB does not have such an outlook.

Its organizational outlook is also now seriously challenged by PKS. For ordinary people, "being Islamic" sometimes is simply associated with being orderly, peaceful and clean. And for this, PKS now is the champion. PBB is left behind PKS in portraying itself as a visionary, modernist, intellectual Muslim-based party.

Jakarta and West Java, where PBB gained a significant number of votes in 1999, seem to be fragile areas for the party this year. PKS's performance has been quite convincing in these two provinces. In 1999, the highest support for PBB was from West Java where it secured 3 seats. Jakarta contributed one seat, as did nine other regions.

PBB hopes to consolidate and garner votes from members of its non-political wing, the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Assembly (DDII), which was established following the crack down on Masyumi in 1960.

It is not an easy job, and may even be a mission impossible for PBB to make a real impact based exclusively on Masyumi nostalgia. The political aspirations of the children of Masyumi members have been channeled through larger parties such as the United Development Party (PPP). 1955 just might be too long ago for most people to remember. Thus, the target of 25 percent, as Yusril claimed, sounds wildly optimistic.