No easy way out of RI's crisis
No easy way out of RI's crisis
By Bambang Subianto
This is the second of two articles excerpted from a paper
presented at the National Issues Forum of the Brookings Institute
and the Harvard Institute for International Development,
Washington D.C. on Oct. 2, 1998.
WASHINGTON: Creating a foundation for resumed economic growth
most obviously requires immediate, strong and credible steps to
strengthen our financial institutions. Investor confidence cannot
be restored until we can assure investors, foreign and domestic,
that the banking system is sound.
As long as investors are fearful that there is a risk of a
sudden and massive reduction in their financial wealth, they will
be reluctant to invest in Indonesia. Having lost investor
confidence we must now be able to provide investors with
assurances that the risk of a future financial crisis has been
sharply reduced.
How can we do this? I am afraid that there is no easy way out
of the crisis. First, we must establish effective supervision of
our banks and other financial institutions. I should add that the
rules under which banks must operate are established in law. What
is needed is a supervisory system that will ensure that the laws
are impartially and effectively implemented. This may well mean
that violations of regulatory rules will be made public and that
bank managers who misuse funds or who fail to heed the
regulations will face legal sanctions.
Second, lending must be based on a professional and objectives
assessment of costs and potential benefits free of outside
interference and internal agency problems. This means that we
must adopt international accounting standards and develop a
system for public disclosure of financial reports of corporations
so that the financial information can be made public and can be
easily compared to other sources of information. The era of
maintaining multiple books that hide the real cost of doing
business must be brought to an end.
Third, we must also reduce the inevitable impact of moral
hazard. Moral hazard will always be present and bank failures
will reoccur. But since bank failures have the potential of
creating systemic risks, government cannot treat the failure of a
bank as it would treat corporate bankruptcy, an issue to be
settled without government interference.
When banks are found to be in difficulty, prompt corrective
actions are needed. Any delay in imposing disciplinary actions
will only encourage banks to engage in desperate last minute
actions to try to salvage a bad situation. Numerous examples
provide ample evidence that such efforts create even greater
risks and generally lead to larger losses.
Fourth, it is also important that bank managers be made to
bear a substantial part of the cost of bank failures. Even where
government provides deposit insurance, so that depositors are
given some protection against bank failures, bank owners and
managers must be held strictly accountable. Bank owners and
managers should lose their investment when their banks fail.
Recently the owners of 14 banks that had been placed under the
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency were forced to reimburse the
government for liquidity funds provided to these banks.
In instances where owners failed to come to terms with the
government on repayment of liquidity support, they lost control
of their banks. In other cases, including several of our largest
banks, the owners surrendered assets as reimbursement for the
funds lent to their banks.
One can only hope that the these steps provide an object
lesson to future bank owners that their failures will cost them
dearly. And finally, bank supervision must be made stronger, and
brought into international standards. While these steps will not
eliminate the impact of moral hazard, they will sharply reduce
it.
The economic crisis has damaged our corporate sector and our
financial institutions. Most critically, the crisis has destroyed
the confidence the markets had in the management of our economy.
Confidence is hard to define until it is lost. Regaining the
confidence of the international financial community will not be
easy. But it must be done. Without a resurgence of confidence we
will not see a return of foreign capital, whether portfolio or
direct investment.
Access to such funds provided critical inputs for our economy.
Not only did the capital raise the possible level of investment,
but foreign capital often brought with it modern technology and
management practices. The absence of such capital will reduce
investment, and hence growth, and will retard the modernization
of our economy.
The answer is not to prevent capital inflows, the answer is to
ensure that our banking system and our capital markets are
capable of effectively mediating such capital.
The following is some evidence that the Indonesian economy is
beginning to respond to the stiff medicine it has swallowed.
Our current exchange rate has more than reestablished our
competitive position. Indeed, the exchange rate has moved beyond
the level needed to regain competitiveness, even allowing for the
depreciation of the currencies of our international competitors
and our inflation rate.
It is therefore not surprising that exports have begun to
respond. In the first six months of this year our non-oil exports
grew by 5.3 percent, an admittedly low rate of growth. But two
factors contributed to this outcome. First, international
commodity prices for most of our major export commodities
collapsed. Second, export restrictions on palm oil and other
edible oils reduced officially recorded export revenues.
Adjusting for these two events, our non-oil export growth in the
first half of this year would have been close to 17 percent
rather than the 5.3 percent officially recorded. In real terms
Indonesia's export performance during the first half of 1998 was
far better than that of most countries in the region.
But we can and must do more. There are a number of factors
that impede a return of rapid export growth. Some foreign buyers
are reluctant to place orders with Indonesian manufacturers,
fearing that the Indonesian firms will be unable to deliver their
orders. Quite naturally exporters will only place orders if they
have confidence in Indonesia's social and political stability. We
are committed to maintaining stability even as we embark on the
process of establishing a more open and democratic society.
We will also take steps to ensure that exporters have access
to short-term financing to cover the cost of imported raw
materials and of production. Without access to foreign and
domestic credit, export production cannot take place. We have
already taken steps to eliminate the backing of overdue trade
credits.
A number of countries have pledged resources, financial and
administrative, to ensure that Indonesian exports are not
hindered by a lack of trade finance. But we must also ensure that
exporters have access to domestic credits to finance production.
Under a more normally functioning credit market, finding the
financing for export activities should be simple. But our credit
markets are not functioning normally and hence even exporters,
especially small -- and medium -- scale producers, find it
difficult to obtain credit. This is an issue of domestic monetary
policy that we will deal with.
And we have also begun a detailed examination of policies that
might inhibit export production. We will be looking at the
operations of our ports, at the efficiency of our customs and tax
administration, and at the implementation of all decrees
affecting export activities.
We will do whatever is necessary, in terms of economic
policies and administrative reform, to ensure that exporters have
access to needed inputs, whether domestically produced or
imported, and that they can access international markets with a
minimum of bureaucratic interference.
We have also brought increases in the money supply under
control. Since June, our base money supply, which is our key
monetary indicator, has shown no growth, and our broad money
supply actually declined in July and August.
We are well below the ceiling target on net domestic assets
established in the framework of our agreement with the
International Monetary Fund. Although the sharp depreciation of
the rupiah is still working its way through our price system, I
am confident that the relative stability of the rupiah in the
past few months, combined with monetary restraint, will allow for
a substantial decline in inflation over the coming months.
The writer is minister of finance.
Window A: When banks are found to be in difficulty, prompt
corrective actions are needed. Any delay in imposing disciplinary
actions will only encourage banks to engage in desperate last minute
actions to try to salvage a bad situation.
Window B: We will do whatever is necessary, in terms of economic
policies and administrative reform, to ensure that exporters have
access to needed inputs, whether domestically produced or
imported, and that they can access international markets with a
minimum of bureaucratic interference.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/no-easy-way-out-of-ris-crisis-1447893297-1397570)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post