New direction for S'pore-RI ties

New direction for S'pore-RI ties

Leonard C. Sebastian, Senior Fellow, Institute of Defense
and Strategic Studies, The Straits Times, Asia News Network,
Singapore

Singapore's relations with Indonesia have been jostled out of
their comfort zone of predictability and stability where they had
nestled since the 1970s. Several shocks have ripped through
Indonesia since the 1997 financial crisis: The collapse of
Soeharto's regime, the decline of Golkar and the emergence of
political Islam.

Bilateral relations are thus in transition, between the
Soeharto era structures and the uncertainty surrounding the new
social and political forces in the post-Soeharto era.

Can a new set of beliefs influence the bilateral relationship?
How will such ideas change existing rules and norms?

Relations between Indonesia and Singapore were subjected to
severe strains during the brief and turbulent presidencies of
B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid. The reasons had more to do
with the crisis of confidence in Indonesia and the displacing of
the Indonesian army's (TNI's) central role in foreign policy,
than any bilateral issue. They reflected unrealistic expectations
among Indonesian leaders of the assistance that Singapore could
provide Indonesia during the economic crisis.

While relations have improved and settled down to an even keel
under Megawati Soekarnoputri's administration, the relationship
continues to be fragile, because of poor conditions within
Indonesia and a desire to discuss bilateral issues which were put
on the backburner during the Soeharto era.

President Megawati's tenure has not been marred by the
instability and uncertainty that marked her predecessors'
administrations. Her declining popularity, however, prompts the
question: If she is to be voted out of office, who would or could
take over?

With the leaders of major political parties tainted by
corruption scandals or criminal charges, and the smaller parties
lacking finance and organization to become serious contenders,
the search for an acceptable candidate may be elusive. Megawati,
despite her indecisiveness and lack of leadership skills, may win
the 2004 election in the absence of serious competition.

Indonesia has muddled through five years of poor governance.
Can it afford another seven years of muddling if Megawati stays
on for another five years in 2004? At some point, a major
discontinuity will result, exacerbating the cracks already
evident.

As the terrorist attacks and threat have highlighted starkly,
Singapore cannot be insulated from what goes on in Indonesia. It
is pertinent to ask, what would be our response if Indonesia were
embroiled in another crisis?

Should we just wait for a new leader whose mindset closely
matches Soeharto's? Or hope that someone from the TNI would seize
power? Or declare that there is little Singapore can do to assist
an Indonesia in crisis?

Uncertainties can lead one to rely on commonly held beliefs as
guides to action even if these do not benefit the bilateral
relationship.

First, the belief that there is a paucity of leadership talent
in Indonesia. Singapore's perceived obsession with picking
'winners' makes little sense in a fluid political environment
where the absence of strong leadership will be normal in the
short to medium term.

Second, Indonesians do not want to return to the militaristic
structures that became the norm during the New Order era.
Furthermore, post-Bali investigations will raise the profile of
the police, raising the prospect that a more assertive and
confident police will contest the TNI's hegemony in the provision
of domestic security.

Singapore's special relationship with the TNI is important and
must be cultivated. However, the TNI should now be seen as one
part of the sum total of our relationship with the new socio-
political forces emerging.

Third, if the "muddling through" scenario continues, there is
every likelihood that a crisis will be inevitable. A failing
Indonesia would not only be detrimental to Singapore but would
also have adverse consequences for the security of South-east
Asia. In the context of these challenges, can we afford to adopt
a reactive foreign policy stance?

Singapore's preoccupation with economic aspects of the
bilateral relationship frames our understanding of what we think
may be best for Indonesia. The two major economic initiatives in
1998 and 2000 crafted to stimulate the Indonesian economy, though
well-meaning, brought with them the unwanted perception that on
the one hand, Singapore was overly cautious in its prescriptions,
but on the other, was unable to deliver on its initiatives.

Such great expectations on the part of the Indonesian people,
whether warranted or not, coupled with a catalog of differences
ranging from Singapore's poor understanding of Islam; its
reluctance to sign an extradition treaty; environmental damage
owing to sand mining in Riau; the maritime boundary problem with
Indonesia; the issue of Indonesian citizens who have served
national service; the treatment of Indonesian domestic maids; and
the comments made by Singapore leaders over the terrorist threat
posed by militants based in Indonesia; have done little to
assuage the Indonesians' annoyance at Singapore's perceived
arrogance.

How can we overcome these discontinuities in bilateral
relations?

It is hard to envisage under present conditions how bilateral
relations can be improved. However, an important principle needs
to be enunciated. The excellent economic cooperation between the
two countries in the Riau Archipelago could be attained only with
a confident Indonesia. Such a condition was evident in the 1980s
when Soeharto grew progressively confident in the bilateral
relationship. Without such self-confidence, insecurity would
characterize the relationship, as the perceptions of Singaporean
exploitation of Indonesia shape Indonesian mindsets.

Such mindsets in time will be institutionalized, as
Indonesia's world view and causal beliefs change with reformasi.
Singapore needs to be proactive to prevent such perceptions
taking root.

While win-win economic opportunities must be emphasized,
foreign policy should not be based predominantly on investment
relations but should emphasize building institutions and
institutional capacity. It is through institutions in both the
government and non-governmental organizations that the next
generation of Indonesian leaders will emerge.

More effort should be made to create an environment where
ideas can affect policy by providing principled or causal road
maps. A program targeted at building institutional capacity
particularly in areas of governance and public policy in
Indonesia would be useful starting points.

By opening more channels for dialog, we could enable Indonesia
to better understand that Singapore is no longer the vulnerable
neophyte state that emerged by caesarean section of Malaysia in
1965, and that it should treat Singapore as an equal and accept
its unique role as a financial and business hub.

Singapore, on its part, must quickly grasp the enormity of
changes that have taken place in post-Soeharto Indonesia and seek
to absorb these changes by going beyond developing close ties
with political, military and business elites to reach out to the
broadest spectrum of Indonesians possible, and develop a new
causal map for better bilateral relations.

Ideas developed in the context of institution-building may in
time become institutionalized, playing a role in generalizing
rules and linking issues.