New direction for S'pore-RI ties

New direction for S'pore-RI ties

Leonard C. Sebastian, Senior Fellow, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

Singapore's relations with Indonesia have been jostled out of their comfort zone of predictability and stability where they had nestled since the 1970s. Several shocks have ripped through Indonesia since the 1997 financial crisis: The collapse of Soeharto's regime, the decline of Golkar and the emergence of political Islam.

Bilateral relations are thus in transition, between the Soeharto era structures and the uncertainty surrounding the new social and political forces in the post-Soeharto era.

Can a new set of beliefs influence the bilateral relationship? How will such ideas change existing rules and norms?

Relations between Indonesia and Singapore were subjected to severe strains during the brief and turbulent presidencies of B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid. The reasons had more to do with the crisis of confidence in Indonesia and the displacing of the Indonesian army's (TNI's) central role in foreign policy, than any bilateral issue. They reflected unrealistic expectations among Indonesian leaders of the assistance that Singapore could provide Indonesia during the economic crisis.

While relations have improved and settled down to an even keel under Megawati Soekarnoputri's administration, the relationship continues to be fragile, because of poor conditions within Indonesia and a desire to discuss bilateral issues which were put on the backburner during the Soeharto era.

President Megawati's tenure has not been marred by the instability and uncertainty that marked her predecessors' administrations. Her declining popularity, however, prompts the question: If she is to be voted out of office, who would or could take over?

With the leaders of major political parties tainted by corruption scandals or criminal charges, and the smaller parties lacking finance and organization to become serious contenders, the search for an acceptable candidate may be elusive. Megawati, despite her indecisiveness and lack of leadership skills, may win the 2004 election in the absence of serious competition.

Indonesia has muddled through five years of poor governance. Can it afford another seven years of muddling if Megawati stays on for another five years in 2004? At some point, a major discontinuity will result, exacerbating the cracks already evident.

As the terrorist attacks and threat have highlighted starkly, Singapore cannot be insulated from what goes on in Indonesia. It is pertinent to ask, what would be our response if Indonesia were embroiled in another crisis?

Should we just wait for a new leader whose mindset closely matches Soeharto's? Or hope that someone from the TNI would seize power? Or declare that there is little Singapore can do to assist an Indonesia in crisis?

Uncertainties can lead one to rely on commonly held beliefs as guides to action even if these do not benefit the bilateral relationship.

First, the belief that there is a paucity of leadership talent in Indonesia. Singapore's perceived obsession with picking 'winners' makes little sense in a fluid political environment where the absence of strong leadership will be normal in the short to medium term.

Second, Indonesians do not want to return to the militaristic structures that became the norm during the New Order era. Furthermore, post-Bali investigations will raise the profile of the police, raising the prospect that a more assertive and confident police will contest the TNI's hegemony in the provision of domestic security.

Singapore's special relationship with the TNI is important and must be cultivated. However, the TNI should now be seen as one part of the sum total of our relationship with the new socio- political forces emerging.

Third, if the "muddling through" scenario continues, there is every likelihood that a crisis will be inevitable. A failing Indonesia would not only be detrimental to Singapore but would also have adverse consequences for the security of South-east Asia. In the context of these challenges, can we afford to adopt a reactive foreign policy stance?

Singapore's preoccupation with economic aspects of the bilateral relationship frames our understanding of what we think may be best for Indonesia. The two major economic initiatives in 1998 and 2000 crafted to stimulate the Indonesian economy, though well-meaning, brought with them the unwanted perception that on the one hand, Singapore was overly cautious in its prescriptions, but on the other, was unable to deliver on its initiatives.

Such great expectations on the part of the Indonesian people, whether warranted or not, coupled with a catalog of differences ranging from Singapore's poor understanding of Islam; its reluctance to sign an extradition treaty; environmental damage owing to sand mining in Riau; the maritime boundary problem with Indonesia; the issue of Indonesian citizens who have served national service; the treatment of Indonesian domestic maids; and the comments made by Singapore leaders over the terrorist threat posed by militants based in Indonesia; have done little to assuage the Indonesians' annoyance at Singapore's perceived arrogance.

How can we overcome these discontinuities in bilateral relations?

It is hard to envisage under present conditions how bilateral relations can be improved. However, an important principle needs to be enunciated. The excellent economic cooperation between the two countries in the Riau Archipelago could be attained only with a confident Indonesia. Such a condition was evident in the 1980s when Soeharto grew progressively confident in the bilateral relationship. Without such self-confidence, insecurity would characterize the relationship, as the perceptions of Singaporean exploitation of Indonesia shape Indonesian mindsets.

Such mindsets in time will be institutionalized, as Indonesia's world view and causal beliefs change with reformasi. Singapore needs to be proactive to prevent such perceptions taking root.

While win-win economic opportunities must be emphasized, foreign policy should not be based predominantly on investment relations but should emphasize building institutions and institutional capacity. It is through institutions in both the government and non-governmental organizations that the next generation of Indonesian leaders will emerge.

More effort should be made to create an environment where ideas can affect policy by providing principled or causal road maps. A program targeted at building institutional capacity particularly in areas of governance and public policy in Indonesia would be useful starting points.

By opening more channels for dialog, we could enable Indonesia to better understand that Singapore is no longer the vulnerable neophyte state that emerged by caesarean section of Malaysia in 1965, and that it should treat Singapore as an equal and accept its unique role as a financial and business hub.

Singapore, on its part, must quickly grasp the enormity of changes that have taken place in post-Soeharto Indonesia and seek to absorb these changes by going beyond developing close ties with political, military and business elites to reach out to the broadest spectrum of Indonesians possible, and develop a new causal map for better bilateral relations.

Ideas developed in the context of institution-building may in time become institutionalized, playing a role in generalizing rules and linking issues.