Tue, 11 Feb 2003

Need for new U.S. communications paradigm: 'It's the oil, stupid'

Piers Gillespie, Jakarta

One oft-used message to justify an upcoming invasion of Iraq, from New York taxi drivers through to administration spokespeople and military strategists is the emblematic point that "Saddam is so evil he even used chemical weapons on his own people." Horrific? Definitely. Disgraceful? Undoubtedly. Black and white issue -- the U.S. as the do-gooder and Iraq as the evil? Hardly.

Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. administration saw Baghdad's leaders as the stopping point against Iran in general and the Shah in particular, with his aggressive rhetoric and pointed anti-U.S. gestures.

Declassified documents -- which always come back to haunt -- show that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld traveled to Iraq "almost daily" during the time that Iraq was using chemical weapons in defiance of international conventions.

They show that he was aware of their use at the time and did not enforce diplomatic or public pressure to order their immediate cessation. It is yet again, a classic example of the dark side of U.S. foreign policy, and is the reason why many in both the Middle East and Asia see the recent cat-and-mouse game with Iraq as the latest form of hypocrisy from the U.S. administration.

Given this is the case, and that the world is judging the U.S. as much on its history and what they see as questionable motives in regards to the benefits a post-Saddam Iraq would give the U.S., a fundamental change in the way the U.S. should "sell" this story to the world is necessary.

Taking into account the current level of cynicism, the U.S. administration may well do better by trying the "truth paradigm" -- a relatively new concept in the military-public relations nexus; one that is honest and directly addresses the realities of the current situation.

The concept is simple. What if America actually admitted that this war has as much to do with oil as it has to do with ridding the world of a tyrant who has chemical weapons? The vast majority of the American population knows this to be the case and knows that the U.S. administration has no intention of implementing a democracy in Iraq. Indeed, as the Washington Post points out, at least Saddam Hussein pretends to have a democracy, whilst U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait "don't even bother going through this charade."

Political scholar Lawrence Friedman has stated that any war in Iraq will certainly be in part about oil, and to deny that is laughable. However, Friedman's point is whether the lingering perception post-invasion will be that the invasion was indeed only about oil, or about the Bush administration was actually trying to "make the world a better place" and not simply fueling American excesses.

"I have no problem with a war about oil", he says, "if we accompany it with a real program for energy conservation. But when we tell the world that we couldn't care less about climate change, that we feel entitled to drive whatever big cars we feel like, that we feel entitled to consume however much oil we like, the message that we send is that a war for oil in the gulf is not a war to protect the world's right to economic survival -- but our right to indulge."

Friedman continues by focusing on an Iraq post-invasion and potentially post-Saddam. "If we end up occupying Iraq, and the first thing we do is hand out drilling concessions to U.S. oil companies, the perception that this is just a war for oil would be intensified." But herein lies the opportunity for the U.S. to be perceived as a definitive hegemonic power: By staying in Iraq post-Saddam and paying the full price in both finances and manpower to help the Iraqi people build their own progressive, democratized Arab state.

A war partly over oil could then be deemed legitimate.

If done properly and responsibly, and if the Bush administration has the follow up gumption to stay the course with a new Iraq and pay the considerable economic cost of rebuilding the country, then U.S. global hegemony may continue well into this century. Indeed, many eminent U.S. scholars such as Samuel Huntington would confirm that this type of action would extend the U.S.'s tenure as the last great hegemonic power.

But while a short contemporary fought military attack by the U.S. -- now being compared by the Pentagon to Hiroshima in terms of its "shock and awe" strategy -- may well be cheap in terms of U.S. lives, the financial burden will be considerable. The Bush administration's policy of tax cuts and massive ongoing military spending will be unsustainable.

If Iraq is left to clean up the mess after the invasion, American hatred will likely increase around the world. Friedman says there will could then be a many-fold increase in "...the number of terrorists who see U.S. with hatred and are therefore willing to strap a bomb to their backs and wander into local shopping malls."

Admitting that economics -- and obtaining greater control of oil -- is central to a military strike on Iraq would do more to give the U.S. administration legitimacy than 1,000 empty speeches by George Bush. Maintaining a presence in Iraq post-invasion in order to ensure a more democratic form of governance, whatever that is, and not installing another puppet administration for the U.S. and its oil companies in the Middle East, is fundamental.

Such a brave, altruistic action would go further in terms of the world perceiving the U.S. as a real world leader and reduce the potential for any further horrific terrorist attacks than any inflated defense budget ever could.

It appears that the phrase "honesty is the best policy" is as relevant now as it was in Napoleon's time. Using the truth therefore in a communications strategy will therefore always remain the best option -- even if the truth is as thick, black, and indigestible as crude oil.

The writer has a Masters Degree in International Politics and is a senior technical adviser at Indo Pacific, a strategic communications consultancy.