Need for new U.S. communications paradigm: `It's the oil, stupid'
Need for new U.S. communications paradigm: `It's the oil, stupid'
Piers Gillespie, Jakarta
One intriguing aspect of the inevitable build up to what could
be the biggest military catastrophe in this young century is the
way in which the two opposing leaders, George W. Bush and Saddam
Hussein have attempted to shape global public perception. In
2003, the issues of perception and credibility are proving
central to the way in which both the U.S. and Iraq are being
positioned by the world.
Although hundreds of years have passed since Napoleon
Bonaparte wrote that "... four bad news articles are a more
fearsome weapon than a sword", his words emanate with as much
resonance today as they did in his time. And what is even more
fascinating is that despite the lessons that should have been
learned in the Vietnam and Gulf wars, despite its slick political
campaigns and sophisticated communication programs, and despite
its media know-how and expertise in cognitive dissonance, it is
the United States administration that seems to be coming off
second best.
The shadow boxing diplomacy, "spin", and consensus building
for America's seemingly imminent invasion of Iraq has
demonstrated that success in the modern world of conflict still
depends as much on perceptions of innocence and of who is
perceived as being in the right, as it depends on smart bombs and
missiles.
Both Iraq and the United States have attempted to position
themselves as the innocent in the military build-up, at times
focusing as much on their media plan as their war plan. In a
crisis, no matter its nature, the media will attempt to identify
the champion and the villain. Indeed, in this crisis, the methods
adopted by both the U.S. and Iraq to utilize the media to build
support has proven to be a fascinating study for political,
communication, and military strategists alike.
Of surprise, however, is just how well Iraq is doing.
Across the globe, leading publications have increasingly raised
questions and critiqued the world's last hegemonic power and its
seemingly unstoppable quest towards Usiing the military option.
Even nationalistic U.S. publications are beginning to report that
it is the stars and stripes that is the labeled aggressor.
At its most fundamental level, the communications dilemma for
the U.S. appears to be one of honesty and credibility; of making
key messages and statements that are not backed up with succinct
and credible facts that justify the use of the message in the
first place.
Saddam Hussein and his long-standing international
spokesperson, Foreign Minister Taruiq Aziz, seem to have learned
this lesson well. The Iraqi administration has generally released
measured, balanced and common sense statements over the past few
months, and has backed these up with open action that lends a
logical legitimacy to their case.
Opening up their borders to weapons inspectors -- and allowing
the international media to follow them all over the country
virtually uninhibited -- has been a masterfully executed
communications plan. Although individual comments made by Saddam
recently about making September 11, 2001 look "like a picnic" do
not help his cause,they have been the exception rather than the
rule. Comments such as "they (the Americans) can get much more
from Iraq without resorting to the logic of force and war" have
been more the order of the day.
Such action-backed communication has proven very effective in
the international arena. Measured public statements made by Iraqi
officials throw the focus squarely back onto the U.S. and their
motivations. And under the glare of the spotlight, the U.S.
administration has suffered in terms of credibility and
accusations of double standards. Past and present issues have
eroded the U.S.'s position and the legitimacy of their strident
moves towards a military option. Thomas Friedman, a renowned
American political analyst, points out the most recent double
standard:
"North Korea breaks all its nuclear agreements with the United
States, throws out UN inspectors and sets off to make a bomb a
year, and President Bush says it's 'a diplomatic issue'. Iraq
hands over a 12,000-page account of its weapons production and
allows UN inspectors to roam all over the country, and - after
they've found not a jam-jar of dangerous chemicals in 230 raids -
President Bush announces that Iraq is a threat to America, has
not disarmed and may have to be invaded."
Many publications are realizing the duplicity of an approach
that leaves Iraq with seemingly no options and with the UN with
seemingly no say in the matter of U.S. strikes in Iraq. A recent
editorial in the Washington Post reflected a feeling in the U.S.
and sheds light on why America is finding it so hard to convince
both its allies and its own citizens about the legitimacy of a
first strike.
"Our government seems to be telling U.S. that if Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein denies having weapons of mass
destruction, while we know he does have them, that falsehood
becomes a material breach of Iraq's agreement and reason to take
Saddam Hussein out militarily. But if Saddam Hussein admits to
having such weapons, he stands convicted out of his own mouth and
therefore we have no choice but to take him out."
So what's the Iraqi president supposed to do?
As a typical human response, humor comes to the fore as a way
to deal with this situation. "We know he's got those weapons of
mass destruction," satirist Mark Russell explains. "We've got the
receipts." Behind the humor however is another sorry tale of U.S.
foreign policy gone wrong; of the U.S. backing an ally, only to
see him them turn, leaving the current American administration
with the unenviable task of trying to demonize an individual who
once was a key collaborator. In this respect, it must be
particularly galling for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who
was telling Congress right up to the 1991 Gulf War that Saddam
was an ally.
The writer has a Masters Degree in International Politics and
is a senior technical adviser at Indo Pacific, a strategic
communications consultancy.
Piers Gillespie, Jakarta
One intriguing aspect of the inevitable build up to what could
be the biggest military catastrophe in this young century is the
way in which the two opposing leaders, George W. Bush and Saddam
Hussein have attempted to shape global public perception. In
2003, the issues of perception and credibility are proving
central to the way in which both the U.S. and Iraq are being
positioned by the world.
Although hundreds of years have passed since Napoleon
Bonaparte wrote that "... four bad news articles are a more
fearsome weapon than a sword", his words emanate with as much
resonance today as they did in his time. And what is even more
fascinating is that despite the lessons that should have been
learned in the Vietnam and Gulf wars, despite its slick political
campaigns and sophisticated communication programs, and despite
its media know-how and expertise in cognitive dissonance, it is
the United States administration that seems to be coming off
second best.
The shadow boxing diplomacy, "spin", and consensus building
for America's seemingly imminent invasion of Iraq has
demonstrated that success in the modern world of conflict still
depends as much on perceptions of innocence and of who is
perceived as being in the right, as it depends on smart bombs and
missiles.
Both Iraq and the United States have attempted to position
themselves as the innocent in the military build-up, at times
focusing as much on their media plan as their war plan. In a
crisis, no matter its nature, the media will attempt to identify
the champion and the villain. Indeed, in this crisis, the methods
adopted by both the U.S. and Iraq to utilize the media to build
support has proven to be a fascinating study for political,
communication, and military strategists alike.
Of surprise, however, is just how well Iraq is doing.
Across the globe, leading publications have increasingly raised
questions and critiqued the world's last hegemonic power and its
seemingly unstoppable quest towards Usiing the military option.
Even nationalistic U.S. publications are beginning to report that
it is the stars and stripes that is the labeled aggressor.
At its most fundamental level, the communications dilemma for
the U.S. appears to be one of honesty and credibility; of making
key messages and statements that are not backed up with succinct
and credible facts that justify the use of the message in the
first place.
Saddam Hussein and his long-standing international
spokesperson, Foreign Minister Taruiq Aziz, seem to have learned
this lesson well. The Iraqi administration has generally released
measured, balanced and common sense statements over the past few
months, and has backed these up with open action that lends a
logical legitimacy to their case.
Opening up their borders to weapons inspectors -- and allowing
the international media to follow them all over the country
virtually uninhibited -- has been a masterfully executed
communications plan. Although individual comments made by Saddam
recently about making September 11, 2001 look "like a picnic" do
not help his cause,they have been the exception rather than the
rule. Comments such as "they (the Americans) can get much more
from Iraq without resorting to the logic of force and war" have
been more the order of the day.
Such action-backed communication has proven very effective in
the international arena. Measured public statements made by Iraqi
officials throw the focus squarely back onto the U.S. and their
motivations. And under the glare of the spotlight, the U.S.
administration has suffered in terms of credibility and
accusations of double standards. Past and present issues have
eroded the U.S.'s position and the legitimacy of their strident
moves towards a military option. Thomas Friedman, a renowned
American political analyst, points out the most recent double
standard:
"North Korea breaks all its nuclear agreements with the United
States, throws out UN inspectors and sets off to make a bomb a
year, and President Bush says it's 'a diplomatic issue'. Iraq
hands over a 12,000-page account of its weapons production and
allows UN inspectors to roam all over the country, and - after
they've found not a jam-jar of dangerous chemicals in 230 raids -
President Bush announces that Iraq is a threat to America, has
not disarmed and may have to be invaded."
Many publications are realizing the duplicity of an approach
that leaves Iraq with seemingly no options and with the UN with
seemingly no say in the matter of U.S. strikes in Iraq. A recent
editorial in the Washington Post reflected a feeling in the U.S.
and sheds light on why America is finding it so hard to convince
both its allies and its own citizens about the legitimacy of a
first strike.
"Our government seems to be telling U.S. that if Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein denies having weapons of mass
destruction, while we know he does have them, that falsehood
becomes a material breach of Iraq's agreement and reason to take
Saddam Hussein out militarily. But if Saddam Hussein admits to
having such weapons, he stands convicted out of his own mouth and
therefore we have no choice but to take him out."
So what's the Iraqi president supposed to do?
As a typical human response, humor comes to the fore as a way
to deal with this situation. "We know he's got those weapons of
mass destruction," satirist Mark Russell explains. "We've got the
receipts." Behind the humor however is another sorry tale of U.S.
foreign policy gone wrong; of the U.S. backing an ally, only to
see him them turn, leaving the current American administration
with the unenviable task of trying to demonize an individual who
once was a key collaborator. In this respect, it must be
particularly galling for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who
was telling Congress right up to the 1991 Gulf War that Saddam
was an ally.
The writer has a Masters Degree in International Politics and
is a senior technical adviser at Indo Pacific, a strategic
communications consultancy.