Murder without motive -- the killing of Munir
Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
Why was Munir murdered? That question is unresolved. A fact-finding team, in its report to the president said Munir was killed because of his pro-democracy and rights activism. That may have been an underlying reason, but hardly a solid motive for murder in an era of reformasi where censure and criticism are the rule rather than an exception.
Why then assassinate an activist, who was effectively going on sabbatical?
It is important to establish that while the team's investigation did not conclusively accuse anyone, their vivid report strongly suggests the presence of a conspiracy.
Central to this was the presence of Pollycarpus Budihari Priyanto -- already named a suspect by police -- who hastily boarded the Jakarta-Singapore leg of Munir's flight to Amsterdam under the guise of urgent Garuda Airways business.
It was Pollycarpus who allegedly moved Munir to a new seat on the GA974 flight. Telephone records show that Pollycarpus also contacted Munir before takeoff in Jakarta.
Investigators further found records of over 30 telephone calls between Pollycarpus to numbers either held by a then deputy chief of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) or the BIN office before and after Munir's murder on Sept. 7.
The BIN officer in question, however, denied any knowledge of any conversation.
Suspicion of Pollycarpus' role as an "agent" was reinforced by his presence in Aceh in May 2003 during the early phase of martial law. A witness told The Jakarta Post that Pollycarpus, while in Aceh, was in close contact with a confirmed BIN operative.
None of these details, however, proves the involvement of the intelligence community, either on an institutional or an individual basis. Nevertheless, it does support the belief that the murder was well-planned and not some simple homicide.
And, as suggested by the fact-finding team, the use of arsenic and venue of an airplane -- which would limit medical assistance -- further supports assumptions of a conspiracy.
Though the question of "how?" seems more revealing, the "why?" part remains a mystery given that, as established earlier, Munir no longer posed an immediate threat.
At best he may have included some damning, albeit obsolete, information in his thesis during for his study in Holland.
Revenge may have been a motivator. Munir, in the past, was a thorn in the side of many powerful men, especially those in military circles.
But such a grudge would have had to fester for years. Can vengeance survive for such a long time? If so, it would have needed to involve someone, who is still in power given the complexity of the assassination.
Another scenario, albeit somewhat conspiratorial, involves political intrigue.
Munir's murder occurred just ahead of the second round of the presidential election. It would have been easy to predict that news of his murder would have initially been blamed on "forces" linked to the military given Munir's perceived anti-military views.
But this hypothesis does not stand up because it was clear that the murder was specifically designed with discretion in mind.
While it was not explicitly mentioned in the fact-finding team's report, their findings of the "compartmentalized" nature of the intelligence community's work suggests much more than is being said.
The compartmentalized structure -- just like cell systems for terrorists networks -- allows for individuals within the community to work autonomously and exploit resources without direct oversight or overlapping responsibility.
It is well-known that the intelligence community got used to the habit of being an extension and supporter of the Soeharto regime's power. It can be a habit that is hard to break. A case of, "I did, because I can".
Despite changes in government since 1998, the intelligence community has continued to work in relative autonomy, sometimes beyond direct executive oversight.
Witnesses have told the fact-finding team that Munir was a target of operations for several years. These allegations have also been denied by a former intelligence official during questioning.
If it were true, it would have been too blatant -- tantamount to institutional suicide -- to murder such a noted rights activist at the height of his prominence.
Nevertheless, by 2004 democracy was at a fever pitch and the torch of rights activism was being carried by a wider crowd. Pioneers like Munir could take time away from the limelight and engage in personal study.
Ironically this, perhaps, proved to be a fateful window of opportunity. Those who committed the murder did it, simply because they now could.
The infamous Watergate scandal on the burglary and wiretapping of the Democratic Party's campaign headquarters in 1972 by U.S. intelligence officers is an example of just how paranoia, the habit of subversion and political sabotage led to a compulsion for subterfuge.
Then U.S. President Richard Nixon was under no immediate threat of losing the election to Democratic Party candidate George McGovern. But still he engaged in illicit practices, which had apparently been a long political habit.
He did it because he could.
Tenacious reporting and investigative work in the Watergate scandal eventually showed that in a nation of laws, no one is above the law. Hopefully, the Munir case will prove the same of Indonesia.