MSCI atones for its sins: An epistemic critique of its methodology
MSCI atones for its sins: An epistemic critique of its methodology
Note: This article is the author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the views of the CNBC Indonesia editorial team.
The uproar began when Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), a global stock-index provider whose benchmarks are followed by investors and securities professionals, announced that a number of Indonesian shares would be included in its MSCI Global Standard Index.
According to available data, shares owned by conglomerate Prajogo Pangestu were the most numerous to qualify for the index. These included PT Chandra Asri Pacific Tbk (TPIA), announced as an addition on 14 May 2024; PT Petrindo Jaya Kreasi Tbk (CUAN) and PT Petrosea Tbk (PTRO), announced on 7 August 2025; and PT Barito Renewables Energy Tbk (BREN), announced on 7 November 2025. Shares in PT Dian Swastatika Sentosa Tbk (DSSA), part of the Sinar Mas Group, were announced as an addition on 7 August 2025.
After these prominent companies’ shares were added to the prestigious MSCI Global Standard Index, global investment managers and passive-fund operators soon began buying them in large numbers.
Bloomberg data for January 2026 show that BlackRock added 1,076,643 TPIA shares through purchases that month. Its holding subsequently reached 243,861,788 shares, equivalent to 0.28 per cent. BlackRock also acquired 656,453 BREN shares in January 2026, bringing its holding to 275,956,335, or 0.21 per cent of the total shares outstanding.
US investment firm Dimensional Fund Advisors LP also bought 4,734,308 BREN shares. As of January 2026, it held 27,927,700 shares, equivalent to 0.02 per cent of the total shares outstanding. Dimensional Fund also purchased 1,269,439 CUAN shares, bringing its total holding to 124,268,671.
JPMorgan Chase & Co. was also seen buying 419,200 TPIA shares in 2026, taking its total holding to 807,000. It additionally purchased 1,763,900 shares in PT Petrindo Jaya Kreasi Tbk (CUAN), bringing its total holding to 1,785,900.
Well before January 2026, Bloomberg data for December 2024 showed BlackRock holding 228 million Chandra Asri Pacific shares (TPIA), or 228,033,245 shares, equivalent to 0.26 per cent of the total. Its investment in the company amounted to more than Rp1.89 trillion.
BlackRock held 137 million shares in Barito Renewables Energy (BREN), another company in Prajogo Pangestu’s Barito Group: specifically, 137,779,100 shares, equal to 0.10 per cent of BREN’s total paid-up shares. BlackRock’s investment in BREN amounted to Rp1.02 trillion.
Another major foreign fund manager, US-based Vanguard, held 50 million CUAN shares, or 50,270,433 shares. That represented 0.45 per cent of the company’s total paid-up shares, with an investment valued at Rp361.95 billion.
At the same time, foreign investors were selling shares in state-owned companies, including PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia Tbk (BBRI), worth Rp235.3 billion; PT Bank Mandiri Tbk (BMRI), worth Rp127.4 billion; and PT Bank Negara Indonesia Tbk (BBNI), worth Rp49.8 billion.
Bloomberg data for July 2025 also showed BlackRock holding 246 million TPIA shares, or 246,571,565 shares, equivalent to 0.29 per cent of the total, with an investment worth more than Rp2.31 trillion.
BlackRock’s holding in Barito Renewables Energy (BREN), also part of Prajogo Pangestu’s Barito Group, stood at 90 million shares, or 90,795,100 shares, equal to 0.07 per cent of the company’s total paid-up shares. Its BREN investment was valued at Rp719.55 billion. BlackRock also held 11 million shares in Petrindo Jaya Kreasi (CUAN), or 11,999,000 shares, equivalent to 0.01 per cent, with an investment worth more than Rp19.49 billion. Vanguard held 667 million CUAN shares, or 667,360,000 shares, equal to 0.59 per cent of the company’s total paid-up shares, with an investment valued at Rp1.08 trillion.
DSSA, a Sinar Mas Group company, followed a similar trajectory. Before its inclusion in the MSCI index, its share price had already risen 77 per cent year to date between 30 December 2024 and 7 August 2025. After its index inclusion, DSSA shares reached Rp78,600 on 8 August 2025, a 20 per cent surge from the previous day. Compared with the end of the previous year, the share price was up 112 per cent by August 2025.
These figures point to the accumulation of shares in several conglomerates, particularly those associated with Prajogo Pangestu, by global asset managers including BlackRock, Vanguard Group Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Dimensional Fund. Purchases took place before announcements that the shares would enter the MSCI Global Standard Index, while they were being discussed or forecast as potential constituents, and in the run-up to and aftermath of their inclusion. In other words, the addition of conglomerate shares to the index generated substantial net foreign buying.
However, on 12 May 2026, MSCI removed these conglomerate stocks from its indices over concerns about low free float and concentrated ownership. It is true that the available free-float data did not reflect the full reality, and that ownership concentration was difficult to detect.
That, however, is precisely the problem. The quality of MSCI’s methodology deserves scrutiny, particularly its estimates of free float and its data verification, which appear to have led to inconsistent classifications and interpretations. This calls for a methodological critique of the inconsistencies in MSCI’s decisions about which shares to include in its indices.
The result is a phenomenon known as excess comovement: once a stock is included in a published index, its price may be pulled upwards not because of its business fundamentals, but simply because it has become part of the index basket.
In other words, rigid methodological rules compel passive funds to keep directing capital towards large companies already included in an index, regardless of whether they are well managed. As a result, indices can impede healthy price discovery.
An epistemic critique of the MSCI index methodology
MSCI has a methodology for classifying whether a share is eligible for its indices: the Global Investable Market Indexes (GIMI). It applies five criteria: market capitalisation, free float, liquidity, accessibility to foreign investors and index coverage. The methodology is reviewed every three months, beginning in January.
This methodology is the epistemological framework MSCI uses to construct global stock indices. Our critique begins with three questions. First, does MSCI’s measure of free float really capture what it is intended to measure: shares effectively available to investors?
Second, how is the complexity of company ownership simplified into a free-float figure, free-float-adjusted market capitalisation and index weighting? Third, to what extent do index decisions follow mechanically from rules and methodological tools, and to what extent do they depend on data classification, interpretation or provider discretion?
The changes in MSCI’s decisions on the inclusion and removal of Indonesian conglomerate shares raise a serious problem: a stock may meet an index’s formal criteria, while its level of investability may not be adequately represented by the indicators used to assess its eligibility.
MSCI initially included a share because it passed the formal mathematical rules of its methodology—what may be described as a nomological-deductive test within a nomological network. But when market anomalies showed that the proxy could not measure actual liquidity, MSCI was forced to change its decision.
This case raises questions about whether MSCI’s operational measures reliably capture the market as it really is. We therefore need to test whether its methodology produces a valid representation of investability. The question becomes methodological: were the measures underlying the initial decision valid enough in the first place?
The reported free-float percentage is an operational indicator. It needs to be tested to establish whether it supports conclusions about investability. If concentrated ownership and limited share supply are not captured by the measurement, the problem may involve what Cronbach and Meehl called construct validity.
This matters when assessing whether free-float and foreign inclusion factor (FIF) measures adequately represent effective investability. The validity of free float as a proxy for effective investability must be tested against evidence beyond mere compliance with administrative thresholds.
From the perspective of Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism (1975), this issue also highlights the need to distinguish observed data from the structures and mechanisms that produce market conditions. Administrative data on ownership, trading volume and prices are empirical representations, but may not be sufficient to identify the underlying control relationships, ownership concentration and price-formation mechanisms.
An evaluation of MSCI’s methodology must therefore go beyond checking compliance with quantitative thresholds and examine whether the indicators capture the structural mechanisms relevant to investability. Administrative data represent market reality; they are not reality itself. Ownership structures, affiliated relationships and trading mechanisms can produce conditions that are not fully visible in formal figures.
The methodological critique of index providers such as MSCI does not end there. In her work ‘Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index” Investing’, Adriana Z. Robertson argues that index decisions are not simply automatic outputs of a formula or a set of methodological rules.
They also depend on how the provider designs rules, classifies data and applies its methodology. Robertson challenges the assumption that stock indices are neutral objects that emerge automatically from the market. Every index is the result of human and institutional decisions: what is measured, how rules are designed, how data are classified and when a rule requires interpretation.
The MSCI classification anomaly involving Indonesian conglomerate shares therefore raises a question akin to Max Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental rationality: can a methodology that is technically correct also represent the reality of capital markets adequately?
From this perspective, the issue is not merely whether MSCI miscalculated free float, market capitalisation or liquidity. The more fundamental question is how much complex economic reality is reduced to calculable indicators when those technical measures are used to determine investment eligibility.
This does not mean rejecting mathematical standards or measures. A methodology can be mathematically consistent and still have limitations in representing the economic phenomenon it is meant to measure.
Max Horkheimer’s contribution here is the insight that equality in formal indicators does not necessarily mean equality in substantive reality. Methodologies and indicators may claim to capture all relevant features of a market, yet in practice produce inconsistent decisions because they fail to test themselves against a market structure characterised by oligarchic and concentrated ownership.
MSCI does use indicators to construct indices for global investors. The problem is not the existence of indicators, but whether their underlying assumptions are treated as universally applicable without sufficient regard for differences in market structure.
The fact that a methodological tool can calculate and classify an object does not automatically prove that its classification adequately reflects reality. This critique becomes more pertinent when the information available is insufficient to identify share ownership precisely.
The problem is that MSCI’s technical measures have become an economic authority. An index constructed using a particular methodology can influence not only investors’ capital allocation, but also perceptions of a country’s economic conditions, while the methodology’s epistemic limitations cannot be openly tested.
This marks a shift from the power to measure to the power that arises when measurement is used to guide action. MSCI’s influence stems not simply from its ability to calculate market capitalisation or free float, but from the fact that investors, asset managers and financial institutions use those results in real decisions. When those decisions in turn affect prices, capital flows, market policy and a country’s economy, technical methodology takes on an economic dimension of power.
This leads to the question: does MSCI’s methodology merely measure market reality, or does it also reproduce a particular view of what constitutes a healthy market, an investable share and a country worthy of the confidence of global capital?
It is therefore reasonable to subject MSCI’s methodology to ideological critique, because ideology can operate through categories, standards and procedures that appear neutral but carry particular assumptions and social consequences. When such standards are widely used by investment funds, classification decisions can have economic consequences beyond the contractual relationship between index provider and index user.
This brings us to a crucial question: does MSCI’s private authority to set investability standards carry greater economic influence than its level of public accountability would warrant?
Another equally critical issue arises when the instrumental rationality reflected in index methodology fails to control or account for market realities. When conglomerate shares with nominal free float enter an index, their secondary-market behaviour can often be anomalous: extreme volatility, a lack of organic liquidity or susceptibility to manipulation.
What emerges is ‘panicked technocratism’: when these market anomalies become evident and are criticised by institutional global investors—the users of MSCI’s services—the instrumental system in use becomes dysfunctional. They are forced to intervene ma…
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/msci-atones-for-its-sins-an-epistemic-critique-of-its-methodology-1792707677)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20261023040527-14-778730/msci-menebus-dosa-kritik-epistemik-atas-metodologi-msci), translated from Indonesian