Moro Muslims in the Mideast eyes

By Riza Sihbudi

JAKARTA (JP): The Moro Muslims of the Philippines have once again been the focus of world attention after the Abu Sayyaf group embarked on a kidnapping spree, holding 21 Americans and Filipinos captive on a resort island. The issues of the Bangsamoro (Moro people) -- like any other minorities -- are closely associated with problems of identity.

Minority groups in particular will always seek to establish claims of identity and demonstrate and position itself with a similar level of expectation as that of other larger majorities. And Muslims in the southern Philippines think that their conflict with the local administration has been triggered by religio- cultural issues.

The word moro stems from mauri -- a word coined for the Spanish people who settled in Mauritania and converted to Islam when Caliph Ummayah colonized Spain (711-1492). This word formerly had a negative connotation as it symbolized vice, backwardness, fighting and even ridicule. But it has recently acclaimed international recognition, making the Moro Muslims in southern Philippines one of the most feared Muslim guerrilla movements.

In this regard, Peter G. Gowing, has written that: "Filipino Muslims were first called Moros by the Spaniards in the 16th century, after the Islamized North African Mauritanians (Moors) who, under Arab leadership, conquered and ruled Spain for eight centuries. In the popular imagination, "Moro" came to connote a people who were ignorant, treacherous, violent, polygamist as well as being slaves, pirates and so on."

Networks among Filipino Muslims and Middle Eastern countries have been established since the 1950's, when the latter funded Muslim youths in the Philippines to further their Islamic studies in the region. Likewise, some countries in the Middle East have also sent missions to the Philippines. Since the mid-1970s, some Filipinos (not only Muslims) have tried their luck to seek work in various sectors such as construction and health services in oil rich Arab countries.

With this in mind, therefore, the Manila administration -- particularly under Corazon Aquinno (1986-1992) and Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) -- was rather cautious in dealing with the Moro fighters, as the issue was linked with the fate of some 650,000 Filipinos working in Arab countries who were contributing at least US$4 billion to their state coffers.

Moro movements, particularly those in alliance with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), have dragged member countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) even deeper into their struggles. With oil as their weapon, the OIC successfully forced the late president Ferdinand Marcos to the negotiating table in 1972 and a year later the OIC set up a commission comprising four countries -- Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Somalia. In 1974, they accorded MNLF the status of observer in OIC.

Then the diplomatic efforts of the Moro leader, Nur Misuari, spawned the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, which stipulated that the MNLF agreed to end armed conflicts and pledged not to establish a separate country, and Mindanao would eventually achieve autonomy.

They also reached a deal on resolving issues raised by MNLF such as reorganizing armed insurgents in Mindanao district. Owing to sharp differences between Manila and Mindanao, some of the issues failed to be resolved, plunging them into another armed conflict.

Peace efforts intensively undertaken after Aquino was propelled to the helm brought positive results for her successor Fidel Ramos who made intensive attempts to work out peace talks in this area. Under the OIC umbrella in 1993, a six-nation commission, with Indonesia as chairman, churned out an interim peace agreement.

It was only in 1972 that the OIC seriously addressed themselves to the fate of the Muslim minority in the Philippines, a year later the OIC set up a Quadripartite Ministerial Commission composed of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Senegal. Indonesia and Bangladesh were later included.

In the same year, in a bid to raise direct funding for the Filipino Muslims, the OIC established an organization called the Filipino Muslims Welfare and Relief under the auspices of and supervised by the Islamic Solidarity Fund, a Jeddah-based OIC organ.

The issues of the Filipino Muslims were among the topics on the agenda in the fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held on June 21-24, 1974, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and attended by delegates from 38 countries.

Upon hearing a report from a six-member OIC mission dispatched to see the conditions of the Muslim community there, the conference rapped Manila's policy against Bangsamoro.

The fact-finding commission then proposed a five-point recommendation to the Islamic Conference that a direct negotiation between the Filipino President and MNLF be held. After hammering out the report on the situation in the southern Philippines, the OIC then agreed on a resolution urging the Filipino government to seek a peaceful political solution.

The conference also appealed to its members to give assistance to Filipino Muslims. The sixth ICFM held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on July 12-15, 1975 resulted, among other things, in a ministerial committee tasked to work out an agreement between the MNLF and the Filipino government.

Since then, Muslim issues in the Southern Philippines have always drawn the attention of the OIC. The Moro Muslims, despite their failure to set up a separate country, succeeded in obtaining an autonomous district in Mindanao. They have therefore won the hearts of OIC member countries.

As an organization, however, the OIC have only given their serious attention to the struggles of the Moro Muslim fighters under Nur Misuari in the southern Philippines.

Indonesia and Malaysia, being countries of highly heterogeneous populations under the constant threat of disintegration, have strongly recommended all parties to be cautious in dealing with separatist-colored movements.

It is therefore understandable if the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia have shown little interest in defending the struggles of minority groups in other countries.

Any support to such causes, including the case of the Moro, would be confined to a framework that would not undermine the integrity of their own country. Solidarity shown to governments of other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations could play a significant role in the decision-making process in their respective governments.

The writer chairs the Indonesian Society for Middle Eastern Studies in Jakarta.