Moro Muslims in the Mideast eyes

Moro Muslims in the Mideast eyes

By Riza Sihbudi

JAKARTA (JP): The Moro Muslims of the Philippines have once
again been the focus of world attention after the Abu Sayyaf
group embarked on a kidnapping spree, holding 21 Americans and
Filipinos captive on a resort island. The issues of the
Bangsamoro (Moro people) -- like any other minorities -- are
closely associated with problems of identity.

Minority groups in particular will always seek to establish
claims of identity and demonstrate and position itself with a
similar level of expectation as that of other larger majorities.
And Muslims in the southern Philippines think that their conflict
with the local administration has been triggered by religio-
cultural issues.

The word moro stems from mauri -- a word coined for the
Spanish people who settled in Mauritania and converted to Islam
when Caliph Ummayah colonized Spain (711-1492). This word
formerly had a negative connotation as it symbolized vice,
backwardness, fighting and even ridicule. But it has recently
acclaimed international recognition, making the Moro Muslims in
southern Philippines one of the most feared Muslim guerrilla
movements.

In this regard, Peter G. Gowing, has written that: "Filipino
Muslims were first called Moros by the Spaniards in the 16th
century, after the Islamized North African Mauritanians (Moors)
who, under Arab leadership, conquered and ruled Spain for eight
centuries. In the popular imagination, "Moro" came to connote a
people who were ignorant, treacherous, violent, polygamist as
well as being slaves, pirates and so on."

Networks among Filipino Muslims and Middle Eastern countries
have been established since the 1950's, when the latter funded
Muslim youths in the Philippines to further their Islamic studies
in the region. Likewise, some countries in the Middle East have
also sent missions to the Philippines. Since the mid-1970s, some
Filipinos (not only Muslims) have tried their luck to seek work
in various sectors such as construction and health services in
oil rich Arab countries.

With this in mind, therefore, the Manila administration --
particularly under Corazon Aquinno (1986-1992) and Fidel Ramos
(1992-1998) -- was rather cautious in dealing with the Moro
fighters, as the issue was linked with the fate of some 650,000
Filipinos working in Arab countries who were contributing at
least US$4 billion to their state coffers.

Moro movements, particularly those in alliance with the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF), have dragged member countries
of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) even deeper into
their struggles. With oil as their weapon, the OIC successfully
forced the late president Ferdinand Marcos to the negotiating
table in 1972 and a year later the OIC set up a commission
comprising four countries -- Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and
Somalia. In 1974, they accorded MNLF the status of observer in
OIC.

Then the diplomatic efforts of the Moro leader, Nur Misuari,
spawned the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, which stipulated that the
MNLF agreed to end armed conflicts and pledged not to establish a
separate country, and Mindanao would eventually achieve autonomy.

They also reached a deal on resolving issues raised by MNLF
such as reorganizing armed insurgents in Mindanao district. Owing
to sharp differences between Manila and Mindanao, some of the
issues failed to be resolved, plunging them into another armed
conflict.

Peace efforts intensively undertaken after Aquino was
propelled to the helm brought positive results for her successor
Fidel Ramos who made intensive attempts to work out peace talks
in this area. Under the OIC umbrella in 1993, a six-nation
commission, with Indonesia as chairman, churned out an interim
peace agreement.

It was only in 1972 that the OIC seriously addressed
themselves to the fate of the Muslim minority in the Philippines,
a year later the OIC set up a Quadripartite Ministerial
Commission composed of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Senegal.
Indonesia and Bangladesh were later included.

In the same year, in a bid to raise direct funding for the
Filipino Muslims, the OIC established an organization called the
Filipino Muslims Welfare and Relief under the auspices of and
supervised by the Islamic Solidarity Fund, a Jeddah-based OIC
organ.

The issues of the Filipino Muslims were among the topics on
the agenda in the fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers
held on June 21-24, 1974, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and attended
by delegates from 38 countries.

Upon hearing a report from a six-member OIC mission dispatched
to see the conditions of the Muslim community there, the
conference rapped Manila's policy against Bangsamoro.

The fact-finding commission then proposed a five-point
recommendation to the Islamic Conference that a direct
negotiation between the Filipino President and MNLF be held.
After hammering out the report on the situation in the southern
Philippines, the OIC then agreed on a resolution urging the
Filipino government to seek a peaceful political solution.

The conference also appealed to its members to give assistance
to Filipino Muslims. The sixth ICFM held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
on July 12-15, 1975 resulted, among other things, in a
ministerial committee tasked to work out an agreement between the
MNLF and the Filipino government.

Since then, Muslim issues in the Southern Philippines have
always drawn the attention of the OIC. The Moro Muslims, despite
their failure to set up a separate country, succeeded in
obtaining an autonomous district in Mindanao. They have therefore
won the hearts of OIC member countries.

As an organization, however, the OIC have only given their
serious attention to the struggles of the Moro Muslim fighters
under Nur Misuari in the southern Philippines.

Indonesia and Malaysia, being countries of highly
heterogeneous populations under the constant threat of
disintegration, have strongly recommended all parties to be
cautious in dealing with separatist-colored movements.

It is therefore understandable if the governments of Indonesia
and Malaysia have shown little interest in defending the
struggles of minority groups in other countries.

Any support to such causes, including the case of the Moro,
would be confined to a framework that would not undermine the
integrity of their own country. Solidarity shown to governments
of other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
could play a significant role in the decision-making process in
their respective governments.

The writer chairs the Indonesian Society for Middle Eastern
Studies in Jakarta.