Modern Warfare and the Imperative of Smart Deterrence for Middle Powers Like Indonesia

The changing face of modern warfare, driven by drones, satellites, artificial intelligence, and precision strikes, has made war increasingly destructive yet politically more difficult to win, as analysed in a recent edition of The Economist. The Russia-Ukraine war exemplifies this, where Russia’s large conventional force has been bogged down in a protracted conflict, sapping resources and creating new political pressures, while Ukraine has demonstrated that a combination of cheap drones and Western tech support can hold a larger force at bay. This phenomenon shows that military victory no longer automatically translates into political success, and advanced technology often prolongs conflicts by enabling the weaker side to resist, turning wars into prolonged drains on the economy and political resilience of all involved. Despite this, major powers appear not to have learned restraint. Harvard professor Stephen Walt argues the United States remains ‘addicted to war’ due to its power structure, while Russia has adapted to a long-term war economy rather than learning to avoid conflict, and China is increasingly developing coercive grey-zone tactics around Taiwan. This creates a paradoxical situation where great powers understand the prohibitive costs of modern war, yet continue to compete in developing new military technologies out of fear of falling behind rivals. For a middle power like Indonesia, the lesson is clear: it requires a smart, defensive, and relatively inexpensive deterrence. Indonesia does not need to pursue offensive power projection capabilities. Instead, it should focus on making any potential aggression prohibitively costly through an adaptive, dispersed defence system, prioritising maritime denial and a sharp archipelagic ‘porcupine’ strategy rather than simply accumulating large, expensive platforms like tanks or fighter jets.