Misplaced alarm over missile system

Misplaced alarm over missile system

Bernard Loo, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

The reported Australian proposal to acquire from the United
States a missile defense system has generated some disquiet.

China, for instance, seems to see the system -- in which Japan
has also indicated an interest -- as part of a wider regional
effort to challenge its own ballistic missile forces. Indonesia
appears to think Australia might use the system against some
Asian countries.

Such misgivings are based on poor strategic logic.

What Australia has proposed is the acquisition of three
destroyers armed primarily with the SM3 missile. These destroyers
are designed to be part of the U.S. naval operational structure,
where destroyers form part of the protective screen for aircraft
carriers against enemy air and submarine attack.

The SM3 is a surface-to-air missile -- in other words, an
anti-aircraft missile system. Its long range apparently gives it
a potential anti-ballistic missile capability -- hence
Australia's interest.

This proposed acquisition fits into a longer-term Australian
plan of dominating what it calls the air-sea gap to its north.
Australian defense has been long based on the assumption that any
aggressive action would have to come from or through the north --
meaning Indonesia.

Given Australia's size and relatively small population, its
strategic planners believe they must prevent an invasion from
even occurring. The proposed anti-aircraft destroyers with their
surface-to-air missiles fit into this broader strategic need. It
is not an offensive military capacity, but rather a defensive
one.

The assumption underpinning Indonesia's objection is that
there is no such thing as a purely defensive weapon.

Presumably, possession of a potent anti-aircraft defense
system will allow Australian military forces to operate
offensively in Asia. However, Australia's defense force doesn't
have a capability to project its power aggressively in Asia.

Chinese reactions are equally misconceived. The proposed
missile defenses can challenge China only if China deploys
ballistic missiles against Australian targets. Since there is no
evidence China has any such intention, it is difficult to see how
China's concerns are justified.

The argument that missile defenses will instigate a regional
arms race is also flawed. Arms races tend to revolve around
offensive weapons -- armored vehicles, combat aircraft, warships.

But the SM3 is essentially a defensive weapon. How can an arms
race be triggered by this proposed acquisition? Will China seek
to acquire more ballistic missiles to overcome this Australian
anti-missile capability? But China has no intention of targeting
Australia.

Similarly, will Indonesia acquire combat aircraft and missile
systems that can prevail against the SM3? That would be necessary
only if Indonesia harbored aggressive feelings towards Australia,
which it patently does not.

So if China and Indonesia's objections to Australia's missile
defense system have no strategic basis, what prompted their
respective reactions?

One possible reason may have to do with the issue of arms
control.

Arms control is a mechanism through which otherwise hostile
states can begin to gain some degree of mutual trust. Its primary
objective is the development of mutual confidence, and
controlling the levels of armaments is merely the means to
achieve that aim.

However, states often use arms control as a whip to flay their
putative adversaries. That the Chinese and Indonesians chose to
use the arms control argument suggests they either have not
grasped the true meaning of arms control or are using it as a
whip to punish Australia for some perceived transgression.

Australia is not the only country in the region that has
expressed a desire to acquire an anti-missile capability. Japan
has displayed a similar interest, but only the Chinese have
reacted to the Japanese proposal.

That there has been no overt Indonesian reaction to the
Japanese proposal is instructive. If arms control is Jakarta's
main concern, it should object to Japan's proposal as much as it
has to Australia's.

This is not to say acquiring the SM3 system makes good
strategic sense. If the SM3 system proves to be technologically
viable, it may well be a good defense investment. But there are
too many questions about SM3 viability as an anti-missile system.

Given this uncertainty, any Australian acquisition of SM3
systems can potentially be a waste of scarce defense resources.
The debate ought to focus on the technological and operational
viability of the SM3, not China's and Indonesia's strategically
dubious protests against it.

The writer is an assistant professor in the Institute of
Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
He specializes in war and strategic studies.