Misplaced alarm over missile system

Bernard Loo, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

The reported Australian proposal to acquire from the United States a missile defense system has generated some disquiet.

China, for instance, seems to see the system -- in which Japan has also indicated an interest -- as part of a wider regional effort to challenge its own ballistic missile forces. Indonesia appears to think Australia might use the system against some Asian countries.

Such misgivings are based on poor strategic logic.

What Australia has proposed is the acquisition of three destroyers armed primarily with the SM3 missile. These destroyers are designed to be part of the U.S. naval operational structure, where destroyers form part of the protective screen for aircraft carriers against enemy air and submarine attack.

The SM3 is a surface-to-air missile -- in other words, an anti-aircraft missile system. Its long range apparently gives it a potential anti-ballistic missile capability -- hence Australia's interest.

This proposed acquisition fits into a longer-term Australian plan of dominating what it calls the air-sea gap to its north. Australian defense has been long based on the assumption that any aggressive action would have to come from or through the north -- meaning Indonesia.

Given Australia's size and relatively small population, its strategic planners believe they must prevent an invasion from even occurring. The proposed anti-aircraft destroyers with their surface-to-air missiles fit into this broader strategic need. It is not an offensive military capacity, but rather a defensive one.

The assumption underpinning Indonesia's objection is that there is no such thing as a purely defensive weapon.

Presumably, possession of a potent anti-aircraft defense system will allow Australian military forces to operate offensively in Asia. However, Australia's defense force doesn't have a capability to project its power aggressively in Asia.

Chinese reactions are equally misconceived. The proposed missile defenses can challenge China only if China deploys ballistic missiles against Australian targets. Since there is no evidence China has any such intention, it is difficult to see how China's concerns are justified.

The argument that missile defenses will instigate a regional arms race is also flawed. Arms races tend to revolve around offensive weapons -- armored vehicles, combat aircraft, warships.

But the SM3 is essentially a defensive weapon. How can an arms race be triggered by this proposed acquisition? Will China seek to acquire more ballistic missiles to overcome this Australian anti-missile capability? But China has no intention of targeting Australia.

Similarly, will Indonesia acquire combat aircraft and missile systems that can prevail against the SM3? That would be necessary only if Indonesia harbored aggressive feelings towards Australia, which it patently does not.

So if China and Indonesia's objections to Australia's missile defense system have no strategic basis, what prompted their respective reactions?

One possible reason may have to do with the issue of arms control.

Arms control is a mechanism through which otherwise hostile states can begin to gain some degree of mutual trust. Its primary objective is the development of mutual confidence, and controlling the levels of armaments is merely the means to achieve that aim.

However, states often use arms control as a whip to flay their putative adversaries. That the Chinese and Indonesians chose to use the arms control argument suggests they either have not grasped the true meaning of arms control or are using it as a whip to punish Australia for some perceived transgression.

Australia is not the only country in the region that has expressed a desire to acquire an anti-missile capability. Japan has displayed a similar interest, but only the Chinese have reacted to the Japanese proposal.

That there has been no overt Indonesian reaction to the Japanese proposal is instructive. If arms control is Jakarta's main concern, it should object to Japan's proposal as much as it has to Australia's.

This is not to say acquiring the SM3 system makes good strategic sense. If the SM3 system proves to be technologically viable, it may well be a good defense investment. But there are too many questions about SM3 viability as an anti-missile system.

Given this uncertainty, any Australian acquisition of SM3 systems can potentially be a waste of scarce defense resources. The debate ought to focus on the technological and operational viability of the SM3, not China's and Indonesia's strategically dubious protests against it.

The writer is an assistant professor in the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He specializes in war and strategic studies.